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Introduction - Taking a closer look at Non-state actors: Challenges Ahead 
Sophie Huber & Katrin Milzow 
 
 
The following papers are the result of a graduate conference held at Graduate Institute of 
International Studies in Geneva in March 2007. The conference was an initiative of the History 
of European Integration Research Society (HEIRS), an informal network of young researchers 
(Ph.D. and Post-doc) created in the fall of 2004. It was the network’s third annual conference, 
hosted  by  the  Department  of  International  History  and  Politics  of  the  Graduate  Institute  of 
International Studies in Geneva. 
Participants came from universities in eight European countries (Belgium, France, Great 
Britain,  Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  the  USA  and  Switzerland).  The  conference  also 
welcomed Profs. Anne Deighton and Antonio Varsori, both members of the European Liaison 
Committee of Historians, as well as Prof. Francis Cheneval from the University of Zurich and 
Prof.  Pierre  du  Bois
†  from  the  Graduate  Institute.  Dr.  Gilles  Grin  from  the  Jean  Monnet 
Foundation for Europe also joined the colloquium. To all participants, we are very grateful for 
their keen interest and insightful contributions. We are very sad that Prof. Pierre du Bois, who 
died  very  suddenly  during  the  summer,  will  not  be  able  to  witness  the  completion  of  this 
project. We are deeply grateful for the enthusiastic support he gave us at the time. 
We would also like express our gratitude to Professor Andre Liebich, who from the very 
inception of our project supported the conference and this publication. Without his enlightening 
advice and his steady support in administrative procedures this endeavour would not have been 
possible.  We  also  extend  our  thanks  to  Professors  Bruno  Arcidiacono  and  Gopalan 
Balachandran, Heads of the Department of International History and Politics, as well as to 
Professor Philippe Burrin, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. 
The  conference  was  organised  with  the  kind  support  of  the  Graduate  Institute  of 
International Studies, the Europaeum, the Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales 
(ASSH) and the Swiss National Science Foundation (FNSRS). We are very grateful to all these 
institutions. 
 
 
*  *  * 
 
 
This collection of papers aims to shed further light on the role of non-state actors within 
the European integration process. Current historiography on the process that led to the creation 
of the three European Communities widely acknowledges the role played by states, as well as 
by some of their major political leaders, diplomats, and civil servants (among them Monnet, 
Schuman, de Gasperi, Adenauer, and Bevin). Less attention has, however, been given to non-
state actors, to their visions of Europe, their stakes in the integration process, and the means at 
their disposal to voice their opinions and influence the process of European unification. Taking 
a  closer  look  at  these  non-state  actors  entails  both  opportunities  and  challenges, 
historiographical as well as methodological. 
 
Historians’ training has tended to push them to focus their search for primary sources on 
documents found in national archives as the most reliable and relevant basis for their work. This 
might explain why the historiography of European integration takes its roots only in the late 
1970s with the opening of the US archives, followed in the early 1980s with the opening of 
European archives, with works such as Pierre Gerbet’s textbook La construction de l’Europe HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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first published in 1983.
1 The first generations of researchers focused on the very early years of 
European integration, more specifically on the role of the nation states, where the archives 
originated
2. Even first attempts at studying European institutions, such as the work conducted 
by members of the European Liaison Committee of Historians from 1982
3, focused primarily on 
the strategies and policies of nation states within those institutions. This pioneer work enabled 
researchers to fine-tune their understanding of the role of nation states in the overall process of 
European integration.  
The concentration on archival sources has led many historians to follow the calendar of the 
opening of collections. On the one hand, this has led to a constant renewal of research topics as 
new archival material was made available. But on the other hand it led scholars to explore only 
a narrow time-span of the EU’s history, in order to consider always new materials
4 unveiling 
states’  perspectives  on  European  integration.  Only  in  the  1990s  did  historians  of  European 
integration begin to reflect on their own work. In search of new avenues of analysis
5, they began 
to consider a wider time-span and a broader range of actors. Historical accounts of European 
institutions began with Raymond Poidevin’s history of the High Authority, published in 1993
6. 
It is, however, interesting to note that the Liaison Committee’s major project on the history of 
the European Commission was launched only in the early 2000s
7. 
Also as of the mid-1990s, a greater openness to disciplines other than history encouraged 
scholars to focus on issues and policies which implied a closer look at their broader domestic, 
European  and  international  contexts.  A  closer  look  at  specific  European  policies,  such  as 
agricultural or social policy, can’t but take into account the role of non-state actors
8. In this 
context,  diplomatic,  and  even  economic  history,  was  no  longer  sufficient  to  shed  light  on 
developments of European politics.  
A newer generation of historians of European integration feels less compelled to tackle 
new events and time periods and is increasingly willing to shift their focus away from nation 
states.  Researchers  once  more  look  back  at  the  earlier  stages  of  European  integration  now 
focussing on actors such as trade unions and employer associations, lobbies, foreign investors, 
NGOs, pro-European movements, political parties, European civil servants and public opinion. 
In this respect, the volumes edited from the early 2000s by Elisabeth du Réau and Robert Frank, 
by Gérard Bossuat, or by Antonio Varsori offer an overview of current research
9.  
                                                 
1 Gerbet, Pierre 1983, La construction de l’Europe, Paris, Imprimerie nationale. 
2 Varsori, Antonio 2001, “La storiografia sull’ integratione europea” Europa-Europe, Vol.10, No 1, pp. 
69-93 
3 See http://www.restena.lu/lcd/cere/uk/groupe/glinfouk.html 
4 The Liaison Committee itself acknowledges this tendency. See Deighton, Anne & Alan Milward 1999, 
“Introduction” in Deighton, Anne & Alan Milward (eds) 1999, Widening, Deepening and Accelaration: 
The European Economic Community 1957-1963, Brussels, Bruylant, p. 11 
5 This tendency to strive for new approaches to the study European integration is clearly perceptible in the 
works  by  Bossuat,  Gérard  2003,  «Avant-propos »  in  Bossuat,  Gérard  (dir.)  2003,  Inventer  l’Europe, 
Histoire nouvelle des groupes d’influence et des acteurs de l’unité européenne, Brussels, P.IE. Peter 
Lang, p. 17 ; Deighton, Anne, op. cit., p. 11 ; Varsori, Antonio 2006, “Introduction”, in Varsori, Antonio 
(ed.) 2006, Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957 – 
1972, Brussels, Bruylant, p. 10 
6  Poidevin,  Raymond  &  Dirk  Spierenburg  1993,  Histoire  de  la  Haute  autorité  de  la  Communauté 
européeene du charbon et de l’acier: une experience supranationale, Brussels, Bruylant; see also Loth, 
Wilfried & William Wallace & Wolfgang Wessels, Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Bonn, 
Europa Union Verlag, 2006 
7 site web 
8 Varsori, Antonio 2004, “Introduction”, in Varsori, Antonio (ed.) 2004, Towards a history of vocational 
eduction and training (VET) in Europe in a comparative perspective, Luxembourg, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, p. 8 
9 Du Réau, Elisabeth & Frank Robert (dir.), Dynamiques européennes, Nouvel espace, Nouveaux acteurs 
1969-1981, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne; Bossuat, Gérard (dir.), op. cit., Varsori, Antonio (ed.) 
2006, Inside the European Community, op. cit. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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The present collection of papers aspires to build on this work, while also hoping to foster 
the dialogue between historians and scholars from other disciplines in the area of social science, 
especially political science, political sociology and law. The papers illustrate how focusing on 
non-state actors opens interesting lines of analysis to complement more traditional approaches 
to the history of European integration. 
For  one,  a  consideration  of  non-state  actors  reopens  the  debate  on  what  are  to  be 
considered appropriate primary sources on which to base a historical argument. The use of 
private  sources,  such  as  the  collections  of  trade  unions,  pro-European  movements  or  even 
individuals - many which are available at the European University Institute in Florence - allow 
researchers to consider a variety of documents such as unpublished memoirs, personal notes and 
annotations,  collections  of  selected  newspaper  extracts,  private  correspondence,  minutes  of 
meetings and personal notes on the basis of which the former were prepared, lists of members 
and participants, or even financial statements.  
Other  materials,  such  as  public  opinion  polls,  press  reviews,  speeches  and  interviews, 
statistics,  and  European  institutions’  official  documents  (Commission  papers,  Council 
conclusions, Parliament reports and resolutions) complement archival sources. They also enable 
analyses to explore time spans extending beyond the time periods opened up by the thirty year 
rule. 
It is interesting to note that in the early stages of European integration actors and witnesses 
of integration frequently overlapped. This raises the question of how to consider the work of 
contemporary historians, as secondary literature or as primary sources bearing witness to the 
spirit of the time
10.  
Besides, focussing on non-state actors allows for multiple perspectives on a single event, 
leading to more nuanced and less linear accounts of European integration. Early historians’ 
focus on national and institutional sources may have contributed to teleological biases in their 
work. When enlarging the pool of actors considered, voices opposing the European process 
cannot be ignored. Critical points of view add to the depth of narratives of European integration, 
revealing the complexity of the process and the political and ideological battles it entailed. Such 
‘thick’ descriptions underline the contingency characterising the European process at each step 
of its development. 
The consideration of non-state actors also points to the grey area dividing institutional 
approaches to European integration from intellectual history approaches. The question whether 
one should write a history of the European Union as a political and institutional process, or a 
history of the ideas informing the European integration process, can be partly overcome by 
focussing on non-state actors. Indeed, exploring the contributions of non-state actors at various 
steps  of  the  European  integration  process  may  unveil  ideological  debates  behind  policy 
progresses and setbacks. As a result, the analysis will include the study of ideas that may not 
have resulted in any specific institutional progress. Besides bridging the gap between the history 
of the idea of Europe and the institutional history of the process of European integration, the 
consideration  of  non-state  actors  again  underlines  the  contingency  of  the  development  of 
European integration. 
Lastly, the study of trade-unions, political parties, interest groups, or intellectuals among 
others, encourages the importation of conceptual tools such as identities, socialisation, networks 
or the public sphere from other disciplines, so that it allows for enriching cross-fertilisations
11. 
Building on other disciplines often improves the researcher’s grasp of complex legal, social and 
economic issues informing historical events. Social sciences also may enable the researchers to 
consider a greater body of material and to cover wider time spans. Encouraging historians to 
                                                 
10 Deighton, Anne, “Europe at Fifty”, Keynote Speech, HEIRS 3
rd Annual Colloquium, Geneva, March 
2007 
11 The very interest in non-state actors may also have arisen from pioneering research conducted in other 
disciplines, especially law and the social sciences.  HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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bridge the gap between snapshot studies and the wider context
12, this provides one example of 
the ways in which interdisplinarity may enrich historical analysis. 
 
If the inclusion of non-state actors into the analysis of the history of European integration 
implies a number of important advantages, each of these also entails difficulties and pitfalls. 
To start with, returning to sources, one may wonder whether documents coming from non-
state actors can be considered as appropriate, relevant, and reliable as the records compiled by 
national or European institutions. In particular, one should be aware that private collections may 
be  incomplete  due  to  a  lack  of  archival  experience  within  those  private  actors.  Thus  the 
researcher may be left wondering whether a document he has found is representative or what 
place it might have occupied in an original collection. Such drawbacks can be overcome by also 
looking into official records. 
The  question  of  the  reliability  of  primary  sources  is  all  the  more  acute  for  materials 
younger than thirty years, where official sources, against which to cross-reference a piece of 
information, are scarce. As a result studies of more recent events tend to adopt alternative 
research designs, which may be inspired by interdisciplinary approaches. 
Concerns about the cross-referencing of various collections produced by non-state actors 
often  lead  to  logistical  difficulties  related  to  multi-archival  research.  In  particular,  the 
multiplication of application procedures, mobility, financial resources, language proficiency, 
and time constraints are an issue. The study of non-state actors, however, often implies such 
multi-archival research; all the more so as domestic non-state actors have a tendency to compare 
themselves to their European counterparts and/or to create federations or other common entities 
at the European level.  
The frequently interdisciplinary nature of the study of non-state actors furthermore raises 
problems  of  theoretical  and  methodological  soundness.  The  combination  of  historical 
approaches  and  other  disciplines,  in  particular  political  science,  has  triggered  controversial 
debates within the community of historians of the European integration process. Many critiques 
of interdisciplinary approaches point out, that historians who draw on other disciplines in which 
they  are  not  primarily  schooled  are  more  prone  to  methodological  mistakes.  Here,  teams 
composed of scientists of different backgrounds and experiences may help move the historical 
discipline forward. 
 
 
*  *  * 
 
 
The following papers illustrate the ways in which the twin themes of non-state actors and 
interdisciplinarity combine to fruitfully inform the study of European integration. 
The paper by Paolo Orlando Ferrara traces ideas elaborated and launched by non-state 
actors which surround more specific institutional and legal controversies. In particular, Ferrara 
considers the Vatican Jesuit Journal La Civiltà Cattolica’s contribution to the immediate post-
war debate on European integration.  
A further series of papers by Hitoshi Suzuki, Philip Robert Bajon and Mariëlla Smids 
consider  the  more  active  participation  of  non-state  actors  at  various  stages  of  European 
construction. Suzuki looks into the strategies followed by labour unions to secure participation 
in the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community. Bajon sheds additional light on 
the Empty Chair Crisis by emphasising the role of agricultural interest groups and civil servants 
at the national and European level, as well as wider domestic pressures generated by electoral 
constrains  and  media  attention.  Smids  analyses  the  evolving  role  played  by  the  European 
Commission in the first rounds of enlargement negotiations conducted between 1961 and 1972. 
                                                 
12 Deighton, Anne, “Europe at Fifty”, Keynote Speech, HEIRS 3
rd Annual Colloquium, Geneva, March 
2007 HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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The last four papers focus on the increased acknowledgement of the role played by non-
actors,  more  specifically  voices  emerging  from  the  general  public.  Alexander  Rheinfeldt 
illustrates how the Commission very early on recognized the significant part youth might play 
in  promoting  and  legitimising  the  process  of  integration  and  in  securing  its  continuation. 
Cristina Blanco Sío-López presents an at times conflicting dialogue between the general public 
and the Commission, which can’t but take into account criticism expressed regarding the pace 
and shape of the EU’s eastern enlargement. Axel Marion wonders whether the public, led by 
intellectual  elites,  has  begun  to  match  or  even  supersede  the  role  played  by  national  and 
European  official  actors  in  gearing  the  process  of  European  integration.  Jan-Henrik  Meyer 
builds on Habermas’ concept of a European public sphere and the shape it would have to take to 
best support the European process. Through an analysis of key European newspapers’ coverage 
of the 1991 Maastricht summit, he wonders whether such a European public sphere may indeed 
be developing. 
 
Sophie A. Huber   
Graduate  Institute  of  International  Studies, 
HEI Geneva  
huberso0[at]hei.unige.ch   
 
Katrin Milzow 
Graduate  Institute  of  International  Studies, 
HEI Geneva 
milzow2[at]hei.unige.ch 
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The Italian Jesuit journal La Civiltà Cattolica and the transformation of Europe 
from post-WWII reconstruction to the creation of the Council of Europe (1945-
1949) 
Paolo Orlando Ferrara 
 
Introduction 
 
     The new international context that took place after World War II signaled a turning point in 
the evolution of international relations as it interrupted the millenary prevalence of European 
powers over the globe and shifted the axis of balance towards the USA and the USSR. Even 
those European states that had played a part in the war on the side of the Allied forces lost their 
appealing status as economic and political world leaders and suffered the consequences of the 
upcoming general mentality that was pushing for the acquisition of autonomy and the increase 
of liberties for their former colonies; therefore, France and the UK started a new phase of their 
history in which their capacity to influence world policy was not as relevant as it had been 
previously.  At  the  same  time,  Italy  tried  –although  unsuccessfully–  to  be  invited  to  the 
roundtable of the influential countries so as to recover from what the winners perceived as a too 
quick “stop-and-go” in its foreign policy when it suddenly moved from the Nazi-led Axis to the 
liberal-communist military Alliance. 
 
     Nonetheless, the main concern of the Italian people did not center on pretending to remain 
the heir of that political giant that it happened to be a few centuries earlier, in line with the 
national rhetoric of the inter-war period. In modern times, the country had to provide, inevitably 
with  the  help  of  foreign  powers,  for  its  economic  reconstruction  and  for  the  political 
stabilization  and  appeasement  of  a  people  who  were  manifestly  divided  due  to  strong 
ideological contrapositions. In addition, the stereotypical divide between North and South, or 
even the split of the country into three, which has become an object of common wisdom after 
Bagnasco’s studies of the highly heterogeneous parts of the territory,
1 dramatically undermined 
the rhetorical idea of a fully completed process of national unification. Material as well as 
cultural reasons for fragmentation contributed thus to separate regions and social classes. 
 
     In this context, a part of the country raised its voice to speak against the environment that 
was generated by the ashes of Fascism and the end of the war. Catholics indeed expressed their 
outspoken  disapproval  of any  form  of  social  desegregation that  could  be  imputed to  either 
geographical or class divides, cleavages that were mainly exalted by left-wing interpretations,
2 
in line with that ontology of the State and society that the theories of natural law celebrated. 
Therefore, because they were politically committed to halting all ideologies that denied validity 
to an inter-class social doctrine both domestically and internationally, Catholics also fought an 
intellectual battle to affirm that particular Weltanschauung that overcame the principle of the 
inevitable clash between separate social groups and countries depending on a conception of life 
defined  as  a  Darwinian  permanent  struggle  –ultimately  classifiable  as  an  exclusive 
interpretation of social relations, or the affirmation of a logic of exclusion– and affirmed an 
inclusive system of human interactions.  
                                                 
* I would like to thank Ms Diana De Vito for her kind support in proofreading this paper.  
1 Bagnasco A., 1977, Le tre Italie, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 50-66. The author has underlined how post-
WWII  represented  the  turning  point  in  the  history  of  the  country  in  relation  to  the  multi-level 
development analysis.     
2 Left-wing interpretations of the post-WWII Italian history are generally centered on the idea of the 
conflict between capitalistic and socialist models of production and social relations and the triumph of the 
former over the latter. As an example, see Luperini R., 1971, Gli intellettuali di sinistra e l’ideologia 
della ricostruzione nel dopoguerra, Edizioni di Ideologie, Roma, pp. 9-13.  HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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     For this reason, an eminent part in the Italian intellectual scenario was played by the Jesuit 
writers  of  La  Civiltà  Cattolica,  who  represented  a  traditional  instrument  for  defending  the 
Catholic  Church.  Created  in  1850  in  the  midst  of  the  Risorgimento  wars  that  opposed  the 
upcoming lay Italy to the theocratic country of the Holy See, this journal was guided by the goal 
of defending Catholicism and the Church’s institutions against its enemies by making use of the 
“power of the words.”  Ideologically speaking, socialism as well as liberalism thus became the 
alternative targets of this journal’s struggle. A century later, however, the situation had deeply 
changed: the Holy See had diplomatically recognized the Italian State after the Concordato 
signed on 11 February 1929, and liberalism had been tolerated –although not fully integrated 
into the doctrine– basically as a consequence of the harsh opposition to Marxist thought, both in 
the  forms  of  socialism  and  communism.  The  development  of  the  idea  of  Europe  that 
characterized the second half of the 1940s was therefore clearly conditioned by this scenario in 
which the Church aimed at denying the legitimacy of Eastern socialist governments. Yet, the 
pursuit of this primary goal did not imply an absolute conformation of Catholic political thought 
to  liberal  ideals  promoted  by  Washington,  as  this  paper  aims  to  show  by  presenting  three 
different moments in the history of Europe from post-war reconstruction to the creation of the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  and  the  Council  of  Europe  in  1949.  Mainly 
following the reasoning of the most eminent Jesuit writer appointed to discuss supranational 
political issues and international law, Antonio Messineo, the idea of Europe that was presented 
seemed to be much less subordinate to Washington’s projects than a part of the literature has 
suggested and more conformed to autonomous Catholic projects of cultural “spiritualization” of 
European democracies.    
 
An  intellectual  ancilla  ecclesiae  for  the  affirmation  of  the  Catholic  Weltanschauung:  the 
“conversion” to democracy of La Civiltà Cattolica in post-WWII  
 
     The Jesuit journal that most prestigiously defended the Church’s vision of the world after 
1945,  La  Civiltà  Cattolica,  was  constituted  of  a  “board  of  writers”  directed  by  Giacomo 
Martegani which, due to the firm reactions to the left-conciliatory positions that even clergy 
intellectuals  were  assuming  at  that  time,  was  often  accused  of  aiming  at  the  pursuit  of 
reactionary political projects that nostalgically looked backwards at theories based on affirming 
concepts of social order and political stability more than promoting a new democratic culture, in 
continuity with the conservative line of the previous decades.
3 Indeed, going back to the articles 
published in the early 1940s, the concept of democracy did not appear as an unquestioned 
principle. In the Italian case, the principle had been occasionally related with the risks that this 
new conception of the relations between rulers and the electoral body could generate. On one 
hand, the Jesuit authors warned against any possible deviation from the “natural norms” of 
behavior that the totalitarian experience had caused. On the other hand, though, they stressed the 
fact that many citizens who had never been taught to be actively involved in processes of civic 
participation, as was the case of the Italian people, for instance, could not be suddenly requested 
to express their preferences for the country’s management.  Consequently, there was a need for 
imposing  limits  to  a  superficial  and  insufficiently  elaborated  application  of  democratic 
processes  to  the  country.  At  that time,  when  Italy was  about to realize the transition from 
Monarchy to Republic,
4 the writers even advised their readers not to contribute to the possible 
destabilization that such a process could determine, if it was not pursued gradually.
5    
 
                                                 
3 Taradel, R. & Raggi, B. 2000, La segregazione amichevole. La Civiltà Cattolica e la questione ebraica, 
1850-1945, Editori Riuniti, Roma.  
4 For the centrality of the issue according to La Civiltà Cattolica, see Sale G., 2003, Dalla monarchia alla 
repubblica. Santa Sede, cattolici italiani e referendum (1943-1946), Jaca Book, Milano. 
5 Oddone A., 1944, ‘Il pensiero cattolico sulle forme di governo’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 377.   HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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     Against  this  background,  the  cultural  paradigm  followed  by  Catholics  had  nonetheless 
significantly changed and seemed to be dynamically adaptable to the new circumstances. If 
compared to the Church’s long history of skepticism towards democracy,
6 the speeches of Pope 
Pius  XII  when  the  winds  of  war  were  blowing  favorably  to  the  Allies  and  Italy’s  Fascist 
collapse was completing its descending parabola, literally gave the Vatican beneplacit to the 
incoming political leaders to fulfill the country with democratic contents.
7 In this sense, the new 
domestic system as well as the developing international order could become safer if they were 
built  over  liberal-democratic  models,  but  this  cultural  shift  did  not  correspond  to  a  full 
acceptance of the values that were proposed by that political system, as we have already seen.  It 
mostly depended on the recognition of the logic of the “lesser evil.” If the right-wing totalitarian 
regimes  had  terminated  their  historical  cycle,  and  the  only  available  options  were  now 
represented  either  by  the  circulation  of  liberal  ideals  or  by  the  spreading  of  revolutionary 
Marxist thought on a larger scale, then the former ideology had to be welcomed as the less 
dangerous  alternative  at  that  time.  In  other  words,  the  Church  followed  the  traditional 
distinction between thesis and hypothesis that was the key instrument to maintain doctrinal 
integrity and apply it depending on the historical contingencies that each epoch imposed on 
Catholics.
8    To  a  certain  extent,  the  “provisory  morals”  proposed  by  French  philosopher 
Descartes seemed to reappear in the words of the Jesuits.
9 
 
     According to different historiographic interpretations, two alternative understandings of the 
relations between Church and State and two rational explanations of the international relations 
in post-WWII are at stake. On one hand, Antonio Acerbi and Giuseppe Vedovato explained the 
policy of Pope Pius XII towards the USA and liberal thought as a global rethinking of Catholic 
political culture.  In this sense, Pius XII would pave the way for the transformations that his 
successors, John XXIII and Paul VI, introduced in the sixties and seventies. Accordingly, the 
Pontiff succeeded in completing a “synthesis between democracy and the common good”
10 and 
facilitated the Church’s distancing from the ambiguous giro di walzer (“flirting dance”) that 
marked its policy towards the authoritarian regimes in Italy, Germany and Austria. With the 
Christmas radio messages on democracy read in 1944, the Church definitely reconciled with 
that  particular  political  philosophy.
11  On  the  contrary,  Guido  Verucci  has  been  reluctant  to 
accept  the  idea  of  a  new  political  course  with  Pacelli
12  and  has  underlined  the  ideological 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of the Meeting held in Molveno and the encyclical Pascendi, see Scoppola P., 1961, 
Crisi modernista e rinnovamento cattolico in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 221-260. For the creation of 
the Christian Democratic movement by Romolo Murri and his political culture, see the anthology edited 
by Tedeschi L., 1966, I pionieri della D.C. (1896-1906), Il Saggiatore, Milano, pp. 399-494.     
7 Board of the writers, ‘Radiomessaggio natalizio di Pio XII ai popoli del mondo intero’, Civ. Cat., 1945, 
vol. I, pp. 3-14.  
8 This distinction was elaborated after the Syllabus in 1864 by La Civiltà Cattolica. For an overview, see 
Felice F., ‘The ethical foundation of the market economy. Reflection on Economic Personalism in the 
Thought of Luigi Sturzo’, [Online], available at http://mises.com/journals/scholar/felici.pdf, p. 13.  
    
9 Descartes explained the idea of a “provisory morals” through the analogy of the people that have to 
build up a new house, and start collecting refined materials and famous architects; nonetheless, they first 
need a temporary place to live in, while waiting for the “house of their dreams”. Similarly, the Jesuit 
writers supported in the long run a deep change of social structures in the direction of Catholic societies, 
but in the short run they had to feel safe in the contingent “temporary house”. For Descartes’ quotation, 
see Lepenies W., 1998, Ascesa e declino degli intellettuali, Laterza, Roma, Bari, p. 26.     
10 Acerbi A., 1985, Pio XII e l’ideologia dell’Occidente, in A. Riccardi (ed.), Pio XII, Laterza, Roma, 
Bari, pp. 149-178; Vedovato G., 2005, ‘La Chiesa, il totalitarismo, la democrazia tra storia e presente’, 
Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, vol. 4, pp. 642-643.  My translation.  
11 Board of the writers, ‘Radiomessaggio natalizio di Pio XII ai popoli del mondo intero’, cit. 
12 Verucci G., 1988, La Chiesa nella società contemporanea. Dal primo dopoguerra al Concilio Vaticano 
II, Laterza, Roma, Bari, pp. 201-203. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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support given by the Holy See to the authoritarian regimes, not only in the pre-war period, but 
also after its official statements in favor of the democratic institutions.  
 
     From the combination of the two opposing arguments, what can be stated is the new role 
exerted by the Catholic Church that finally adopted the concept of democracy and accepted the 
European  democratic  systems  in  a  historical  moment  in  which  ideological  sponsorships  of 
despotic regimes would have been simply anachronistic. Nevertheless, democracy could not be 
appreciated  per  se,  as  La  Civiltà  Cattolica,  with  the  contribution  of  scholars  like  Angelo 
Brucculeri, Andrea Oddone, and Antonio Messineo, or clearly stated even in relation to the 
intra-European system of relations that took place in the 1940s through the development of 
economic, military and political international organizations created from 1945 to 1949.  
           
The Jesuit celebration of Europe as a “third force” to balance the two super-powers 
 
     In such a context, the bipolar system that was about to emerge in virtue of the preeminence 
of two states that were basically built over laic rules, the constitutionally tolerant and pluralist 
USA and the materialistic USSR, could not be accepted by the journal’s group of Catholic 
radicals.  Strains  of  disapproval  for  the  new  international  system  ran  through  Antonio 
Messineo’s articles for the first two years after the end of war. The international system that the 
former allied countries were generating was blamed for its lack of recognition of any principle 
that the two super-powers had previously announced when the circumstances encouraged them 
to make use of that rhetoric.  Both countries thus received the moral condemnation of the Jesuit 
writer for the way in which they were conducting bilateral relations with other states in spite of 
the apparent willingness that they had showed to generate a multilateral system through the 
United Nations Organization.
13 Nonetheless, examination of the roles played individually by 
Washington and Moscow allowed readers to easily understand how the two super-powers were 
not considered equivalent by the Jesuits. 
     According to Messineo, a Russian-American pure voluntas to pursue their own particular 
objectives balanced by an idealistic pursuit of the general interest of the other nations was 
lacking totally. This led the USA, UK, and USSR to implement a clear strategy of maintenance 
of a hegemonic stance, that from time to time reached even imperialistic tones: 
 
It was a long time since everybody could understand how the official declarations of disinterested actions 
were just a camouflage that covered traditional and new forms of imperialism.
14 
 
     The principles that had been proclaimed on the Western side by US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt  and  British  Prime  Minister  Winston  Churchill  in  August,  1941,  subsequently 
included  into  the  Atlantic  Charter  on  1  January  1942,  had  been  completely  betrayed  and 
repudiated in a very few years, once the war had turned favorably to the same States that had 
proposed that act.
15  The application of those principles had totally failed, and so did the will of 
the  parties  to  bind  their  political  choices  with  that  declaration.  Against  their  self-defensive 
                                                 
13 La Civiltà Cattolica constantly described the UN as unsuccessful as its predecessor – the League of 
Nations– had been: Messineo A., 1945, ‘Il naufragio della Carta Atlantica’, Civ. Cat., vol.I, pp. 283-291; 
id., 1945, ‘Il piano di Dumbarton Oaks e la sicurezza internazionale’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 15-24; id., 
1947, ‘La seconda assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 97-105.   
14 Messineo A., 1945, ‘Il convegno dei Cinque’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, p. 72. My translation.  
15 Even more than the two super-powers that mainly drew the post-war system, the position of the UK 
was depicted by La Civiltà Cattolica as the most betraying policy towards the rest of Europe. This idea 
accompanied the journal for the whole Forties: Messineo A., 1948, ‘L’Europa alla svolta del suo destino’, 
Civ. Cat., vol. I, p. 227. For the Vatican diffidence towards the Allies’ attitude, see Formigoni G., 1996, 
‘La democrazia cristiana e l’alleanza occidentale (1943-1953)’, Il Mulino, Bologna, p. 88, note 21.  HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
14 
positions, the Jesuit writer mentioned two motives of validity of the declaration: first, the act 
had  been  signed  by  a  large  group  of  countries that  had  thus  shown their firm  intention  to 
develop national policies aimed at building an international community, and not only a system 
of  selfish  states.  Second,  and  even  more  important  in  terms  of  international  law,  concrete 
development had followed that declaration and had been incorporated into bilateral treaties, 
whose obligatory character could not be questioned.
16 The Anglo-Russian Treaty, signed on 26 
May 1942, and the American-Russian act, stipulated on 11 June 1944, reflected indeed the same 
“Atlantic spirit,” and were now expected to be put in practice. 
 
     In such a disappointing international context, the margins for European countries to affirm 
the recognition of their rights to prosper autonomously and freely in front of the super-powers 
were not particularly high. On one hand, the “Hobbesian Leviathan” found full application in 
the  behavior  of  Russian  authorities.    On  the  other,  the  homo  homini  lupus  principle  was 
supported by policies pursued by the two liberal war winners. The case of Italy’s post-war peace 
treaty was an exhaustive demonstration of promises and rights that had been denied.
17 As a 
result, the destiny of continental Europe could be represented by a sunset in which black clouds 
were appearing at the horizon. For La Civiltà Cattolica, the meaning of the East-West pressures 
on Europe in order to contribute to the complete liberation of the continent seemed to be now 
unveiled: 
 
If on the territories that are militarily occupied by the Anglo-American troops both true liberty and 
autonomy are nothing but dreams, under the pretense of carrying on simple monitoring operations 
apparently conduced in a soft and human way, but in reality with rigid and occasionally even harsh 
methods, the fate of the populations held under Russian control will be easily imaginable.
18 
 
The evil that was depressing Europe was traditionally a policy built on the use of force, instead 
of a truly democratic attitude. If the super-powers aspired at becoming truly democratic, in fact, 
they had to respect (and not only, when it was the case, tolerate) European Christian roots.
19  
 
     Put differently, the ultimate word in policy-making processes ought not to be given to the fait 
accompli, that is to say to the prevalence of the use of force instead of recurring to the power of 
law. In fact, even though a particular course of events had come into reality, the historical 
development of human relations did not constitute a justification or legitimacy for any event; on 
the contrary, the evolution of the European post-war reorganization needed to be sifted on the 
basis of its conformity to legality. Nonetheless, legality and politics did not always coincide, 
                                                 
16 Messineo A., 1945, ‘Il naufragio della Carta Atlantica’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 283-291. According to the 
writer, declarations ought to be considered always as forms of moral obligations by the signatory parties, 
in line with Catholic principles, and not only as vague preambles without any substance. 
17 The series of articles concerning the treatment that was reserved to Italy by all the super-powers, and its 
exemplarity for the destiny of the whole Europe, was astonishing: Messineo A., 1946, ‘La Conferenza di 
Parigi’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 369-378; id., 1946, ‘I trattati di pace. Diktat o contratto?’, Civ. Cat., vol. 
IV, pp. 401-410; id., 1947, ‘I trattati di pace nella dottrina giuridica contemporanea’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 
279-289; id., 1947, ‘Pace senza giustizia’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 353-358; id., 1947, ‘La validità dei trattati 
di pace’, Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 317-327; id., 1947, ‘La teoria contrattuale dei trattati e la loro validità’, 
Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 514-525; id., 1946, ‘La ratifica del Trattato di Pace con l’Italia’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, 
pp. 3-11; id., 1947, ‘Restituzione e riparazioni nella condizione di una pace giusta’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 
193-203; id., 1946, ‘Per una pace vera e duratura’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 486-495; id., 1947, ‘Sanzioni e 
sicurezza nella stipulazione di una pace giusta’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 3-14; id., 1946, ‘L’Italia e il mondo 
coloniale’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 385-395.    
18 Messineo A., 1945, ‘Le incognite della ricostruzione europea’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, p. 5. My translation. 
19 Brucculeri A., 1945, ‘Dalla guerra alla pace’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 269-277. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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according to Catholic doctrine.  As Messineo pointed out, policies could be regarded as legal if 
and only if they referred to the supremacy of Natural Law and to God’s will, as all Catholic 
intellectuals accurately knew following pontifical teachings
20 and the philosophical arguments 
of the theoretician Jacques Maritain.
21 Politics was not only a concern for the elites in charge of 
making  political  decisions,  either  in  its  domestic  or  in  its  international  dimension,  but  it 
concerned everybody (partly as the heritage of the recently revitalized culture of intellectuals’ 
engagement, partly as the product of Catholic commitment in social and political matters),
22 and 
the  Church,  in  particular,  had  the  duty  of  filtering  any  by-product  of  human  activities  by 
verifying its compliance to the doctrine. Since it was undeniable that Western traditions had 
evolved along Christan roots, the Church not only could, but had to watch out for European 
integrity.
 23 In the period immediately after the end of war, the Anglo-American liberals did not 
represent for Messineo and the other writers of the Collegio degli Scrittori the most appropriate 
answer to  the  crisis  of  civilization  that  modern  times  caused,  having  undermined  Christian 
traditions and values. Nonetheless, things were going to change quickly. The East-West divide 
happened to become harsher, the issue of “impeded dioceses” in the Eastern countries totalized 
the attention of Catholic journalists, and La Civiltà Cattolica introduced a new editorial line in 
the discussion of international politics issues. Between the two systems, the “Latin Europe” had 
to make a choice, and this could not be alternative to the support given to Western coalitions 
against communist regimes. At the time of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the 
Jesuit opinion-leaders expressed their unequivocal support to the idea of a joint Western reply to 
the threats coming from the other side of the “iron curtain.” 
 
The creation of the two blocs and the Journal’s acceptance of Cold War logic after the 
Truman Doctrine 
 
    Accordingly, the political analysis of La Civiltà Cattolica changed significantly in 1947 as 
the Catholic Church started to follow completely new orientations in international politics. The 
criticisms towards both the leading systems and the welcoming of a common European foreign 
policy based on the principles of neutrality and equidistance from the competing super-powers, 
a policy that the Jesuits wished to see established since 1945, shifted towards a firm support for 
American projects aimed to stop what was now regarded as the aggressive and offensive policy 
of the USSR. The overall construction of the “European castle,” in a certain sense, fitted with 
this  paradigm.  This  does  not  imply  that  the  Jesuits  were  ideally  satisfied  with  the  new 
organization  of  the  international  community;  nevertheless,  they  regarded  skeptically  any 
conciliatory proposal coming from Soviet authorities and rejected them as manifest proofs of 
the way in which Moscow pretended to bridge the blocs so as to generate the conviction that the 
contraposition  depended  on  the  policy  decided  by  the  other  side  of  the  “battlefield.”  The 
Church’s goal of keeping an equidistant approach thus was already abandoned since 1947. The 
contraposition  between  the  two  blocs  and  their  models  of  civilizations  became  from  this 
                                                 
20 Pius XII, 1949, ‘Discorso ai giuristi cattolici’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 413-417; id., ‘Discorso alla Sacra 
Rota’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 520-523. See also Messineo A., 1949, ‘Il diritto naturale nella dottrina di 
Francesco  Suarez’,  Civ.  Cat.,  vol.  I,  pp.  270-282;  Lener  S.,  1950,  ‘La  certezza  del  diritto,  il  diritto 
naturale e il magistero della Chiesa cattolica’, Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 400-414.  
21 Maritain J., 1981, ‘I diritti della persona umana’, in La conquista della libertà. Antologia del pensiero 
etico-politico, P. Viotto (ed.), La Scuola, Brescia, pp. 109-115.  
22 An Italian historian, Walter Crivellin, has underlined this attitude in the inter-war period by analyzing 
“the culture of engagement” of French Dominicans through the journals “La Vie Intellectuelle”, “La Vie 
Spirituelle”  e  “Sept”.  See  Crivellin  E.  W.,  1984,  ‘Cattolici  francesi  e  fascismo  italiano.  «La  Vie 
Intellectuelle» (1928-1939)’, Franco Angeli, Milano, p. 15.     
23 Lener S., 1948, ‘Il Bolscevismo e l’essenza cristiana degli ordinamenti occidentali’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, 
pp. 588-601.  HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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moment onward the main issue at stake. At that time, East Europe’s destiny was considered by 
Pope Pacelli and the Jesuit writers of the Journal as forcefully compromised; even if we accept 
the thesis according to which the Pope had tried until then not to over-stretch the divergences 
between  East  and  West  up  to  the  point  of  friction,  the  judgment  of  La  Civiltà  Cattolica 
concerning the status of the “Church of silence” two years after the end of war did not leave 
room  for  any  uncertainty  about  the  Church’s  total  condemnation  of  the  way  in  which 
communist authorities were conducting relations between Church and State. 
 
     Although for the rest of the year the Journal’s articles devoted to the analysis of international 
relations between the two super-powers were quite rare (one of the preferred themes still being 
the  unfair  treatment  reserved  by  the  war’s  victors  toward  Italy  and  Germany),  the  space 
accorded to the evolution of Europe’s policies in relation to the deterioration of the international 
crisis  within  the  notes  of  “Cronaca  Contemporanea”  conspicuously  increased.  The  Truman 
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in particular were given high rank among the topics presented to 
their readers. In addition, a stronger emphasis on the important presence of the USA as a shelter 
against Russian maneuvering recurred in the notes.  
 
     The internecine wars in Greece and Turkey,  Italy’s and France’s political uncertainties, all 
the minor and major areas of crisis (Germany before the others) made clear that some forms of 
protection and guarentigie (“guarantees”) had to be pursued. The only available option was then 
constituted by the US. The messages that Pope Pacelli and US President Truman exchanged 
reciprocally strengthened their cultural and political alliance.
24 Therefore, even the American 
inquiry of liberty before any other value, that had not fully received Catholic approval so far, 
reached the status of a highly desirable objective: 
 
Great Britain cannot continue to protect Greece after 31 March, and the United Nations Organization, due 
to the urgency of the situation, is unable to furnish aid as it would be necessary. Turkey too, even though 
characterized  by  a  different  situation,  has  to  be  helped  to  accelerate  its  way  to  the  country’s 
modernization and to secure its own  national sovereignty, the defense of  which is  necessary  for the 
maintenance of a stable order all over the Middle East. Among the main goals of the USA, the creation of 
domestic and international conditions for the implementation of free systems gets the priority.
25 
   
     The Truman Doctrine, proclaimed on 12 March, was now perceived in a totally different way 
compared to the criticisms that “American imperialism” had received a year earlier. In addition, 
when Marshall, on 5 June, pronounced his popular speech at Harvard sponsoring US financial 
aid to realize the project of European reconstruction by supporting continental integrity and the 
harmonic development of the whole region, the importance of international cooperation for 
European  recovery  was  generally  recognized  by  Messineo  and  the  other  writers.  Yet  some 
remarks could not be abandoned: financial and capital aid from liberal countries, starting from 
the  USA,  were  needed,  and  liberal  measures  had  to  be  gradually  introduced  in  Italy  and 
elsewhere. Still, liberalism and libertarianism had not to be regarded as the panacea nor had to 
be uncritically imitated.
26 Specifically in relation to the Marshall Plan –it was specified by the 
economist of the Journal, De Marco– American support for Europe had to be counterbalanced 
                                                 
24 Messineo A., 1947, ‘Per una pace vera e duratura’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 485-495. For the whole text, 
‘Scambio di messaggi tra S.S. Pio XII e S.E. Harry Truman’, 1947, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 481-485.    
25 ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, 1947, Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 94-95. My translation.  
26 Barbera M., 1945, ‘Liberalismo illiberale e democrazia non democratica’, Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 56-60; 
Oddone A., 1945, ‘Libertà moderne’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 73-82; id., 1945, ‘La Chiesa e la libertà 
civile’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 291-301; id., 1946, ‘La libertà politica nel pensiero cattolico’, Civ. Cat., 
vol. II, pp. 97-104; id., 1946, ‘La libertà morale di coscienza’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 14-21; id., 1946, 
‘Diversi aspetti del liberalismo in materia religiosa’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 153-161; Brucculeri A., 1945, 
‘Democrazia e morale’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 369-377; id., 1946, ‘La giusta società’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, 
pp. 37-41; Messineo A., 1951, ‘Democrazia e libertà religiosa’, Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 126-137.     HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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by European capacity to re-organize the national economic systems autonomously, limiting all 
conditionalities that the external donors could put on them:  
 
Though it is truly undeniable that the criteria established by the USA to distribute economic aids for 
reconstruction imply for the recipient governments such renounces to their liberty of action to highly 
increment US influence, which could be even labeled as interference, on their economic policies, at both 
the national and international levels. This could even  make people think that the elusion of Russian 
political and economic militarism undermines the full economic independence of European countries, as a 
consequence of the duties imposed on them by the American government.
27 
 
The optimal organization of the continent was thus represented by a cooperative system in 
which the states developed positive partnerships with the US, but at the same time they posed a 
barrier to the influence  exerted  by  Washington  on  their  domestic issues.
28  In  this  way, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that was created in order to 
plan the distribution of aid among the sixteen member countries and to negotiate the progressive 
liberalization of the markets had to put a limit to the American manifest economic superiority. 
This  thinking  would  then  remain  unchanged  until  the  creation  of  the  European  Economic 
Community, as Messineo would affirm during a conference eight years after the Marshall Plan 
launching: 
 
Between two large areas and a less efficient third one like the British Empire, only the creation of a new 
[European] area, economically and politically united, can be successful and influential in international 
politics.
29 
 
The necessity of developing military alliances at the regional level during the Cold War 
climax: from the Brussels Treaty to NATO 
        
      The contrasting sentiments that the Jesuit writers expressed in relation to the USA, whom 
they conceived as strategically necessary to contain the Russian menace but culturally not in 
line with Catholic social doctrine and therefore not imitable for their world conception, were 
analogously exhibited with respect to the conviction that Europe had to develop its own system 
of autonomous military alliances. On the one hand, in fact, the traditional promotion of a culture 
of peace and international cooperation was reflected through the speeches of the Pontiff and the 
articles of the Jesuits.
30 Nonetheless, on the other hand, the writers of La Civiltà Cattolica 
maintained a pragmatic attitude and accepted as an inevitable destiny the incoming creation of 
well integrated continental organizations aimed at preventing any potential offensive attempted 
by the Eastern neighbors. The stipulation of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 among five European 
countries that had jointly experienced the hardship of the war on the same front (Belgium, 
France,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom)  led  to  the  creation  of  the 
Western Union alliance; this organization, together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), whose signature followed one year later, received the “spiritual legitimacy” by the 
Jesuit intellectuals due to their function as pre-emptive measures to protect the Catholic Church 
at  the  time  in  which  its  millenary  certainty  of  an  “eternal  presence”  had  been  seriously 
undermined by Marxist wars on religion.
31 Even though these alliances did not give an answer 
                                                 
27 De Marco A., 1948, ‘Piano Marshall e orientamenti politici europei’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, p. 125. 
28 Messineo A., 1946, ‘I paradossi della politica internazionale’, Civ. Cat., vol. II, p. 5. 
29  Messineo  A.,  1957,  ‘Evoluzione  politico-sociale  dell’Europa  contemporanea’,  in  Le  basi  culturali 
dell’unità  europea,  Atti  del primo  incontro  internazionale  dell’Istituto  Internazionale  Studi  Superiori 
“Antonio Rosmini”, 10-20 settembre 1956, Athesia, Bolzano, p. 125.   
30 ‘Radiomessaggio natalizio di S. S. Pio XII sulla sicurezza e il perfezionamento della pace’, Civ. Cat., 
vol. I, pp. 113-124. See also note 7 of this paper.  
31  Lener  S.,  1949,  ‘Crisi  e  degenerazione  del  bolscevismo  russo’,  Civ.  Cat.,  vol.  III,  pp.  275-286; 
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to the Christian Churches anxiety for the increase of an anti- and a-religious spirit within the 
Western members, they were indeed helpful in deterring communist countries from extending 
their influence beyond the limits of the “iron curtain”.  
 
     Among the key factors that pushed the Jesuit writers to “consecrate” the Western Europe and 
trans-Atlantic  organizations  in  1948-1949,  the  deterioration  of  the  situation  of  the  Catholic 
Church  under  communist  rule  assumed  a  central  place.  The  case  of  Magyar  clergyman 
Mindszenty stood at the pinnacle of this conflict between spiritual and temporal powers. From 
the very first moment in which the Primate had been appointed on 8 September 1945,
32 he had 
appeared  as  a  clergyman  characterized  by  an  intransigent  tendency  to  oppose  not  only 
communism and Marxist ideologies, but also republican and democratic cultures. Shortly after 
the  Hungarian  Republic  was  proclaimed  on  1  February  1946,  the  Primate  exasperated  his 
critical tones against the government, in particular following the electoral triumph of a coalition 
led by the Communist Party in the summer 1947. From that moment onward, he thought that 
any form of conciliation with that government would not be considered as acceptable among the 
options of the Hungarian Church.
33 The idea that the church could become a bridge between 
East and West, an idea that was still present even among a minority of Catholics in the country, 
completely vanished. As a reaction, the national authorities engaged him as the symbol of the 
Church’s rejection of the principle of non- involvement in political issues; the escalation of this 
conflict between Church and State led finally to his condemnation and imprisonment on 27 
December 1948.
34 His imprisonment reverberated through the pages of every Catholic journal, 
and La Civiltà Cattolica devoted great importance to what it depicted as his “martyrdom.” 
Together with the situation of the Church in Hungary, all other national Churches in Eastern 
Europe were thus presented as “impeded” and persecuted.
35 
 
     Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church therefore took a clear stance in the highly debated 
issue of security on the international scale. As the Pontiff admitted during a speech he held in 
January 1949, only four years after the end of the previous devastating war, peace happened to 
be again undermined by international tensions. According to Pius XII, both super-powers were 
making a contribution toward the establishment of peaceful relations among the nations difficult 
                                                 
32 After the replacement of Cardinal Seredi with Mindszenty, who was then the bishop of Vesprem, a 
clear shift in the political culture of the Catholic Church towards the Hungarian State derived, becoming 
more antagonistic: Kent P. C., 2002, ‘The lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII’, McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, Montreal, pp. 208-209. 
33 ibid.   
34 For the Catholic narration of this case, see Boer N., 1950, ‘Il cardinale Mindszenty’, Garzanti, Milano. 
The persecution –that is the “formula” through which the Catholic press presented the legal case to its 
audience– is also described by ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 327-333; for the arrest, id., 
Civ.  Cat.,  vol.  I,  pp.  215-222;  for  the  process,  id.,  Civ.  Cat.,  vol.  I,  pp.  563-567.  For  the  overall 
persecution/religious policy towards the Catholic Church in Hungary in this period, ibid., pp. 585-600.     
35 For the period 1946-1953, see de Vries G., 1946, ‘La Chiesa Russa sotto il regime sovietico’, Civ. Cat., 
vol. II, pp. 173-185; Migliorati V., 1946, ‘La persecuzione religiosa in Jugoslavia’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 
318-324; Brucculeri A., 1948, ‘La libertà religiosa nell’Unione Sovietica’, Civ. Cat., vol. IV, pp. 633-
634; Lener S., 1949, ‘Lo scisma jugoslavo e il difficile assestamento del blocco orientale’, Civ. Cat., vol. 
II, pp. 297-313; Cavalli F., 1949, ‘Chiesa cattolica e governo comunista in Cecoslovacchia’, Civ. Cat., 
vol. III, pp. 239-254; id., 1950, ‘Caratteristiche della lotta contro la Chiesa in Cecoslovacchia’, Civ. Cat., 
vol. II, pp. 121-136; id., 1951, ‘Il dramma di un popolo: la bolscevizzazione dell’Ungheria’, Civ. Cat., 
vol.  I,  pp.  60-73;  Cavalli  F.,  1951,  ‘Sviluppi  della  tattica  comunista  contro  la  Chiesa  cattolica  in 
Cecoslovacchia’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 481-494; de Echalar P., 1951, ‘Il comunismo contro il cristianesimo 
in Cina’, Civ. Cat., vol. III, pp. 28-39; Cavalli F., 1953, ‘Persecuzione religiosa nella Repubblica Popolare 
Bulgara’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, pp. 138-152. In addition, see Cavalli F., 1950, ‘Governo comunista e Chiesa 
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to reach.
36 Yet, full responsibility for the troublesome developments of international relations 
were  attributed  by  the  Church  to the  USSR  through  the  voices  of  Messineo  and  the  other 
“microphones of God,”
37 who described the Soviets as those responsible for the annihilation of 
the  role  of  the  UN  by  rendering  the  exercise  of  its  competencies  impossible  to  pursue. 
Compared  to  the  balanced  attribution  of  responsibility  to  the  two  super-powers  that  had 
characterized the early post-war phase, the Catholic sponsoring of the West field was now 
manifest: 
  
Once the dream of creating an international system of collective security through the activities of the UN 
was over, as a consequence of Russia’s annihilation of any international body belonging to its galaxy, 
Western countries decided to organize themselves through a system of regional pacts; they seem finally 
able to face the situation, even though they cause the inevitable Russian resentment.
38 
 
     In  such  a  troubling  context,  Messineo  and  the  other  writers  of  the  Journal  pushed  the 
European nations to get involved in a search for unity, due to the fact that only if they accepted 
to function as a single actor they would have been able to counter the threat. On the contrary, 
though, there were governments that seemed to be unable to fully understand the challenges of 
their times, and continued to elaborate schemes of foreign policies that the Jesuit considered 
simply inapplicable to the new reality. Among these nations, La Civiltà Cattolica persistently 
blamed  the  United  Kingdom  for  its  policy  of  “splendid  isolation”  that  prevented  national 
politicians from fully integrating the country with the continental Europe. In the course of 1949, 
the British anachronistic philosophy of keeping its distance from its partners could be verified in 
relation to two different situations: first, when the five partners of the Western Union studied 
the possibility of fostering the evolution of that military alliance transforming it into a political 
organization that could pave the way to the creation of a European Union;
39 then, a few weeks 
later, during the preparatory works to the signature of the Atlantic Pact which was finalized on 4 
April 1949, when British diplomats showed reluctance to support the widespread enlargement 
of the organization: 
 
If the British government stopped to be mainly concerned with the project of letting the other countries 
see as a munificent concession any form of British involvement in international affairs, the Pact could be 
extended to include all the other nations which are threatened by communism. Four years after the end of 
the conflict it is indeed clear that when communism comes to power, there are neither UN Charters, nor 
Treaties of Peace or governmental protests that can exclude this threat.
40 
   
     By the end of the 1940s, the European frame that the Jesuit community had in mind took a 
well defined form: a compact economic ensemble, politically homogeneous and compatible 
with Catholic teachings, and able to provide security for its inhabitants through intra-continental 
and Atlantic collaboration. In addition, Messineo contemplated a last dimension to increase the 
level of homogeneity: European legal harmonization through the establishment of a regional 
organization that could be able to propose the elaboration of norms that set common standards 
                                                 
36 Pius XII, 1949, ‘Radiomessaggio natalizio di S.S. Pio XII sulla sicurezza e il perfezionamento della 
pace’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, p. 119.  
37 This is the label that an Italian scholar, Giancarlo Zizola, attributes to a well-known Jesuit who wrote 
on La Civiltà Cattolica in the post-WWII period, Riccardo Lombardi: Zizola G., 1990, ‘Il microfono di 
Dio. Pio XII, padre Lombardi e I cattolici italiani’, A. Mondadori, Milano. In particular, see the narration 
of Lombardi’s crusade against Marxist thought in post-WWII, pp. 59-61. See also Lombardi R., 1945, 
‘Una “mano tesa” minacciosa. A proposito del discorso di Togliatti’, Civ. Cat., vol. II, pp. 147-159.      
38 ‘Cronaca Contemporanea’, Civ. Cat., vol. I, p. 456. My translation.  
39 ibid.  
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to  every  member  country  and  fixed  therefore  a  minor  common  denominator  to  the  whole 
continent. An answer to this exigency was given in 1949, when the ten signatory parties gave 
birth to the Council of Europe, the institution aimed at fulfilling the convergence of the national 
legal cultures of the continent, with a particular focus on the safeguard of the human rights.
41   
 
Messineo and the pursuit of a common legal culture oriented to the defense of the human 
person: the creation of the Council of Europe 
 
     The  fourth  and  last  dimension  that  the  process  of  European  integration  was  called  for 
concerned the promotion of philosophical and juridical means aimed at fostering the respect of 
humanity independently from the situation in which it happened to exist. The “culture of the 
human  person”  became  a  Catholic  philosophical  and  theological  leitmotiv  that  had  been 
revitalized in the course of the 1930s and 1940s thanks to the fortune acquired by the essays of 
the French philosopher Jacques Maritain. His most renowned work, humanisme intégral, had 
launched the season of the révolution personnaliste that would have a strong impact in Italy and 
in the rest of Europe.
42 Messineo, likewise, was significantly interested in the teachings of the 
French scholar, even though he would reject his positions and hardly contrast his doctrine later 
in the 1950s, accusing the author of elaborating a philosophical system that misled believers 
from the true doctrine and opened the door to the spreading of naturalistic forms of thought.
43 
Yet in post-WWII times, a perfect entente was still prevailing between Messineo and Maritain, 
and both writers supported at the same pace the involvement of the international community in 
view of the recognition of those rights naturally belonging to the human person, in line with 
Thomistic thought. 
 
     On an international arena, the first serious attempts at catalyzing the attention of policy-
makers  to  this  issue  was  conceived  in  1948,  when  the  international  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights was delivered under the aegis of the UN.
44 Messineo underlined the importance of this 
act as the most articulated chart that listed the rights that all human persons were entitled to 
despite  any  pretense  of  the  States  to  emphasize  their  role  as  the  primary  sources  for  the 
existence of the same rights. In other words, the recognition of the existence of human rights as 
something  that  preceded  the  formalization  made  by  the  States  through  official  laws  and 
statements represented for the Jesuit an important step towards the true emancipation of the 
individuals, particularly after decades of hegemonic prevalence of public authorities over the 
citizens. Nevertheless, the deficiencies of the act far exceeded its virtues; most of all, the blame 
was put on the vagueness of both the preamble and the thirty articles it was composed of, 
vagueness that Messineo imputed to Russia’s willingness to erase the document’s value and 
render the words rhetorically vain: 
 
Beside the abstract forms that have been used and the evident incoherence that emerged from the whole 
debate, guided by the intention of satisfying the Russian friend (though it has not even approved the act), 
the UN Assembly would have reached much concrete results could it promote the respect of the famous 
four liberties applied to the Atlantic Chart, instead of recurring to very broad principles.
45 
                                                 
41 The States parties to the organizations were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. See Judt T., 2005, ‘Postwar. A History of Europe Since 
1945’, Penguin Books, London, p. 155.  
42 Maritain J., 1936, ‘Humanisme integral: problèmes temporels et spirituelle d’une nouvelle chrétienté’, 
Aubier, Paris, 1936. 
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     To summarize, three main factors impoverished the Declaration: first, the whole frame still 
reflected a liberal conception of human rights, instead of referring to Natural Law; second, 
rhetoric impregnated the general structure, so that the legislators’ main concern seemed to be 
represented by the search of accords on the empty words more than on their willingness to 
effectively produce concrete results for the individuals’ lives; third, as a consequence of the 
latter issue, States did not find consensus on attributing any applicable validity to this act, as it 
was conceived as a recommendation and not as a directive.
46 Therefore, Messineo concluded 
that the implementation of its principles through concrete acts on a regional scale became the 
only viable answer to fulfill this gap. 
 
     The Council of Europe was purposely interpreted with regard to this goal. Signed on 5 May 
1949,  the  act  through  which  the  Council  was  established  followed  an  intergovernmental 
approach and structured the organization into two main bodies: the Council of Ministers and the 
Consultative Assembly. The former organ, in charge of voting recommendations on a majority 
rule, was composed of national delegates chosen on the basis of national laws.
47 It did not 
concern questions relating to the national defense (that constituted still part of the prerogatives 
of  the  Western  Union)  nor  economic  integration  (belonging  to  the  competencies  of  the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), but strictly focused on legal issues. 
To a closer inspection, it reflected the Jesuit expectations of what an international organization 
had to do in relation to the human person in merit to four points: first, it fostered the idea that 
individuals could be entitled to being considered as subjects of international law, at the expense 
of the traditional conception of the States’ absolute preeminence over their citizens; second, it 
showed a strong attention to the problems of the national minorities that had been at the center 
of  Messineo’s  studies  since  the  early  1940s;
48  third,  it  undermined  the  principle  of  non-
intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  States;  finally,  it  grounded  the  idea  that  the  ius 
gentium could be affirmed, following the lessons of the ancient Jesuit scholars such as Vitoria 
and  Suarez.  In  November  1950,  when  the  “European  Convention  on  Human  Rights”  was 
signed, Messineo would receive thus the confirmation of the appreciable efforts invested in the 
process of European integration.
49    
 
Conclusions 
 
       Although  trying  to  synthesize  in  a  few  pages  a  multifaceted  phenomenon  such  as  the 
process of European integration is a difficult task, filtering it through the lens of a prestigious 
Jesuit journal with regard to the interpretation of an eminent scholar à la Messineo, at least three 
principles that grounded the continental attempts of building supranational institutions can still 
be  extrapolated  from  the articles and  notes  of contemporary  history  which appeared  in  the 
Journal. 
     First, a “Europe of the nations” went far beyond any simple idea of harmonization of the 
national policies of all European States. From this moment, a firm banishment of nationalistic 
policies became the prerogative of Catholic analysis concerning international politics, partially 
in  contrast  with  what  had  been  presented  in  the  previous  decades,  when  the  principle  of 
nationality had been highly taken into consideration.  In the post-war international arena, on the 
contrary, there was enough room to get rid of past ambiguities so that all Christian countries 
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were newly invited to spread the principle of solidarity beyond national boundaries. Yet, the 
nations could never be abandoned as means that incomparably marked peoples’ personalities:  
 
Respect and safeguard of nationalities have never constituted a problem for the Church, either on a 
theoretical or on a practical ground… [The Church] has recently condemned political nationalism, 
because it contradicts the law of solidarity and the precept of universal charity, but it never depreciated 
nationalities in themselves, as they have been regarded as a natural, human value, a precious element 
of the general order and harmony of the universe, whose last source lies in God.
50 
 
     In line with the combined principles of solidarity and nationalities’ safeguards, we can find 
in Messineo’s articles the antecedents of what would then become the key words of Europe as 
defined by the first Communities’ institutions: the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
that are still regarded as inalienable, seemed to be aligned to Messineo’s basic idea that, on one 
hand, States could not be so blind as to limit their policies on a restrictive range and were thus 
encouraged to pursue objectives that excluded forms of collaboration with their neighbors. Yet, 
on the other hand, Messineo anticipated the fear that the directional centers could be built far 
from those that were subject to their decisions, and called for gradual and balanced forms of 
policy transfers from the “peripheries” to the center.  
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Trade Unions’ first European Network under the ECSC: Decartelisation Policy 
and Trade Unions’ Response from a German Perspective 1950-1955 
Hitoshi Suzuki 
 
Introduction 
 
        Considerable amount of historiography of European integration has described the history 
of integration as a process of clashes and compromises of national interests.
1 Accordingly, since 
it mainly focused on national interests, most of the works focused on nation state government 
and the role it played in the history of European integration. While there is little doubt that 
integration started from and mainly served for national interests of its Member States, not much 
is known about the role played by  various groups which were also deeply involved in the 
process.  Some  works  have  been  done  on  the  role  played  by  management  groups  and 
industrialists,
2 who mainly cooperated with their national authorities, hence serving for national 
interests  as  well  as  their  own  business  interests.  Historiography  lacks  almost  completely, 
however, on their counterpart, the trade unions.
3 It is the aim of this article to look into the 
indispensable role the trade unions played in the first days of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the impact they had on the development of European integration.  
        Current works on trade unions have mainly focused on domestic issues of the unions, 
mainly those of wage bargaining and institutional structures of industrial relations. The very few 
works which took a brief look into international trade union organisations were descriptions and 
sketches of the secretariat of such organisations and its functions,
4 and did not analyse the role 
played by the trade unions in European integration. This article will describe how the trade 
unions  in  the  six  Member  States  defined  and  coordinated  their  common  interests  at  the 
European level and how they influenced the decision-making process of the ECSC. In order to 
avoid a fragmented collection of research of all six countries, the German trade unions and the 
international trade union organisations will be mainly looked into. The time period spans from 
                                                 
1 Wilfried Loth (ed.), Crises and Compromises: the European Project 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
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2  Andreas  Wilkens  (eds),  Le  Plan  Schuman  dans  l’Histoire:  Intérêts  nationaux  et  projet  européen, 
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syndicats ouest-allemands et  le Plan Schuman,” in Wilkens (eds), Le Plan Schuman dans l’Histoire, 
2004; Werner Link, “Building Coalitions: Non-governmental German-American Linkages” in, Charles S. 
Maier, Günter Bischof (eds), The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the 
Framework of the European Recovery Program, Berg Publishers, New York / Oxford, 1991; Michael 
Fichter, “HICOG and the Unions in West Germany,” in, Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Alex Frohn, Hermann-
Josef Rupieper (eds), American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955, German 
Historical Institute, Washington D.C., 1993. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
24 
April 1950 to May 1955, focusing on the negotiation process of the Schuman Plan and the first 
Presidency of the High Authority under Jean Monnet. Archival materials from Germany and the 
U.S., and those of Jean Monnet and the European Communities have been consulted.  
        It is the conclusion of this article that the trade unions, namely due to efforts made by the 
German unions, were successful in sending their people into the High Authority, and that this 
accomplishment  of  direct  participation  made  it  possible  for  the  unions  to  halt  Monnet’s 
decartelisation policy. Though the national governments and the industrialists also raised the 
same claims, it was only after trade unions’ persuasion that the High Authority changed its 
policy. The direct participation of trade unions in the High Authority and its accomplishment to 
halt decartelisation were both achieved by the European wide network of the trade unions, in 
which the German unions played a crucial role. The unions from the six Member States not only 
“lobbied” the High Authority as an outsider but also influenced its decision-making process as 
an insider, a story which explains the first case of trade union members becoming Eurocrats in 
Luxembourg. The term “network” in this article is used in the sense that the unions utilised 
several international trade union organisations simultaneously in order to influence the High 
Authority,  and  invented  liaison  officers  to  coordinate  the  simultaneous  use  of  their 
organisations.  
        How and why were the trade unions able to represent themselves in the Schuman Plan 
negotiations and the High Authority? The following three chapters will look into trade unions’ 
negotiation efforts in chronological order, hence showing the development of the trade union 
network.
5 The first chapter will focus on the Schuman Plan negotiations, in which the trade 
unions defined their common position to support the Schuman Plan. The European Regional 
Office (ERO) of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was mainly 
used in this period. The second chapter looks into the process of how the unions sent their 
representatives into the High Authority. This was achieved by persuading the Member States’ 
governments to include trade union members into the national delegations who were sent to the 
High Authority. In this phase, besides the ERO of the ICFTU, the newly launched Committee of 
21  was  also  utilised  in  order  to  define  and  coordinate  trade  union  common  interest  at  the 
European level. The third chapter will look into the negotiations between the High Authority 
and the trade unions in the debates about decartelisation policy. Negotiation by the unions was 
supported and sustained by both the trade union representatives sent into the High Authority and 
the Bureau de Liaison, which the unions established in Luxembourg. The Bureau was in charge 
of collecting information from the High Authority and coordinating the activities of the ERO 
and the Committee of 21. In this way the unions were able to unify their voices on the issue, 
even in cases in which their claims did not agree with their country’s national interests.  
 
 
 
1. The Schuman Plan negotiations 
 
        On 9 May 1950, the Schuman Plan was presented by Robert Schuman late in the afternoon 
at the Salon de l’Horloge of the Quai d’Orsay. The Schuman Plan proposed to place Franco-
German production of coal and steel under a common High Authority. The aim was to set up a 
common foundation for economic development. The task of the High Authority was to secure 
the  modernisation  of  production  and  to  improve  its  quality.  The  Plan  stated  that  such 
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accomplishments would contribute to the rising of living standards of workers and promote 
peaceful  achievements.  The  Authority  was  to  equalise  and  improve  the  living  condition  of 
workers, a goal which trade unionism had always aimed to achieve. The High Authority was to 
consist of “independent persons,” who would be autonomous from the national governments 
and  be  provided  equal  representation.  This  was  the  niche  where  the  trade  unions  found 
possibility to participate in the High Authority.  
Contrary to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German Trade Union 
Federation (DGB) decided to support the Schuman Plan, as they had supported the Marshall 
Plan. The reason was that the DGB supported the idea of free economy, and saw the Schuman 
Plan as a necessary solution to reconstruct the European economy. The leaders of the DGB were 
against  the  postponement  of  abolishing  Allied  regulations,  and  were  also  against  the 
International Ruhr Authority where the German delegates were not treated equally.
6 In their 
sense, if any decisions concerning the German heavy industry were made, which would directly 
affect the living standards of the German workers, the German unions must be present at such 
decision-making process. This idea of Mitbestimmung (co-determination) was the core of the 
German trade unions since the Weimar Republic.
7 If a new European organisation was launched 
by  the  Schuman  Plan,  trade  union  representatives were  to be  sent into its  decision-making 
process.  
The DGB sent their attaché to the Schuman Plan negotiations held in Paris. Hans vom 
Hoff, the Federal executive of the DGB, and Franz Grosse, a specialist working for the German 
coalminers’ union (IG Bergbau), participated in the negotiations.
8 It was mainly vom Hoff who 
reported the proceedings of the Paris negotiations to the Federal executive meetings of the 
DGB. The DGB collected information of the negotiations independently from the SPD. This 
helped the DGB articulate more realistic standpoints than the SPD. The Social Democratic trade 
unions in other European countries also joined the DGB in supporting the Schuman Plan, and 
the ICFTU declared its full support for the Schuman Plan at the Economic Committee of the 
United Nations on 12 June 1950.
9 
The DGB leaders were, however, not unified in their opinion of whether to continue 
their close commitment  to  the  Schuman  Plan  negotiations  or  not.  At the  Federal  executive 
meeting on 18 and 19 July 1950, fears were raised that the participation in the negotiations 
might lead to close cooperation with the cartels and industrialists.
10 Hans vom Hoff argued back 
that the unions should make every effort possible to participate in the negotiations in order to 
confront the industrialists and to control the political decisions concerning heavy industry.  
Hans  vom  Hoff  was,  however,  not  supporting  the  Schuman  Plan  full-heartedly. 
According to his remarks made during interviews in Paris on 26 and 27 September 1950, vom 
Hoff’s concern was that the future economic difficulties the Schuman Plan would face were not 
discussed thoroughly enough at the Paris negotiations.
11 While he supported the political idea of 
                                                 
6 HICOG Staff Conference of 4 April 1950, File 250/68/10/2, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference 
Meetings, Office Executive Secretary, Records of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner, Record 
Group 466, NARA. 
7  For  the  idea  of  Mitbestimmung  see,  (Hrsg.)  im  Auftrage  des  Allgemeinen  Deutschen 
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the Schuman Plan, vom Hoff was concerned with the rise of German coal prices after the ECSC 
started operation. The economic cost for Germany to join the Schuman Plan was too high. If 
inflation was caused by the ECSC, the living standards of German workers would drop. Hans 
Böckler, who was the first Chairman of the DGB and was most keen in supporting the Schuman 
Plan, stressed that the German unions must support European integration, whatever the costs 
were.
12 Vom Hoff carefully added to Böckler’s remark and stated that the German trade unions 
alone should not pay the costs of the new European institution. Vom Hoff’s obvious concern 
was price rise in Germany, and therefore was trying to solve the problem by direct participation, 
Mitbestimmung, in the Paris negotiations.  
Jean Monnet’s exact idea on interest group participation has not been well known. 
According to Hans vom Hoff’s report, Monnet was determined not to allow any interest group 
participation in the decision-making process of the new European institutions.
13 This did not 
merely mean the industrialists and business groups but also the trade unions. Hans vom Hoff 
discussed the issue with his European colleagues of the ICFTU in late September 1950. He and 
his colleagues agreed that they could not agree with Monnet’s idea of excluding trade unions 
from the decision-making process. They agreed that the unions must participate in the High 
Authority, and that they would make joint efforts to convince Monnet.
14  
In order to discuss the issue, an executive meeting of the ICFTU was held from 9 to 
11 November 1950.
15 The trade unions from the six European countries agreed upon four points 
concerning the Schuman Plan and the Paris negotiations. The first was that the unions should 
continue coordinating their efforts in order to include their members into the governmental 
delegations. The second was to send an ICFTU delegate into the new European institution. The 
third was that the Secretary Generals of the ICFTU would prepare the list of candidates to send 
to the High Authority. The fourth was that all representatives from the international trade union 
organisations should be elected, according to the number of membership of each union. This 
meant that the German unions would be represented most.  
 
In  December  1950,  the  Schuman  Plan  negotiations  were  entering  into  the  most 
difficult phase, because decartelisation of the German heavy industry became the central issue. 
The German trade union leaders were disappointed by the negotiations because Germany was 
forced to admit decartelisation. The coal cartels were seen by the German unions as a stabiliser, 
not only for the German coal market but for the German economy as a whole. The cartels were 
indispensable for securing the employment of the German coalminers. This view was stated at 
the Federal executive meeting of the DGB on 11 and 12 March 1951.
16 Contrary to the views of 
the unions, the American Allied High Commissioner John McCloy warned the German union 
leaders that the German coal cartels should be dismantled, because the French steel cartels were 
also scheduled to be decartelised. The German unions argued back that the French and German 
organisations were two different issues, because the German cartels functioned as a basis of 
economy. The German unions were trying to define the German coal sales organisation, not as a 
private cartel acting solely on its own interests, but as a public organisation with a character of 
stabilising the German economy.  
Facing a firm tone of opposing any form of decartelisation, McCloy discussed the 
issue with Jean Monnet. His conclusion did not change, nor that of Monnet’s. Monnet refused to 
                                                 
12 DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses. 
13 DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses. The date of Monnet’s 
statement is not stated in the document. 
14 Report by Hans vom Hoff to members of the Bundesausschuss of the DGB. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 
438, 26./27.9.1950, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses. 
15 Report of the ERO meeting of the ICFTU held in Brussels from 29 to 31 January 1951. The report was 
prepared by Gust de  Muynck, a Belgian trade union leader and the Under Secretary General of the 
ICFTU. DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 60, 29.-31.1.1951. 
16 DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 11./12.3.1951, Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
27 
include the admission of cartels into the Treaty articles, and merely admitted a transition period 
of  decartelisation. The  German  union  leaders saw this  method  as  meaningless,  because the 
German cartels would face decartelisation after the transition period ended. Hans vom Hoff, 
together with Walter Freitag and Heinrich Imig from the German coal and steel unions, met 
Adenauer and stressed that the unions were against the solution. Vom Hoff made it clear that 
whether  the  German  unions  supported  or  opposed  the  Schuman  Plan  would  depend  on 
decartelisation. Considering the social consequence of decartelisation, which was the sudden 
mass unemployment of the coalminers, decartelisation was not acceptable for the unions. This 
view was firmly backed up by August Schmidt, the Chairman of the IG Bergbau. He stated that 
the  IG  Bergbau  could  not  support  the  Schuman  Plan,  should  the  article  on  decartelisation 
remain  intact.
17  In  the  end,  the  Paris  negotiations  were  concluded  by  McCloy,  who  forced 
Adenauer to admit decartelisation. The articles of the Paris Treaty, however, eventually did not 
provide the High Authority with real power in this matter. Details of the policy were to be 
decided after the High Authority initiated its operation in Luxembourg, and therefore the unions 
had to continue their efforts to gain representation. The Paris Treaty was signed by the six 
countries on 18 April 1951.  
 
What was the view of the German trade unions on cartels? Heinz Potthoff, who was 
an economist working for the DGB and soon became one of the two German delegates to the 
High  Authority,  explained  his  view  in  his  book  published  in  1964.
18  Potthoff’s  book 
summarised a view widely shared among the German union leaders. Potthoff saw the cartels in 
terms of securing the current employment of the workers. He had a two-fold definition of what 
were harmful cartels and what were positive ones. What he considered to be harmful cartels 
were those typical in the inter-war period, which stopped the flow of goods and capitals with 
national barriers. Such protectionist methods would reduce trade and investment between the 
European countries, and would therefore keep the living standards of the workers low. On the 
other hand, what Potthoff considered as positive cartels were those which would promote the 
flow  of  goods  and  capitals  under  an  international  framework,  thus  boosting  trade  and 
investment among the European countries. The boosted economy would help improve the living 
standards of the workers. If cartels would increase trade and also sustain current employment, 
the trade unions would support it. While Potthoff preferred to maximise the flexibility of goods 
and capitals on one hand, he carefully excluded labour market flexibility on the other. The coal 
cartels were indispensable in order to secure the latter. If mass unemployment were to occur in 
one of the key energy sectors, the confusion would expand to all the other sectors.
19 It would 
end up in social unrest throughout the country and repeat the tragedy after 1929. 
 
 
 
2. The nomination of the High Authority members and the development of the trade union 
network 
 
        Shortly before the Paris Treaty was signed, the trade unions of the six European countries 
negotiated who they would nominate as their representatives in the High Authority and the 
Consultative Committee of the ECSC. Since the number of seats available was modest, each 
country insisted on their own members being represented. The negotiation among the unions 
reflected the clashes of national interests of the Paris negotiations.  
As  the  previous  chapter  showed, the first  meeting  of the unions  was  held  in  late 
September 1950. At this point, the issue was whether the unions would be able to participate in 
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the new European institution or not, and how to persuade Jean Monnet of the necessity of trade 
union representation. In early 1951, however, the debates were advanced and became a concrete 
issue of how Social Democratic unions should cooperate with the Christian unions in order to 
jointly  participate  in  the  new  European  institutions.
20  A  meeting  of  the  ERO  was  held  in 
Brussels from 29 to 31 January 1951.
21 The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions 
(IFCTU)  proposed  a  joint  conference  with  the  ICFTU.  The  IFCTU’s  aim  was  to  reach  an 
agreement with the ICFTU in order to send their members into the new European institutions. 
The opportunity of participation which the ICFTU  unions secured for themselves was now 
requested by the Christian unions to be shared with. After discussing the issue at the ERO 
meeting, the sub committee of the ICFTU agreed to accept the proposal of the IFCTU.  
Joint meetings between the ICFTU and the IFCTU were held on 28 December 1950 
and 4 January 1951.
22 During the meetings, both Internationals agreed upon their burden sharing 
in the new European institutions. It was decided that the ICFTU would send their members to 
the High Authority, and the IFCTU would send their member to the Court of Justice.
23 The 
ICFTU was to consult the IFCTU before they officially declared their candidates. In this way, 
the candidacy became a joint proposal of the ICFTU and the IFCTU. It was also decided that 
the 15 seats provided for the trade unions in the Consultative Committee would be divided 
between  the  two  Internationals.  The  ICFTU  would  send  11  members,  while  the  IFCTU  4 
members.  
While the ERO meeting was held in January 1951, a crucial agreement was reached at 
the Paris negotiations. It was decided that the ICFTU would propose a list of candidates of their 
members to be sent to the European institutions, and the governments of the six countries would 
name their national delegates from this list. In other words, the ICFTU unions had won the right 
to name their delegate to the High Authority. It was also reported that the functions of the 
Consultative  Committee  were  expanded.  The  High  Authority  would  not  be  able  to  make 
important decisions before consulting the Committee. It was highly crucial for the unions that 
this procedure was made obligatory. Whatever crucial information for the unions, be it the 
rationalisation of the heavy industry or the reallocation of large firms, which would immediately 
affect the employment of the workers, would be first reported to the Consultative Committee. 
Receiving such information would strengthen the bargaining power of the unions. It would have 
been the best solution for the unions if the Consultative Committee were armed with real power, 
though  the  guarantee  of  obtaining  crucial  information  from  the  Committee  was  a  positive 
enough achievement for the unions. Lobbying and negotiation could be carried out through 
other  methods  and  channels,  and,  needless  to  say,  the  solution  to  send  trade  union 
representatives directly to the High Authority was one of the most effective methods. The fact 
that the Consultative Committee lacked real power to influence the High Authority was not a 
serious problem for the unions. 
 
        After  struggles  of  negotiation  which  lasted  nearly  a  year,  the  Paris Treaty  was  finally 
signed by the six governments on 18 April 1951. Facing the ratification debates, the claims of 
the German trade unions were clear. At the Federal executive meeting on 7 May, Hans vom 
Hoff reported to his colleagues that the most crucial claims of the DGB, those concerning the 
German coal cartels and the functions of the Consultative Committee, were fully accepted.
24 He 
pointed out that the High Authority would not be able to make any crucial decisions without 
their pre-consultation to the Consultative Committee. Vom Hoff emphasised his efforts as the 
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DGB attaché, pointing out that the German industrialists and the Bund administrations evaluated 
the German unions as giving a decisive impact in shaping the Treaty, so that it agreed with 
German national interests.  
        Franz Grosse from the IG Bergbau added to the discussion and reported that the American 
Allied High Commission repeatedly emphasised the necessity of dismantling the German coal 
cartels. It was especially Robert Bowie, McCloy’s adviser in Germany and a specialist of anti-
cartel laws, who stressed this view. In his opinion, the German cartels held too much centralised 
power. The IG Bergbau protested against this opinion and called for help from the American 
coalminers’  union,  which  lobbied  the  State  Department.
25  Due  to  this  successful  lobbying, 
McCloy’s attitude eased somewhat. The High Commission stated that the abolishment of the 
German cartels would be suspended. McCloy, however, was not satisfied with the compromise 
he  made  with  the  German  unions,  and  bitterly  criticised  the  personal  attitudes  of  August 
Schmidt and Hans vom Hoff.
26  
While the majority of the DGB leaders were pro-Europe, there existed voices among 
the leaders who showed pessimism and hesitation against integration. Such views came from 
the fear that the Schuman Plan would cause unemployment and poverty in the Ruhr.
27 The 
unions would be blamed for their cooperation for the Schuman Plan. What was more, if the 
living standards were to drop, it would provide the possibility of the communists collecting 
support from the workers in the Ruhr. There were also differences in opinion among the pro-
European leaders. Franz Grosse proposed an international control of the Ruhr and called for a 
European-wide socialisation of the coal industry.
28 This meant that the coal industry of all six 
countries would be placed under the leadership of the High Authority, or more specifically, of 
Jean Monnet. There was a split among the pro-Europeans in respect of how the coal and steel 
industry should be organised under the new European institution. The majority of the DGB 
leaders preferred private ownership.  
Georg Reuter, one of the Federal executives of the DGB, spoke for the pro-Europeans 
and emphasised the efforts made by the union leaders which enabled trade union participation in 
the Paris negotiations.
29 He also pointed out Hans vom Hoff’s successful efforts to act as a 
liaison between the DGB  and the ICFTU’s sub-committee in charge of the Schuman Plan. 
Reuter reported that the sub-committee had discussed the issue of who to send to the High 
Authority as the trade union delegate from the ICFTU. The DGB intended to send Heinrich 
Deist and Franz Grosse from the DGB to the new European institution.  
After hours of discussion, it became clear that a joint will was shared among the 
German union leaders. There was no other solution than the Schuman Plan that would enable 
Germany to stay in the international free economy. If the German unions did not cooperate with 
the Schuman Plan, the Allied restrictions imposed on the German economy would remain, and 
this would hinder the reconstruction of Germany.
30 The pro-Europeans took command of the 
debate, and a resolution prepared by Hans vom Hoff was adopted.
31 The resolution stated that 
the  DGB  would  support  the  Schuman  Plan,  though  under  certain  conditions.  The  Allied 
regulations should be abolished before the ratification of the Paris Treaty. Accordingly, the new 
European institution should adjust the coal demand in a way which would fulfill the demand of 
the German economy. Furthermore, Allied regulations of steel production should be abolished, 
and German economic reconstruction must be guaranteed. Given that such conditions be taken 
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into account, the DGB would support the Schuman Plan. A sentence stating that the unions 
would  not  intervene  into  the  Bundestag’s  debates  was  deleted  from  the  resolution.  The 
resolution was adopted with only one vote against.  
The resolution pointed out four crucial points.
32 The first was to settle a reasonable 
regulation on the coal sales. The second was the abolishment of production regulations. The 
third  was to recover  the production  of the  German  heavy  industry. The  fourth  was  the re-
organisation of the German heavy industry. The German unions also stressed the significance of 
investment  for  the  German  coal  industry.  They  stated  that  their  demands  were  not  met 
sufficiently by the Schuman Plan, and that they should therefore influence the policy of the new 
Community.  
 
Adenauer’s intention to name one of the German delegates from the DGB was first 
reported  to  the  Federal  executive  meeting  of  the  DGB  on  7  May  1951,  shortly  before  the 
ratification  debates  started  in  the  Bundestag.
33  Theodor  Blank,  who  was  one  of  the  State 
Secretaries, informed Georg Reuter, who in turn reported this to the Federal executives of the 
DGB. The German union leaders decided who to recommend on 23 January 1952, twelve days 
after the ratification of the Paris Treaty. The DGB decided to recommend Heinrich Deist.
34  
The  first  German  delegate  to  the  High  Authority  was  named  by  the  Federal 
government at a cabinet meeting on 16 June 1952. This was before the DGB recommended 
Deist  to  Adenauer.  The  cabinet  members  agreed  to  name  Franz  Etzel.  He  was  the  cabinet 
attaché sent to the Schuman Plan negotiations, and was reporting the everyday progress of the 
negotiations to the cabinet. There were few objections among the cabinet members. Etzel had 
close ties with the industrialists in the Ruhr and mostly spoke for their interests.  
On  10  April,  the  German  industrialists  of  the  coal  industry  wrote  to  Adenauer 
personally  in  order  to  recommend  their  man  as  the  second  delegate.
35  The  letter  from  the 
Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung claimed that they were personally informed by Etzel of his 
appointment as the first German delegate, and that the second delegate was not yet chosen. The 
industrialists,  together  with  the  IG  Bergbau,  recommended  Franz  Grosse  from  the  IG 
Bergbau.
36 The letter claimed that the recommendation of Grosse was confirmed and welcomed 
by Etzel himself, stating that the collaboration of the two delegates would work well in the High 
Authority. The joint recommendation from the coal industry was sent to the cabinet, even before 
the  DGB  executives  officially  recommended  Deist  as  their  formal  candidate.  The 
recommendation was ignored by the government.  
Adenauer, facing the DGB’s recommendation of Heinrich Deist, reacted positively, 
though with some hesitation. The cabinet members disagreed with the DGB’s recommendation, 
claiming that Deist had had relations with the Nazi regime since 1937.
37 This was confirmed by 
Deist himself, who therefore renounced his candidacy.
38 The German union leaders, however, 
insisted on recommending Deist. Since they once took a vote to recommend Deist, they were 
not able to put down their request easily. On 16 July, however, the DGB leaders started to show 
a change in their attitude. While confirming their recommendation of Deist, the letter also stated 
at the end that Heinz Potthoff could be recommended as an alternative.
39 Potthoff was to be 
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named, however, only when other governments refused the nomination of Deist. Given a nice 
hint of what to do, this was precisely what Adenauer did.  
Adenauer held a personal conversation with Robert Schuman on the issue,
40 in which 
Schuman spoke against the nomination of Deist. Schuman more preferred the nomination of 
Heinz Potthoff as the second German delegate. By receiving precisely the right reaction from 
Schuman, Adenauer wrote to Fette that the DGB’s proposal was opposed by the French Foreign 
Minister,  and  that  he  could  not  insist  on  nominating  Deist  under  opposition  from  another 
country.  Adenauer  showed  his  “reluctance”  to  the  decision,  bitterly  complaining  that  the 
decision would not agree with German national interests, nor with Deist’s personal interests. 
Adenauer  used  Schuman  in  order  to  remove  Deist  from  the  list  and  to  nominate  Potthoff 
instead.
41  
The DGB still insisted on recommending Deist, and took a resolution once more in 
order to confirm their decision. The union leaders sharply criticised Adenauer’s attitude of using 
foreign actors as an excuse to reject the DGB’s recommendation. There was, however, not 
enough time left for the DGB. If the DGB failed in raising a candidate, be it Deist or Potthoff, 
the cabinet would not further consider trade union participation, and the unions would lose their 
chance of sending someone to the High Authority. Moreover, the union leaders were not against 
recommending  Potthoff.  Potthoff  already  had  experience  as  the  German  delegate  in  the 
International Ruhr Authority. He was to resign from his post and to participate in any possible 
position in the ECSC. The Federal executives reached a consensus on recommending Potthoff. 
Shortly after Franz Etzel was officially named in the Bundestag on 16 July, Potthoff was also 
named as the German delegate. Only two weeks after, the High Authority came to power in 
Luxembourg.  
 
Heinz Potthoff studied economics in Switzerland during the Second World War and 
was called “the planning department trade unionist.”
42  He was sent to the High Authority as a 
counterpart of Franz Etzel. Potthoff was a member of the working group of labour of the High 
Authority under the leadership of Paul Finet, a top leader of the Belgian unions and was the first 
Chairman of the ICFTU. While Finet kept a modest view on the expansion of ECSC’s social 
policy,
43 Potthoff was active in this respect. He made use of every chance to maximise the 
interests of the unions. He often appeared as the trade unions’ spokesman, though it must also 
be  noted  that  Potthoff  was  not  merely  a  spokesman  of  the  unions,  but  also  acted  as  the 
spokesman of the High Authority when he was back in the trade union camps. His role to 
explain the merits and the everyday activities of the High Authority was crucial for the unions. 
It was significant for the High Authority in order to convince the unions of the significance of 
their policies. Potthoff was working for both sides, hence being needed by both sides.  
        An early example of Heinz Potthoff’s task to convince the unions of the significance of the 
ECSC was the Federal conference of the DGB, held in Berlin from 13 to 17 October 1952. It 
was one of the most significant conferences where the Chairman of the DGB was changed from 
Christian Fette to Walter Freitag. Freitag was known as a nationalist leader, and his replacement 
                                                 
40 Letter from Adenauer to Fette, 25 July 1952. BA, B 136/1243, Bundeskanzleramt. 
41  The  SPD,  who  was  against  the  Schuman  Plan  and  kept  distance  from  the  DGB,  suspected  that 
Adenauer  chose  Potthoff.  Walter  Dörrich,  Klaus  Schönhoven,  Quellen  zur  Geschichte  der  deutschen 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung im 20. Jahrhundert, Bund 11: Josef Kaiser, Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund 
1949-1956, Bund-Verlag, Köln, 1996, Dokument 50, 30.7.1952, pp.360-362. 
42 On Potthoff’s person carrier and his role in the High Authority see, Spierenburg, Poidevin, The History 
of the High Authority, p.53. 
43 Finet called for trade union support for the ECSC from all Member States. In his speeches on 1 May 
1953 in Luxembourg and 8 October 1953 in the Hague, Finet emphasised that improving productivity by 
free competition and the creation of an economic area would contribute to stabilise employment and 
would raise the standard of living. He did not, however, call for support to expand the power of the High 
Authority in social policy. CEAB 2, No. 759. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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of Fette, who supported the Schuman Plan, meant that the DGB might retreat from supporting 
the ECSC.  
Among the invited guests from the international organisations and international trade 
union organisations, Potthoff was invited as the official representative of the High Authority. 
On 6 October, Potthoff consulted Jean Monnet about his attendance.
44 One week before the 
conference, he wrote to Monnet that his participation as a formal representative of the High 
Authority would give a good image of the Authority to the DGB member unions. Potthoff asked 
Monnet  whether  he  should  give  his  speech  in  the  name  of  the  High  Authority  or  merely 
personally. This proposal was approved by Monnet, and Potthoff gave his speech on behalf of 
the High Authority.  
        Potthoff gave his speech on the first day of the conference.
45 Following his blessings for 
the  Federal  conference,  Potthoff  explained  the  significance  of  participating  in  the  ECSC, 
explaining  in  particular  that  the  union  members  would  participate  in  the  Consultative 
Committee. Potthoff then pointed out the goals of the ECSC as the expansion of demand and the 
improvement of living standards. He stressed that such aims should be accomplished in order to 
counter the production of the United States and the East. Potthoff stressed the significance of 
investment for the coal and steel industry, while showing caution and hesitation against the 
High Authority’s initiative in coal policy. He pointed out that policies of competition, merger, 
price adjustment, tariff and transportation costs would require close watch by the unions. To 
sum up his points, Potthoff stated that he would make negotiation efforts in the High Authority 
based on the interest of the German unions, and that economic progress and welfare of human 
beings relied heavily on practicing Mitbestimmung in the High Authority. To end his speech, 
Potthoff gave his best wishes to the success of the Federal conference, in a way which would 
make the DGB feel a part of a unified Europe.  
Potthoff’s speech could be seen as a mixture between his task of being a trade union 
representative speaking for the interest of the unions on one hand, and his task of making the 
High Authority function smoothly on the other hand. Potthoff was acting for both sides. His 
speech was mainly based on the viewpoint of the High Authority, hence carefully explaining its 
merits  and  significance  to  the  unions.  His  speech  also  included,  however,  his  promise  to 
exercise Mitbestimmung at the High Authority as a trade union representative. 
 
        One example of Heinz Potthoff’s task in other Member States was to act as a liaison 
between the High Authority and the trade unions, which lacked information about the ECSC. 
Potthoff provided such information for the unions. The unions felt that they were kept out from 
the  ECSC  and  complained  bitterly.  A  critical  article  appeared  in  a  trade  union  journal  in 
Luxembourg, written by Antoine Krier, a leader of the Luxembourg unions.
46 Krier listed up the 
commissions and sub-commissions set up under the High Authority, hence pointing out that 
almost all personnel of the commissions excluded the unions, and that the unions were not 
consulted before the personnel was nominated.  
While he was right to point out that the trade unions were not represented enough, 
Krier’s article included a serious mistake. His article introduced the commission in charge of 
supply and demand, where Heinz Potthoff was the Chairman. Krier, however, did not introduce 
Potthoff as a trade union member. Potthoff had to correct the information and informed Krier of 
all the trade union representatives in the commissions. Potthoff also informed Monnet and sent 
Krier’s  article  to  him,  pointing  out  that  the  unions  were  disappointed  with  their  lack  of 
representation.
47 Potthoff’s task was to provide the unions with information in order to enable 
their activity at the European level. By doing so, Potthoff was also acting in the interest of the 
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46 Antoine Krier, “Die Hohe Behörder,” LAV (Letzeburger Arbechter-Verband), Arbecht, 25 October 
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High Authority in order to secure its everyday activity. His task was to gather information from 
the trade unions’ side, to correct the misunderstandings, and report it to Jean Monnet. This was 
crucial for the successful launch of the High Authority. It must also be noted that Antoine Krier 
soon became one of the key person of the European trade union network, because he became a 
core member of the Bureau de Liaison.  
 
 
 
3. Opposing the High Authority’s decartelisation policy of the Gemeinschaftsorganisation 
Ruhrkohle GmbH (GEORG) 
 
3.1. The Committee of 21 
 
        As the previous chapters showed, the trade unions of the ECSC Member States constructed 
a unified European front by using the ERO of the ICFTU. Issues such as the nomination of 
union members to the High Authority were discussed. Besides the ERO, the unions launched a 
European trade union organisation, the Committee of 21, which was specialised in coal and 
steel issues. The ERO covered all industry sectors and was not specialised enough in coal and 
steel industry.  
The first and almost only thorough review of the activities of the Committee of 21 
was done by Ernst Haas.
48 Haas characterised the decision-making process of the Committee as 
those similar to diplomatic negotiations where decisions were made by unanimity. Haas argued 
that a European wide consensus among the trade unions existed on the issue of harmonising 
working  standards,  while there  was  no  consensus  on  the  coal  cartel  issue.  This  conclusion 
requires  revision,  because  the  unions  did  build  a  consensus  on  the  coal  cartel  issue,  while 
merely stated vague and meaningless statements on harmonisation. Haas was right, however, 
when he concluded that the German unions obtained a veto in the Committee. The German 
unions  were  the  most  influential  among  all  the  member  unions,  thanks  to  their  financial 
contribution and their outstanding number of membership.
49  
 
 
3.2. The Bureau de Liaison 
 
The question of how the trade unions should share the burden between the ERO and 
the Committee of 21 was solved by yet another trade union organisation. The unions, apart from 
launching the Committee of 21, also set up a liaison organisation in order to coordinate trade 
union activity between the ERO and the Committee of 21. The organisation was called the 
Bureau  de  Liaison,  and  was  placed  in  Luxembourg  where  the  High  Authority  was  also 
operating. The Bureau was situated in Rue Dicks. The Bureau was in charge of collecting 
information  from  the  High  Authority  and  other  ECSC  institutions,  and  circulating  the 
information to the unions of the six Member States. The significant function of the Bureau was 
to adjust and set the agenda of international trade union conferences where European wide 
issues of coal and steel were discussed. The Bureau de Liaison was able to carry out its task, 
based on an agreement between the High Authority that it was obligatory for the latter to send 
every record, report or minutes to the Bureau.
50  
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3.3. Unifying trade union voices and putting pressure on the High Authority 
 
The High Authority first announced its intention to dismantle coal cartels in June 
1953. The High Authority first targeted the largest coal sales cartels in the Community, the 
Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle GmbH (GEORG) in the Ruhr. In order to counter this 
decision, the European trade unions discussed the issue at the Committee of 21 and its executive 
meeting. Paul Finet and Heinz Potthoff, members of the High Authority, were invited to such 
meetings  as  “private”  guests.  They  reported  the  recent  activities  and  debates  in  the  High 
Authority, and gave advices and personal opinions for the next step of action.  
In order to discuss current issues of the ECSC in further detail, the trade unions held 
an  international  conference  in  Luxembourg  from  16  to  18  March  1954.  The  agenda  and 
schedule of the meeting was settled by the Bureau de Liaison. At the conference, the unions 
agreed on launching research committees on ECSC related issues.
51 Those were committees on 
cartel, price, investment and free movement of labour. The committees were organised under 
the Committee of 21. The aim of launching the committees was to find trade union common 
interests at the European level. The German unions made use of such committees to present 
their views on cartels.  
 
The German trade unions relied on Potthoff in defining their strategies. He was not 
merely a trade union spokesman in the High Authority but was also a guide for the unions to 
define  their  opinions.  Potthoff  provided  detailed  information  for  the  unions  and  suggested 
possible options. At the Federal executive meeting of the DGB held on 8 July 1954, Potthoff 
pointed out the crucial arguments in the High Authority concerning the coal cartel policy.
52 
Those were three points. The first was whether free competition existed in the coal industry or 
not. The second was whether the production of coal required further flexibility. The third was 
whether the problem of marginal coalmines could be solved or not. All three points were closely 
related  to  the  question  of  employment  of  miners.  Potthoff  pointed  out that  these  questions 
depended on decisions made at the Consultative Committee, because the High Authority was to 
send its proposal to the Consultative Committee and ask for its opinion. This meant that the 
High Authority would not be able to make any decision against the will of the members of the 
Consultative Committee.  
The IG Bergbau immediately made use of Potthoff’s advice. The IG Bergbau issued a 
research report of the German coal cartels and submitted the report to the research committee of 
cartels  under  the  Committee  of  21.
53  They  aimed  to  make  their  claims  clear  in  opposing 
dismantlement of the coal cartels, hoping that their claim would be taken to the Consultative 
Committee by the Committee of 21. After reviewing the history of German coal cartels since 
1893,  the report explained  the functions and structures  of the  GEORG.  It  stressed  that the 
GEORG was not a cartel controlling the distribution of coal, but was merely controlling the 
demand for coal. The report raised the French cartels as a counterexample, claiming that the 
French cartels controlled both supply and demand, and therefore should be criticised as being 
the “real” cartels. The report explained the world wide structural change in energy markets, and 
stressed that the dismantlement of the GEORG must be followed by sufficient compensation. 
The report requested the High Authority to take cautious action in this matter.  
The claims of the IG Bergbau were clear. They started to admit the reform of the 
GEORG, though strongly requested that current employment of the miners must be secured. 
This was the precondition to admit any reform. The report repeatedly stressed the historical 
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development of the coal cartels and its functions of securing employment. It also stressed that 
the German trade union idea of Mitbestimmung should be respected in every reform process of 
the GEORG. The report was circulated by the Bureau de Liaison to the other member unions in 
Europe and the international organisations of trade unions.  
 
After receiving the IG Bergbau’s report, the trade unions of the six Member States 
held an international trade union conference. The conference was organised under the ERO and 
took place from 28 to 30 September 1954. The main issue was the coal cartel. The unions 
supported the view of the IG Bergbau and confirmed that unity among the unions was necessary 
at the European level.
54 The unions agreed that the cartel issue was the most significant one, and 
that  compensation  for  unemployment  was  strongly  required  for  any  kind  of  reform  of  the 
cartels. Compensation meant to launch an institution that would take over the functions of the 
cartels in order to maintain employment.  
The  executive  meeting  of  the  Committee  of  21  confirmed  the  conclusions  of  the 
international trade union conference. The executive meeting was held on 20 December 1954. 
Arthur Gially, a Belgian union leader, stressed to his colleagues that the unions should not insist 
on national interests, but should call for an international policy at the European level. Gially’s 
opinion was agreed by his colleagues, and the executive meeting adopted a resolution. It was 
decided that the Committee of 21 would propose a resolution to the Consultative Committee of 
the ECSC, where a resolution of coal cartels would be adopted. The resolution was to firmly 
reflect  the  claims  of  the  unions,  which  was  to  keep  the  cartels  intact  in  order  to  protect 
employment. The unions of the six Member States sought to receive international and official 
acknowledgement of their claims.  
The trade unions were successful in putting pressure on the High Authority. The High 
Authority  respected  the  opinions  raised  in  the  Consultative  Committee  and  postponed 
decartelisation. According to Potthoff’s report, the lobbying by the unions had been thoroughly 
successful,  and  the  dismantlement  of  cartels  would  never  take  place  without  trade  union 
approval.
55 The reason was, according to Potthoff, that the unions had sent their representatives 
to all institutions of the ECSC, not only to the High Authority but also to the Consultative 
Committee, the Common Assembly, the Council of Ministers and numerous Committees settled 
under the High Authority. Potthoff, being quite proud of such achievements, announced that the 
German trade union idea of Mitbestimmung had now received international recognition.
56 His 
aim was to achieve direct participation in the High Authority and to influence its decision-
making process based on the interests of the unions. Now he was able to proudly announce his 
achievements. The trade unions of the six countries, as their next step of trade unionism at the 
European level, expanded their activities of their European network in 1956 and supported the 
Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe, firmly supporting the idea of 
Euratom.
57  
         
 
 
Conclusion 
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DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 2332, 21.6.1954. The report was presented at the Federal executive meeting on 
8 July.  
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What were the implications that the trade unions were able to directly participate in 
European integration? The working group of the Committee of 21 summarised this point as 
follows: the purpose of trade unionism under the ECSC was to prepare and coordinate trade 
union activity under the framework of the ECSC, and to make this process into a permanent 
one.
58 It would be right to conclude that the unions did succeed in this aim in the case of coal 
cartels. The unions were successful in constructing a network at the European level, which 
enabled them to define and coordinate trade unions’ common interests. The Committee of 21 
and the ERO of the ICFTU functioned as organisations which hosted international trade union 
conferences. The liaison between the unions at the European level played an indispensable role 
in enabling the Committee of 21 and the ERO to function in this way. The Bureau de Liaison 
played an important role in coordinating the burden sharing between the Committee of 21 and 
the ERO. As a consequence, the trade unions successfully secured their interests of halting the 
decartelisation policy of the High Authority.  
Trade  unions’  direct  participation  in  the  High  Authority  had  an  impact  on  the 
Authority’s decision-making process. The High Authority was not able to carry out policies 
which  the  trade  unions  seriously  opposed.  Decartelisation  was  not  carried  out  under  Jean 
Monnet’s Presidency, which was contrary to the articles of the Paris Treaty. The industrialists 
and national governments also claimed the same, but were not able to change the decision of the 
High  Authority  alone.  It  was  only  after  trade  unions’  successful  “lobbying”  that  the  High 
Authority decided to postpone decartelisation. The unions saw the cartels as an institutional 
stabiliser for securing employment. The German union leaders had the intention to practice the 
German idea of Mitbestimmung in the ECSC institutions in order to counter the decartelisation 
policy, and made full use of their representation in the High Authority. Heinz Potthoff played a 
crucial role for the unions to influence the High Authority. On the other hand, Potthoff also 
contributed for the High Authority by warning the claims and complaints raised by the unions. 
This helped the successful launch of the new High Authority.  
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The Empty Chair Crisis 1965: European Crisis Management by State and Non-
State Actors 
Philip Robert BAJON 
 
 
 
This paper deals with the Common Market Crisis of 1965/66 and the French policy of the 
Empty Chair. Since the historical background and the technical aspects of the Empty Chair 
Crisis are well known, this article focuses on the outbreak of the crisis, the multilateral crisis 
management and the influence of non-state actors.
1 
 
 
 
The Empty Chair Crisis: Statesmen, Institutions, and “European Voices” 
 
Different  schools  of  interpretation  have  been  developed  in  explaining  the  Empty  Chair.  A 
minority of interpreters draws the extreme conclusion that French foreign policy in the Empty 
Chair was essentially determined by agricultural and commercial interests
2 or by de Gaulle’s 
desire to establish a strong foreign policy profile vis-à-vis Moscow
3. In this view, institutional 
aspects are of minor importance. However, a majority of observers are divided between those 
who emphasize the importance of economic, financial and domestic interests in the construction 
of  the  crisis  and  those  who  maintain  that  constitutional  questions  related  to  the  European 
institutions and the design of the European Union were of major relevance. Yet, there is no 
dispute among the observers about the fact that the Empty Chair Crisis was dominated by state 
and  supranational  actors.  The  crisis  was  the  work  of  national  and  supranational  statesmen, 
diplomats  and  bureaucrats.  Thus,  the  decisive  role  of  particular  personalities  cannot  be 
neglected,  although  the  outbreak  of  the  crisis  was  at  least  partly  due  to  “contextual 
developments” and broader trends in international politics.
4 
Because  most  standard  accounts  of  the  crisis  strongly  focus  on  the  state  actors’  role,  the 
following analysis examines the non-state actors’ influence on the outbreak of the crisis and on 
the  state  actors’  crisis  management.  Which  influence  did  the  European  movement  have  on 
Hallstein’s  proposal  package?  In  which  way  were  the  leading  diplomats  under  domestic 
pressure, created by lobbies and “European Voices” at their respective “Home Front”? To which 
degree did the dominating personalities and bureaucrats on the French side listen to state and 
non-state actors when the crisis escalated? The intention of this article is to highlight those 
aspects of the crisis, in which the Empty Chair was influenced by non-state actors. 
 
                                                 
1  For  a  general  account  of  the  Empty  Chair  Crisis  see  Newhouse,  John,  Collision  in  Brussels.  The 
Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965, New York, Norton, 1967; Loth, Wilfried (ed.), Crises and 
Compromises. The European Project 1963-1969 (Veröffentlichungen der Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe 
bei  der  Kommission  der  Europäischen  Gemeinschaften,  Volume  8),  Brussels/Baden-Baden, 
Bruylant/Nomos,  2001;  Palayret,  Jean-Marie/Wallace,  Helen/Winand,  Pascaline  (eds.),  Visions,  Votes 
and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On, Brussels, P.I.E.-
Peter Lang, 2006; Ludlow, Piers, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the 
Gaullist challenge (Cold War History, Volume 9), London, Routledge, 2006. 
2  Moravscik,  Andrew,  The  Choice  for  Europe.  Social  Purpose  &  State  Power  from  Messina  to 
Maastricht, New York, Cornell University Press, 1998, chapter 3, particularly p. 177. 
3 Many German officials at the time of the Empty Chair shared this view, see von der Groeben, Hans, 
Aufbaujahre  der  Europäischen  Gemeinschaft.  Das  Ringen  um  den  Gemeinsamen  Markt  und  die 
Politische Union (1958-1966), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1982, p. 277; this was confirmed by Klaus Meyer, 
Deputy Head of the Hallstein Cabinet, in an interview with the author on 12 January 2006 in Bonn. 
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European Parliament Power, “Federalist Voices”, and Walter Hallstein 
 
The European Commission’s proposal package, worked out by the cabinets of Commission 
President  Hallstein  and  of  Agricultural  Commissioner  Mansholt,  played  a  major  role  in 
triggering the Empty Chair Crisis. The delicate question of European Parliament authority was 
central  within  Hallstein’s  conception  of  European  integration,  and  it  was  in  this  delicate 
question that “European Voices” played an important role.  
The  Commission  proposal  package  reflected  Hallstein’s  personal  political  calculation 
concerning French politics: The French Presidential Elections, the approaching NATO-Crisis 
and the obvious irreversible integration of the French economy into the Common Market all 
suggested  that  the  CAP-negotiations  of  1965  would  be  the  appropriate  occasion  on  which 
pressure could be exerted on Paris to pay an institutional price. But the Commission President 
was also encouraged by his conviction that “democratic logic” demanded parliamentary control 
over  budgetary  resources.
5  Hallstein’s  proposals of March  1965  were therefore  designed  to 
justify institutional change: The handing over from 1967 onwards of agricultural levies and 
customs  duties  to  the  Community  (as  proposed  by  Hallstein)  would  produce  budgetary 
resources that were supposed to be controlled by the European Parliament. Therefore, if national 
parliaments  were  increasingly  deprived  of  their  budgetary  competences,  the  European 
Parliament’s role in the budgetary procedure needed to be strengthened. 
When  linking  the  CAP  to  the  European  Parliament-question,  Hallstein  was  encouraged  by 
numerous  “voices”  from  the  six  Common  Market-countries,  favouring  the  enlargement  of 
European Parliament authority. The European Parliament was not satisfied with its embryonic 
role in the Rome Treaty and, since 1960, tried to expand its prerogatives by demanding direct 
election of its members, legislative powers, and real participation in the budgetary procedure.
6 
Three important Strasburg reports between 1962 and 1964 requested greater influence on the 
Community’s budget, finally culminating in the “Martino Report” of early 1965.
7 The demand 
for a greater budgetary role of the Strasburg Assembly was particularly advanced during the 
discussion about the fusion of the executives and accepted by all member-countries but France. 
European lobby groups like the Jean Monnet Action Committee spread their propaganda for the 
democratisation of the Communities as well. For example, after the Action Committee had 
demanded the strengthening of the Strasburg Assembly on its May 1965 session in Berlin, the 
German government was under pressure by the socialist opposition, because members of the 
governing  parties  (CDU/FDP)  had  signed  the  Committee’s  petition  as  well.
8  Hallstein 
personally  appreciated  the  European  Parliament  as  “a  particularly  useful  forum  for  the 
formation and crystallization of the public opinion in European affairs”
9, as he explained to de 
Gaulle not long before the outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis. This suggests that he was also 
particularly sensitive to the public demand that “something should be done” for the European 
Parliament. 
                                                 
5 Hallstein before the European Parliament on 11 Mai 1965, in: Hallstein, Walter, Europäische Reden, 
Stuttgart, DVA, 1979, pp. 560-569. 
6 Groeben, Aufbaujahre, 1982, pp. 250-261. 
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Some  national  parliaments  played  a  decisive  role,  because  the  handing  over  of  agricultural 
levies and customs duties from a member-state to the Community required ratification, which 
offered them an opportunity to exert pressure on their governments. The Dutch, German and 
Italian parliaments were much in favour of greater competences for their European equivalent 
and referred to the public opinion in their countries to justify their demands.  
The European Parliament thus became central in the conception of Walter Hallstein. In 1964 
and  the  first  months  of  1965,  Hallstein  himself  talked  very  openly  to  the  French  Foreign 
Minister Couve de Murville, to General de Gaulle and to the French Permanent Representative 
Jean-Marc  Boegner,  about  the  necessity  of  French  concessions  concerning  the  European 
Parliament. Obviously, he gained the impression that de Gaulle was not categorically opposed, 
which provided essential momentum and encouragement for the Commission President to go 
ahead with his proposal package in the spring 1965. Hallstein claimed as well that from January 
1965 onwards he frequently warned the French Permanent Representative Boegner, who visited 
Hallstein regularly: “[…] think of those parliamentarian things […]”.
10 Hallstein apparently 
concluded that parliamentary pressure and public opinion had sufficiently altered the French 
government’s  opinion  and  that  the  enlargement  of  European  Parliament  authority  may 
eventually be included in the Commission proposal package.  
 
 
 
Negotiations under domestic pressure 
 
Not only statesmen were involved in the outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis. The strained 
political situation within the Common Market-countries in 1965 and the hardening of official 
negotiating positions in the Council deliberations of Mai and June 1965 were also due to the 
influence  of  lobbies,  media,  and  public  opinion.  Particularly  in  the  key-countries  France, 
Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  Italy,  domestic  pressure  left  the  governments  with  little 
manoeuvring space in the Brussels’ negotiations. The leading statesmen and diplomats acting on 
the Common Market-stage were thus obliged to secure national advantages out of the Common 
Market and to disregard the so-called “community spirit” if necessary. As a result, the CAP-
negotiations were complicated by a difficult constellation of partly conflicting national interests, 
particularly in the fields of economy and finance, but also regarding the European Parliament. 
Paris, of course, was under high pressure of its agrarian lobby to secure the financing of the 
Common Agricultural Policy after the crucial grain price decision of December 1964. The past 
French negotiating successes in the Common Agricultural Policy and the enormous benefits that 
Paris took out of the Agricultural Market only reinforced French concerns that the Common 
Agricultural  Policy  might  at  least  partly  be  revised  by  the  five  Common  Market-partners. 
French  diplomats  therefore  entered  the  negotiations  determined  to  receive  a  five  year 
agricultural  settlement  and  to  object  the  premature  creation  of  budgetary  resources,  which 
would serve as justification for institutional change.
11 
Bonn’s negotiating behaviour was influenced by domestic concerns as well, because General 
Elections were going to be held in September 1965. German statesmen and diplomats had the 
overall  impression  that  their  European  objectives  and  sacrifices  were  not  sufficiently 
appreciated by the French, a view that was supported not only by large parts of the media
12 but 
also by the agricultural lobby, Deutscher Bauernverband,
13 and by the Federation of German 
                                                 
10 Hallstein before German managers at Baden-Baden (Unternehmergespräch), 21 October 1965, in: 
Hallstein, Reden, 1979, pp. 605-616. 
11 Ludlow, Crises, 2006, pp. 52-58. 
12 The Bundespressarchiv Berlin provides an endless list of German press articles from 1964 and 1965, in 
which French concessions to the five EEC-partners are ultimately demanded. 
13 For the influence of the DBV see Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen, “Creating the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Story of Cereals Prices”, in: Loth, Crises, 2001, pp. 131-154; Newhouse, Collision, 1967, p. 45. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
￿ ￿￿￿
Industry,  Bundesverband  Deutscher  Industrie.
14  In  April  1963,  Foreign  Minister  Gerhard 
Schröder introduced the conception of “synchronization” of community work in order to come 
to a more balanced and reciprocal European agenda.
15 From a German point of view, this meant 
that efforts should be made to implement the customs union, tax harmonization, the commercial 
policy and the energy policy. The successful negotiation of the Kennedy Round was also one of 
the  major  concerns  of  the  German  government.  Apart  from  those  commercial  interests  the 
Erhard government particularly desired the revival of the European Political Union in order to 
gain some foreign policy profile before the German General Elections in September 1965.
16 
After major German sacrifices in the grain price decision of December 1964, the Germans felt 
they  were  entitled  to  French  concessions.  The  French-German  summit  at  Rambouillet  in 
January 1965 actually gave them the impression that General de Gaulle would allow the revival 
of the Political Union. However, the idea of holding a conference of the head of states collapsed 
when France renounced its participation in April. This left the Germans and Italians feeling 
betrayed by the French. The financing of the CAP then crystallized the idea of synchronised 
community development: Would the French once again achieve a financial agreement without 
paying a price in the form of economic or even institutional concessions?
17 Two important 
actors on the German side were particularly influenced by electoral considerations. First, in 
1964-1965 the German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder adopted, contrary to his personal 
“Atlantic” convictions, a pro-European pose in order to calm the critics of his policy and to 
improve his chances in the forthcoming elections.
18 For this reason, Schröder insisted on the 
strengthening of the Strasburg Assembly in the negotiations before the Empty Chair, which was 
seen as “sabotage” by the French.
19 Secondly, the German Liberals (FDP), at the time Erhard’s 
coalition partner, feared not to be elected into the “Bundestag” in September 1965 and put 
pressure on the Erhard government not to appear too conciliatory towards the French before the 
General Elections.
20 Therefore, they caused a substantial hardening of the German position. 
The  Italian  government  as  well  found  itself  in  an  uncomfortable  situation,  pressurized  by 
agricultural  lobbies,  because  Italian  agriculture  had  not  been  sufficiently  covered  by  the 
agreements of the early CAP. Since Italy had recently become a net importer of agricultural 
goods, Rome had to pay a high price to Brussels by way of its contribution without receiving 
much  in  return.  The  Italian  delegation  was  thus  under  domestic  pressure  and  consequently 
wanted to limit the duration of the financial settlement and to re-evaluate the situation after a 
year  or  two.  Rome  likewise  desired  a  new  political  dynamic  within  the  Community  and 
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supported the Commission proposals insofar as they strengthened the institutions, namely the 
European Parliament.
21 
The influence of non-state actors on Dutch foreign policy in the outbreak of the empty chair is 
striking.  Federalist  ideas  and  the  Atlantic  orientation  of  Dutch  foreign  policy  were  widely 
accepted in the Dutch population. In February 1965, thirty-eight Dutch private personalities 
addressed an open letter to Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, in which they insisted on continuing 
the European integration process and the Atlantic orientation of Dutch foreign policy.
22 The 
General de Gaulle’s rejection of a revival of the Political Union might have been a reaction to 
that  open  letter.  Anyway,  when  de  Gaulle  disparaged  politicians  who  talked  about 
supranationality as “Jean-Foutre”
23 in June 1965, the Dutch classe politique was horrified and 
the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament formally obliged the government to secure the 
strengthening of the Strasburg Assembly in the Council at the end of June.
24 Dutch non-state 
actors were obviously involved in this escalation of Franco-Dutch relations. Although Luns was 
personally inclined to compromise on the Parliament-question, the Dutch delegation had no 
choice  in  the  Council  at  the  end  of  June  but  to  insist  on  the  enlargement  of  European 
Parliament-power,  so  that  Paris  later  blamed  The  Hague  for  having  provoked  the  Council-
deadlock.
25 
In the Council of June 1965, the economic, financial and domestic problems mentioned above 
added to the existing institutional conflict and created a blockade, which de Gaulle felt invited 
to exploit by starting his empty chair politics. 
 
 
 
The Quai d’Orsay between Grain and Grandeur 
 
When the French administration, including the Quai d’Orsay, the Finance Ministry and the 
SGCI  (Sécretariat  Général  du  Comité  Interministériel),  was  dealing  with  the  Commission 
proposal package and all related CAP-matters in spring 1965, the French Foreign Ministry had 
to harmonise the demands of French farmers with the guidelines of Gaullist European policy, 
including the General de Gaulle’s obsession with French sovereignty. The French diplomats 
thus had to secure the maximum financial advantage for French agriculture while avoiding to 
pay  an  institutional  price that  would  be  unacceptable  to  General  de  Gaulle. Quai  d’Orsay-
Director  of  Economic  Affairs  Olivier  Wormser  revealed  the  concrete  French plan  when he 
openly explained to German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder on 24 May 1965:  
 
“En ce qui concerne le rôle de l’Assemblée Européenne, l’idée française est qu’il conviendrait 
de construire un système qui, tant pour les recettes que pour les dépenses, n’exigerait pas une 
intervention plus accentuée de cette Assemblée.”
26  
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The primary objective for the French services was thus to find a technical formula that would be 
advantageous to French farmers and at the same time neutralize the Commission’s political 
ambitions. In this chapter, the influence of the French farmers on the Quai d’Orsay-tactics shall 
be examined. 
With respect to its farm lobby, Paris had to secure the normal functioning of the CAP with all its 
benefits to French agriculture. France had a financial interest in centralising the agricultural 
levies as early as 1967, because the Agricultural Fund would then largely be financed by the 
agricultural net-importers, Germany in particular, whereas the French contribution would be 
minimised.  Yet,  the  creation  of  financial  resources  from  agricultural  levies  inevitably 
encouraged the discussion about the strengthening of the Strasbourg Assembly, which was not 
appreciated  by  General  de  Gaulle.  In  order  to  avoid  the  premature  creation  of  budgetary 
resources, the Quai d’Orsay worked out and advanced the conception of an “equalization fund” 
(“caisse de péréquation”). According to that conception, the customs duties would not create 
resources but be subject to a division among member-states.
27 
However, when Paris approached the CAP-negotiations of June 1965 and the political situation 
became more strained, institutional calculations became more important for the Quai d’Orsay 
than  the  short-term  interests  of  French  farmers.  In  mid-June,  the  French  administration 
abandoned its former negotiating position that the agricultural levies should be collectivized in 
1967 in order to put pressure on the partners to drop their demands concerning the enlargement 
of European Parliament-authority. In April 1965, the French Ministry of Finance had already 
clearly identified the collectivization of the customs duties as the key issue of the Commission 
proposal package and also pointed out that Paris was in a bad tactical position as long as it 
remained demandeur for the collectivization of the agricultural levies.
28 As mentioned above, 
Paris  wished  for  the  centralisation  of  the  agricultural  levies  by  1967.  However,  the 
collectivisation  of  agricultural  levies  would  economically  and  politically  justify  the  same 
scheme for the customs duties and would therefore encourage the enlargement of European 
Parliament  authority.  In  mid-June,  Paris  sacrificed  strong  economic  interests  in  order  to 
discharge diplomatic ballast and to eliminate the whole complex of budgetary resources and 
European Parliament authority from the Council agenda.
29 After the French coup, Ambassador 
Boegner reported to Paris not without satisfaction: 
 
“Il convient de noter que le choix du 1
er Juillet 1967 comme date d’entrée en vigueur du régime 
unique pour tous les produits constituait la clé de voûte de tout le système élaboré par la 
Commission, tant pour le règlement financier proprement dit que pour l’affectation progressive 
des droits de douane à la Communauté et pour le renforcement des attributions de l’Assemblée. 
Le rejet de ce postulat avait en outre pour conséquence de porter un coup sérieux à la thèse 
                                                 
27 Centre des Archives Contemporaines Fontainebleau (hereafter CAC), 4733, SGCI note Proposition 
financière de la Commission Economique Européenne, 27 April 1965 (the French negotiating position for 
May and June, P.B.); Newhouse, Collision, 1967, pp. 76, 102. 
28 CAC, 5555, Règlement financier et propositions annexes, 22 April 1965; although taking a friendly and 
compromising position on the Commission proposals as a whole, the Finance Ministry stated about the 
collectivization of the customs duties: “D’un point de vue strictement financier, les propositions de la 
Commission sont à notre avantage. […] D’un point de vue politique, elles peuvent être jugées 
inacceptables.”; the Ministry clearly pointed out the dangers of the French position of demandeur for the 
collectivization of the agricultural levies. 
29 This is openly admitted in AD, CE-DE, 1198, note (probably by Brunet) concerning financial 
settlement, 21 June 1965 and in AD, CE-DE, 1111, note Nature et conséquences de la proposition 
francaise […], 18 June 1965 that stated: “L’ajournement de l’affectation des prélèvements comme 
ressources propres à la Communauté repousse d’autant la solution du problème que posent les 
attributions de l’Assemblée de Strassbourg.”. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
￿ ￿￿￿
défendue  par  les  Hollandais  et  par  les  Italiens  et  selon  laquelle  les  propositions  de  la 
Commission devaient être considérées comme un ensemble cohérent et indissociable.”
30  
 
Because the French farmers’ interests were threatened by this French tactical retreat, other ways 
had to be looked for to secure the French farmers’ financial benefits from the CAP. The French 
administration was quick to advance a highly complicated formula under which the Agricultural 
Fund would be financed by the agricultural net-importers even without the agricultural levies to 
be collectivized. The Quai d’Orsay, particularly in June 1965, claimed that the member states’ 
contributions be based during the transitional period on a double-key, clé déformante, which 
would  burden  the  net-importer  of  agricultural  goods  from  outside  the  Community.
31  The 
proposed system would have anticipated the financial advantages that France could otherwise 
enjoy only after the collectivization of the agricultural levies and therefore helped Paris to avoid 
the position of demandeur for the agricultural levies to be devolved to the Community in the 
near future, which would have resulted in demands for institutional consequences.
32 
 
 
 
The Élysée, Domestic Resistance, and Reluctant Bureaucrats 
 
The pro-European voices in French agriculture and industry did not only have direct influence 
on the planning of the Quai d’Orsay officials, but also on de Gaulle himself. A close look at the 
policy line of the Élysée reveals that de Gaulle approached and triggered the crisis with an 
ambitious programme, that he was then confronted with fierce resistance to his Empty Chair 
politics and that he finally had to listen to a “chorus” of French pro-European voices demanding 
France’s  return  to  the  negotiating  table.  Although  the  increasing  weakness  of  France’s 
negotiating position was no secret to the informed contemporary observer
33, some details may 
still be added to reveal the degree of de Gaulle’s isolation and vulnerability. The resulting image 
of French weakness serves to question the plausibility of de Gaulle’s ambitious program during 
the Empty Chair Crisis and suggests that it was not only about majority voting or Commission-
behaviour but also a traditional power-struggle about leadership. 
In his record of French politics under Charles de Gaulle, Alain Peyrefitte suggests a concerted 
French strategy of blockade clearly focussing on Treaty revision and on disciplinary action 
against or removal of the Commission.
34 This is confirmed by the public declarations of de 
Gaulle and Couve.
35 
The question whether the spiritual father of the Empty Chair tactics was to be found in the 
Élysée  or  at  the  top  of  the  Quai  d’Orsay  cannot  be  clearly  answered.  In  reaction  to  the 
Commission-initiative  the  General  proposed  “putting  to  sleep”  the  Common  Market  in  the 
French Council of 14 April 1965.
36 However, Couve claimed that he himself took the initiative 
and suggested a blockade as a tactical measure to de Gaulle as early as May 1965.
37 In any case, 
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the decision to carry out the plan was taken by de Gaulle on 1 July 1965 and buttressed by wild 
attacks  on  what  he  called  “[…]  toute  cette  maffia  de  supranationalistes,  qu’ils  soient 
commissaires,  parlementaires  ou  fonctionnaires”.
38  Seven  days  later  the  French  cabinet 
confirmed that strategy and the objectives of Treaty revision and Commission replacement.
39 
After another two weeks de Gaulle revealed in private to Peyrefitte that his strategy went far 
beyond a simple revision and ambitiously aimed at changing the face of Europe and coming 
back to the Fouchet plan-conception of European cooperation.
40 
Likewise, it remains controversial whether qualified majority voting played a major or a minor 
role  in  the  French  management  of  the  Empty  Chair.  De  Gaulle’s  press  conference  of  9 
September  1965  seemed  to  confirm  that  qualified  majority  voting  was  the  General’s  main 
concern. However, internal French documents
41 and the assurances of France’s partners
42 might 
suggest that neither Paris nor its partners expected a ruthless execution of majority voting after 
January 1966 in the case of important national interests. Those documents may be seen as an 
argument for trivializing the importance normally conceded to qualified majority voting in the 
Empty  Chair.  However,  other  more  alarming  opinions  existed  within  the  French 
administration.
43 Moreover, it seems doubtful that those moderated opinions actually had the 
effect of calming the General de Gaulle on the issue of majority voting. His personal style of 
governance  makes  it  unlikely  that  policy  proposals  of  the  French  administration  had  a 
significant bearing on his handling of the Empty Chair. It rather appears that de Gaulle feared 
that much of what had been achieved in the framework of the CAP could be subject to revision 
after the introduction of qualified majority voting in January 1966.
44 
Alain  Peyrefitte’s  chronological  report  about  the  ambitious  Gaullist  programme  of  how  to 
manage the Empty Chair and what to achieve by the Empty Chair tactics, contrasts with the 
increasing weakness of General de Gaulle’s foreign policy line. The French position in this 
power struggle gradually deteriorated, when the political context rapidly changed in the second 
half of 1965. The re-election of the Christian-Democratic German Government in September 
and  the  confirmation  of  Gerhard  Schröder  as  Foreign  Minister  substantially  reinforced  the 
German position, so that Bonn could take the lead in the struggle against de Gaulle. Within the 
Common Market, the October-Council produced the bloc des cinq of France’s five partners, 
resisting French attempts for bilateral arrangements. On the transatlantic level, the approaching 
NATO-crisis further restricted de Gaulle’s scope for manoeuvre on the Common Market stage. 
However, the most dangerous resistance to the General’s Empty Chair tactics came from French 
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domestic policy: The Federation of French Industry (Conseil National du Patronat Français) 
issued a clear statement to the French government about the need to resolve the crisis as quickly 
as possible and to complete the customs union without delay.
45 France’s four great farming 
organisations as well as Jean Monnet’s Action Committee forcefully responded to the Empty 
Chair politics with numerous critical statements, white papers and finally with the advice to vote 
against de Gaulle.
46 French agricultural and industrial lobbies thus reflected the dependence of 
French agriculture and economy on the Common Market. The problems that de Gaulle faced 
during the first ballot of the Presidential Elections clearly revealed the limits of the General’s 
foreign policy line.
47 
Furthermore, a close look at the French administration reveals that de Gaulle lacked the support 
of  his  own  bureaucrats.  Quai  d’Orsay,  Finances  Ministry,  SGCI  and  French  EC-officials 
frequently pointed out to de Gaulle and his collaborators the importance of the Common Market 
for  France’s  economy  and  prosperity.
48  Furthermore,  French  bureaucrats  never  seriously 
discussed or prepared the revision of the Treaty or the departure of France from the Common 
Market.
49 Nevertheless, Couve officially maintained the illusion that France was determined to 
force the Five into a Fouchet-styled Europe when he demanded “revision d’ensemble” of the 
Treaty before the National Assembly on 20 October 1965. 
The  resulting  image  of  de  Gaulle’s  isolation  and  weakness  suggests  that  his  Empty  Chair 
politics was an increasingly tactical campaign in the power struggle and the “war of nerves”
50 
against the Commission and the Five. German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger later described 
the General’s foreign policy as “magic and thunder”
51 and this may apply to the Empty Chair as 
well. Considering the international and domestic pressure as well as the resistance of the French 
diplomatic elite, it was probably his presidential prestige that prevented de Gaulle from giving 
up the Empty Chair tactics before the Presidential Elections of December 1965. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the Empty Chair Crisis was dominated by diplomats and bureaucrats, non-state actors 
played a role in the outbreak and management of the crisis. 
When  issuing  his  proposal  package  including  the  enlargement  of  European  Parliament 
authority, Hallstein acted according to his federalist and democratic convictions, but he also 
took into consideration parliamentary pressure and public opinion, demanding that “something” 
should be done for the Strasburg Assembly. Particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, non-
state actors raised their “voices” to demand “synchronisation” of the Community-agenda and 
“strengthening” of the Strasburg Assembly and therefore contributed to the built-up of domestic 
pressure, which the leading statesmen and diplomats were unable to control in the Council at the 
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Il faut les plonger dans l’épouvante.” and “Il faut angoisser tout le monde. C’est la meilleure manière de 
réduire nos adversaires. S’ils n’ont pas peur, […] alors nous n’y arriverons pas“ and “Pour le moment, 
agir, c’est laisser la chaise vide, c’est plonger les partenaires dans l’angoisse”), for all citations see 
Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, 2002, pp. 888-889 and 897. 
51 See Buchstab, Günther, “Zwischen Zauber und Donner. Die CDU/CSU und de Gaulle”, in Wilfried 
Loth/ Robert Picht (eds.), De Gaulle Deutschland und Europa, Opladen, Leske u. Budrich, 1991, p. 100. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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end of June 1965. Last but not least, French agricultural and industrial lobbies did not only have 
a decisive influence on the shape of the Quai d’Orsay-tactics before the crisis, but they also 
played  an  important  role  in  the  resistance  against  de  Gaulle’s  line.  The  domestic  pressure 
exerted  by  French  farmers,  industrialists  and  diplomats  was such  that  only  the  Presidential 
Elections in December 1965 prevented de Gaulle from putting an end to the Empty Chair tactics 
much earlier than January 1966. 
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The role of the European Commission in the first enlargement process. The 
agriculture negotiations between 1961-63 and 1970-72 
Mariëlla Smids 
 
This paper examines the extent to which the role of the European Commission changed 
during the first enlargement process, by comparing the negotiations between 1961-63 and 1970-
72.  More  specifically,  this  paper  explores  whether  there  is  a  divergence  between  the 
Commission’s formal mandate, as stated in the Treaty and the negotiation framework established 
by  the  Council  at  the  start  of  each  enlargement  process,  and  the  development  of  the 
Commission’s actual role. 
Formally, the Commission’s mandate in the enlargement process did not change over 
time. According to article 237 of the Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) the 
Commission  advises  the  Council  to  take  a  unanimous  decision  to  open  the  enlargement 
negotiations.
1 In practice, however, over time the Commission seems to have made increasing use 
of its opportunity to influence the strategy and the content of the enlargement negotiations.  
Though many studies on European enlargement allude to the Commission’s role, it is 
seldom the central focus of analysis.
2 Some scholars have focused mainly on member states’ 
bargaining and the effects of enlargement on European institutions (Bange 2000; Moravcsik & 
Vaduchova  2003).  Others  have  addressed  enlargement  from  the  perspective  of  the  applicant 
states’ politics (Ludlow 1997; Rasmussen 2005). A third group of scholars has focused on the 
constitutive role of European culture, explaining why the Community decided to enlarge, and on 
the Europeanization effects on the domestic polities of the member states and applicant states 
(Fierke & Wiener 1999; Schimmelfennig 2002; Sedelmeier 2000).  
In the first section of this paper hypotheses are formulated on the conditions under which 
the  Commission’s  actual  role  is  reinforced  over  time.  This  is  grounded  in  the  historical-
institutionalist account of path dependency. A process is path dependent if initial moves in a 
certain direction encourage further moves in that same direction, excluding alternatives that were 
once available. The expectation is that the Commission will play an increasingly influential role 
in the accession negotiations, by using the room for manoeuvre that is available in the formal 
enlargement procedure to initiate policy solutions, thereby steering the course of the negotiation 
process. 
The second section contains the findings and analysis. A distinction is made between two 
phases. In the creation phase the definition of the enlargement procedure, including the degree of 
room for interpretation, as the outcome of bargaining among the member state governments is 
examined. In the operation phase the emphasis is on how the way the enlargement procedure was 
initially  defined  and  specified  by  the  Council  decisions  of  1961  and  1970  affected  the 
Commission’s  actual  role  in  the  enlargement  negotiations  of  1961-63  and  1970-72.  This  is 
illustrated with the case of the transitional arrangements in agriculture negotiations, which were 
among  the  most  important  and  contentious  issues.  In  the  conclusion  the  implications  of  the 
Commission’s role in the first enlargement and the need for further research will be discussed.  
 
A historical-institutionalist framework 
Accounts  of  how  institutional  procedures  affect  political  outcomes  can  be  found  in  the  new 
institutionalist  research  agenda.  This  paper  follows  the  distinction  between  a  rational-choice, 
sociological and historical variant (Hall and Taylor 1996).  
                                                 
1 Treaty establishing the EEC, article 237. 
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Starting from a methodological individualist viewpoint, rational-choice institutionalists 
assign a regulative or constraining role to institutions. Institutions are defined as formal and 
informal rules and procedures that impose constraints on the self-interested behaviour of actors 
(Aspinwall & Schneider 2000). Since institutions do not change national preferences, their effects 
and developments are, however, largely controllable. Noteworthy in this respect is the principal-
agent literature on member states’ delegation of discretion to supranational actors. Pollack (1997), 
for  example,  has  argued  that,  though  the  Commission  may  possess  a  considerable  degree of 
autonomy, based on an information advantage, member state governments remain capable of 
correcting the Commission in case of deviating preferences. 
At  the  other  extreme  stands  the  sociological-institutionalist  variant,  which  defines 
institutions as norms, rules and cultures that shape actors’ identities (Aspinwall & Schneider 
2000). Based on a holistic ontolology, advocates of this approach focus on how European norms, 
rules  and  culture  shape  member  states’  identities.  The  underlying  ‘logic  of  appropriateness’ 
leaves no room for institutional choice or control over European institutional effects. One way of 
studying institutional effects is by depicting them in terms of social learning. According to Hall 
(1993) this occurs when actors gain knowledge by giving meaning to past experiences and new 
information and apply this knowledge to their subsequent actions.  
  A middle course between these two extremes is taken by historical institutionalists. They 
assign an intervening and normative role to institutions, which comprise formal and informal 
rules, procedures, routines, norms and conventions (Hall & Taylor 1996). Actors have decisive 
moments in which they establish institutions, thereby pursuing their objective interests, modified 
by learning and historically constructed ideologies. At the same time, however, institutions shape 
actors’  goals and  strategies  and affect  the  distribution  of  power  between  organized  interests. 
Central to this approach is the notion of path dependency. Focusing on institutional effects over 
time, Pierson (1996) has argued that institutional creations develop in unintended ways due to 
initiatives  of  supranational  or  domestic  actors  and,  more  importantly,  that  member  state 
governments are unable to reverse these institutional  developments. 
Historical  institutionalism  is  expected  to  provide  the  most  useful  framework  for 
explaining the reinforcement of the Commission’s role in the enlargement process, bridging the 
actor versus culture centeredness of the rational and sociological perspectives respectively. This 
implies, on the one hand, a focus on the self-interestedness of the Commission and the Council at 
European level, wishing to exert their influence over the enlargement process. On the other hand, 
the focus is on the influence of the institutionalised European context, which is marked by a 
continuous process of geographical extension and policy integration, on the ideas, preferences 
and capabilities of Council members and the Commission’s internal organization. Further, the 
application of historical institutionalism means a focus on enlargement as a long-term process, 
linking between the different accession negotiations over time. 
Following the comparison of these three approaches of path dependency, this section will 
expound  a  historical-institutionalist  framework  that  distinguishes  between  a  creation  and  an 
operation phase.
3 The first condition for a reinforcement of the Commission’s influence lies in the 
definition of the enlargement procedure. Based on the premise that actors’ negotiation positions 
are not only based on distributive concerns, but also on ideology (Vanberg & Buchanan 1989), 
the  claim  is  that  the  nature  of  conflicting  interests  affects  the  flexibility  of  the  enlargement 
procedure. Since member states find it more difficult to compromise on their beliefs, divergent 
ideological ideas on the appropriate role of the Commission in the general functioning of the 
Community  are  expected to  result  in  a less  well-defined  mandate  of the  Commission  in  the 
specific case of the enlargement procedure, with more room for interpretation in comparison to a 
calculation-driven outcome.   
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H1: The more the conflicting preferences of the member state governments are dominated by 
ideology rather than distributive concerns, the larger the potential room for interpretation in the 
enlargement procedure and the larger the potential room for manoeuvre of the Commission. 
 
The point here is that the outcome of interstate bargaining is assumed not to be optimal because 
of the role that ideology plays in the preferences of the member state governments. By taking into 
account  of  not  only  materialist  concerns,  but  also  historically  shaped  ideologies,  historical 
institutionalism provides for the possibility that the Commission will play a more influential role 
as a broker of the encompassing European interests in the actual enlargement process. 
This is pitted against the rational-choice approach which assumes that the enlargement 
procedure is an efficient equilibrium outcome of the cost-benefit calculations about materialist 
economic and security interests of national governments. From this perspective member states are 
capable  of  clearly  demarcating  the  Commission’s  mandate  in  the  enlargement  procedure. 
Accordingly,  the  Commission’s  role  is  that  of  a  bureaucracy  that  facilitates  member  states’ 
negotiations by coordinating rather than transcending national interests (Moravcsik 1998). 
During the operation phase the emphasis is on whether, as a consequence of the potential 
room  for  interpretation  in  the  enlargement  procedure,  the  encompassing  European  interests, 
embodied by the Commission, rather than the national interests, continue to prevail. Concretely, 
the  focus  is  on  explaining  the  emergence  and  persistence  of  the  gap  between  the  formally 
delegated tasks and the actual role of the Commission.  
Two sets of conditions are distinguished. The first set focuses on the conditions under 
which  the  Commission  will  be  able  to  extend  its  influence.  The  second  set  focuses  on  the 
conditions under which the member states collectively, in the Council, are constrained in their 
control over the enlargement process. This implies the testing of the opposite explanations of the 
Commission as a quasi-autonomous policy entrepreneur versus the Commission as a bureaucracy, 
whose  discretion  depends  on  delegation  by  the  member  states.  In  both  explanations  the 
interaction over time between the internal organization of the Commission and Council and the 
European institutional context is central. 
The first factor for the Commission as a policy entrepreneur is that the Commission must 
be willing to exert influence on the enlargement process. The capacity to do so is expected to 
depend on the Commission’s autonomy and expertise. Autonomy relates to the cohesiveness of 
the  Commission’s  internal  organizational  structure  and  ideas  about  enlargement.  Expertise  is 
connected with the complexity of the policy issues in the accession negotiations. A final factor is 
the learning effect of the enlargement process on the Commission. The Commission is assumed 
to signal opportunities to exploit the room for manoeuvre in the formal procedure, by using its 
experience  with  previous  enlargement  processes.
4  Also  the  complexity  of  the  policy  issues, 
requiring technical proficiency, encourages the Commission to draw on previous experiences. 
 
H2: The stronger the Commission’s preference to influence the enlargement process, the more 
internally  united  the  Commission’s  organization,  the  more  complex  the  policy  issues  in  the 
accession  negotiations  and  the  more  the  Commission  learns  from  experiences  in  previous 
enlargements and policy processes, the more likely it is to influence the course of the enlargement 
process. 
 
The notion of learning is derived from the sociological institutionalist perspective. However, in 
contrast to the constitutive influence of European culture, the conceptualisation of learning as 
used in this historical institutionalist framework leaves room for a certain degree of institutional 
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choice.  The  knowledge  gained  from  past  experiences  shapes,  rather  than  constitutes,  the 
Commission’s internal views on enlargement. and, subsequently, its internal organizational rules 
and  procedures.  The  assumption  is  that  the  Commission’s  views  are  also  influenced  by  the 
personal interests, contacts and expertise of its members and internal organization, as well as the 
particular demands of the member state governments and candidate states in the enlargement 
process.  
The  factor  for  an  increasing  role  of  the  Commission  as  a  bureaucracy,  lies  in  the 
capabilities of the member states governments in the accession negotiations. The expectation is 
that,  due  to  the  development  of  common  policies  in  the  fields  of  the  customs  union  and 
agriculture  1960s,  the  accession  negotiations  will  become  increasingly  complex,  which  will 
provide member state governments an incentive to rely more on the Commission’s coordination 
and technical expertise. Facing a larger number of negotiation issues, the potential chance of 
divergence,  both  among  the  member  states  in  defining  a  common  positions  and  in  the 
negotiations with the candidate states, is expected to be increased. 
 
H3:  The  more  complex  the  European  Community  is,  the  more  (likely)  the  capability  of  the 
member  states  to  fully  control  the  enlargement  process  decreases  and  the  incentive  for  the 
member states to delegate responsibilities to the Commission increases. 
 
The notion of delegation is derived from rational-choice delegation literature. In contrast to the 
rational-choice focus on the control mechanisms that member states have at their disposal to 
correct  unintended  interpretations  of  the  enlargement  procedure  (Pollack  1997),  historical 
institutionalism emphasizes the coordination problems of the short-sighted member states while 
negotiating  a  change  in  the  Commission’s  mandate,  thereby  also  hindered  by  the  adaptive 
expectations  generated  by  the  Commission’s  actual  role  in  the  enlargement  process  (Pierson 
2004). 
 
The creation of the enlargement procedure 
In the 1956-57 negotiations that set up the EEC, the question of the Commission’s mandate in the 
enlargement procedure was closely related to the role of the institutions in general. Divergence on 
this issue dated back to the decision on the opening of the negotiations on the EEC. At the one 
extreme was the Dutch policy for general supranational European integration, driven by the ideal 
of enhancing European prosperity. (Harryvan and Kersten 1989) At the other extreme stood the 
French preference for intergovernmental cooperation in certain, notably security related, sectors 
as the maximum attainable. (Gerbet 1989) In between these two extremes were the Belgian plea 
for sectoral integration coordinated by a supranational institution, as a more cautious and realist 
alternative to the Dutch position (Dumoulin 1999), and the German position which had developed 
into a positive stand on general economic integration, but which was reluctant to mention any 
federalist elements, due to internal divergence (Küsters 1989). Unlike the ideological arguments 
of the adherents to European integration, the French position seemed to be mainly driven by 
calculative self-interest. The domestic opposition to the earlier proposed supranational ECSC and 
EDC seemed to be explanatory. In the mid-1955s, the initiatives of the federalist forces was 
successful to the extent that they managed to table their ideas on the European agenda in Messina 
on  1-2  June  1955.  The  anti-federalist  voices  were,  however,  visible  in the  execution  of  this 
agenda, by the intergovernmental Spaak Committee, which received the restricted mandate to 
produce a non-binding report on the feasibility of the common market.
5  
When the EEC negotiations started on 25 June 1956, disagreement among the national 
delegations  on  the  principles  underlying  the  articles  about  the  institutions  were  prevalent. 
Whereas some delegations, notably the Dutch, emphasized the need for the Commission’s role as 
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initiator, the French delegation stressed the weight of the Council, based on the deep scepticism 
about  the  interference  of  the  Community  in  the  member  states’  domestic  arenas.
6  The 
fundamental difference of opinion on the transfer of sovereignty to the Community resulted in 
disillusionment among participants towards the end of the negotiations. The conclusion was that, 
in order to finalize the Treaty project, there was a need for a functional and pragmatic approach, 
instead of an ideological one.
7 From this it becomes clear that ideological interests were too 
divergent to be compromised.  
The  intergovernmental  conference  in  Rome  resulted  in  two  Treaty  articles  on  the 
Commission’s mandate. With regard to policy integration the Commission’s functions would be 
to guard the application of the Treaty provisions, to formulate recommendations on the content of 
the Treaty, to have its own decision-making power and participate in the decision making of the 
Council  and  Parliament,  and  to  exercise  the  power  of  implementation.
8  Regarding  the 
enlargement of the Community the Commission’s mandate was restricted to advising the Council. 
Article 237 stated that ‘[A]ny European State may apply to become a member of the Community. 
It shall address its application to the Council whose decision, after the opinion of the Commission 
has been obtained, shall be unanimous thereon’.
9 
The ideological differences on the role of the institutions in the European integration 
project and the brief and general wording of the enlargement procedure seem to confirm the 
likeliness of the occurrence of future interpretation difficulties. The true scope for interpretation 
and the subsequent room for manoeuvre for the Commission would only become clear in the 
actual enlargement process. The opening of the negotiations in 1961 and 1970 would be preceded 
by long debates on the exact division of competences among the Commission and the member 
states. This would even provoke the Commission to express its supposition that article 237 was 
deliberately created in a vague way. 
 
The specification of the formal enlargement procedure in 1961 
Discussions on the division of competences in the enlargement procedure were resumed 
after  the  United  Kingdom  (UK),  Ireland,  and  Denmark  made  their  membership  requests  in 
July/August 1961. The contextual setting of these discussions had changed as a result of the entry 
into force of the institutional framework of the EEC and the subsequent policy developments. In 
the field of agriculture the first impetus to the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
were given by the Commission’s initiatives to organize the intergovernmental Conference of 
Stresa in July 1958 and to present policy proposals to the Council in 1959 and 1960. Further, a 
Special Committee for Agriculture was established in July 1960, which was composed of the 
national Ministers of Agriculture, under chairmanship of the Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco 
Mansholt.  In  January  1962,  after  the  first  agricultural  marathon,  the  basic  principles  for  a 
common agricultural policy were agreed on.  
With regard to the autonomy of the member states in the enlargement procedure, the 
choice  was  between  multilateral  negotiations,  in  which  each  member  state  would  engage 
independently  with  the  applicants,  and  bilateral  negotiations,  in  which  member  states  would 
coordinate  their  positions.  Whereas  France  and  the  Benelux  countries  argued  for  a  flexible 
multilateral approach, Germany and Italy preferred bilateral negotiations to prevent the national 
representatives from defending conflicting positions.
10 The latter position was supported by the 
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Commission,  as  a  means  of  accentuating  the  role  of  the  Community  instead  of  the  member 
states.
11   
The question of the Commission’s mandate was more complicated. The first point of 
divergence concerned the judicial basis. The French and Dutch delegations argued for upholding 
the restricted judicial basis of article 237. The practical implementation of this article should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, without creating permanent or detailed rules that could set a 
precedent. The strictness of the position of the Dutch was remarkable given their support for a 
supranational  organization  of  the  European  integration  project  in  general.  This  view  was 
contested by the other member states and the Commission. Their argument was to allow the 
Commission to have a more extended role based on article 155, acknowledging that the member 
states were no longer in charge of every policy field. The Belgian delegation specifically referred 
to the Commission’s right of proposal, while Germany put forward the judicial grounds for an 
involvement of the Commission in the negotiations with the applicants.
12   
The second point of disagreement concerned the practical role of the Commission. All 
member states, except France, agreed that the Commission should have a substantial advisory 
role, participate on all levels of the negotiations, and have the right to speak and coordinate the 
member states’ positions and the negotiations.
13 The exact interpretation of these tasks remained, 
however, contentious. While Germany did not exclude the option that the Commission could act 
as spokesperson for the Six and negotiate certain policy issues, the Dutch delegation was against 
having the Commission as an additional party at the Conference table.
14 The Commission saw its 
preferences largely represented by the Five. In addition, the Commission proposed, in line with 
the German delegation, to be entrusted with the role of spokesperson of the Community.
15 The 
French delegation expressed its hesitations regarding the proposed mandate. First, it preferred to 
reserve  the  right  to  decide  on  the  desirability  of  a  Commission  opinion  to  the  Accession 
Conference. Second, it argued for preserving the option of having exclusively intergovernmental 
meetings.  Third,  while  recognizing  the  benefits  of  using  the  Commission’s  expertise,  it  was 
cautious about involving the Commission in the negotiations. The French ambassador, however, 
did not exclude the possibility that a member of the Commission would chair a Council working 
group or intervene in specific policy negotiations with the candidate countries.
16  
Following these discussions and focusing on the British candidature, the Council decided 
in its meeting of 25-27 September 1961 that within the framework of article 237 the negotiations 
would be held on a multilateral basis between the six member states of the Community and the 
UK, wherein the Six would present as many common positions as possible. The Commission’s 
role would be to, first, participate in the coordination among the Six and, second, to coordinate 
and participate in the Accession Conference as the advisor of the Six with the right of speech.
17  
 
The Commission’s role in the enlargement process of 1961-63 
In October 1961 the enlargement negotiations were opened as a ‘Conference between 
Members  States  of  the  European  Communities  and  other  States  which  have  applied  for 
membership of the Communities’. Unlike the formal enlargement procedure, the Commission did 
not issue an official opinion. In reaction to a request of the Council, the Commission stated that 
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(07.09.1961). 
12 HAEU, SGCI 11521, 52ème session du Conseil (25-27.09.1961). 
13 ABZ, 996.0 EEG/439, Ter informatie. 
14 ABZ, 996.0 EEG/439, Verslag interne vergadering comité van pv’s (23.08.1961). 
15 HAEC, BAC 25/1980, COM(61) PV 156. 
16 HAEU, SGCI 11521, Problèmes soulevés par les démarches effectuées en vue d'une adhésion 
(20.09.1961). 
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its advice would depend on the course of the negotiations, when it would have more information 
about  the  member  state  governments’  positions and  the  British  problems.
18 The  Commission 
described  the  British  application  as  a  turning  point  in  post-War  European  politics,  but  also 
stressed  the  difficulties  of  the  future  negotiations.  Despite  its  support  for  opening  the 
negotiations, the Commission clearly prioritized a further deepening of integration, notably the 
development of the CAP. 
The reserved attitude of the Commission regarding the British accession was obvious in 
the formulation of the enlargement strategy.
19 The main principle was that the applicant states 
accepted  the  Treaty.  The  precise  interpretation  of  this  principle,  however,  was  a  point  of 
discussion, with the Netherlands taking a flexible stand, while France and the Commission argued 
for a strict Treaty application that would allow only for limited and temporal exceptions. With 
regard to the order of the negotiations the Commission’s president, Walter Hallstein, pled for an 
inductive method, reaching first agreement on the whole set of problems, before entering into 
discussions about the specifics. In this way the common goals would be accentuated instead of 
the different national interests.
20 In the first Ministerial meetings in November 1961, the Six 
stated that the negotiations would not allow any modification of the tenor and spirit of the Treaty 
and  that  problems  should  be  solved  only  by  transitional  arrangements,  entailing  limited  and 
temporal exceptions.
21 
The reserved attitude towards enlargement was also apparent in the onerous process of 
defining  a  Community  position  on  transitional  periods  in  agriculture.  Following  the  general 
positions at the start of the accession negotiation, the Community positions on the specific policy 
sectors were formulated in the course of the negotiations, based on a fact-finding mission of the 
Commission that analysed the compatibility of the applicant states’ policies with the EEC and in 
reaction  to  the  applicants’  requests.  In  January  1962  the  British  position  on  agriculture  was 
explained  for  the  first  time.  It  was  a  premature  standpoint  in  which  the  British  delegation 
requested  an  alteration  of  the  Community’s  agricultural  system  and  a  lengthening  of  the 
transitional period from 7,5 to 12 years.
22 This was met with astonishment in the Commission by 
Mansholt, and Jean-François Deniau, head of the enlargement delegation, who suggested a short 
transitional period of 3-4 years.
23  
In the second Ministerial meeting in February prospects for a compromise grew dim with 
the positions of the UK and the Six at two extremes.
24 The UK declared itself ready to accept the 
CAP objectives, but it stressed the need for special and differentiated transitional periods. This 
was motivated by, first, the different nature of the British agricultural system. British agriculture 
depended  largely  on  imports  from  the  Commonwealth  and  its  small  agricultural  sector  was 
supported on the income side by deficiency payments instead of the price side, which was the 
principle in the Community. Second, the British request stemmed from a sense of inequality 
because of the extra years the Six would have in adapting their agricultural markets until the 
establishment of the common market for agriculture in 1970. The Six reacted in a reserved way to 
the British demands and maintained the objective of a simultaneous establishment of the market 
for agriculture. The Six were not prepared to go beyond a transitional period of at most 7.5 years 
for certain products. Based on a study of the Commission, the Six argued that the British system 
did  not  fundamentally  differ  from  the  Community  system  and  hence  would  face  the  same 
difficulties as the Six in adopting the CAP. Further, the Treaty and the CAP regulations would 
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20 ABZ, 996.0 EEG/382, Déclaration Hallstein (08.11.1961). 
21 HAEC, BAC 25/1980 1191, DK/M/1/61 (07.12.1961). 
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offer  sufficient  space  to  compensate  disadvantageous  consequences  for  British  agriculture. 
Finally, awarding special transitional periods was deemed to complicate the British participation 
in  the  Community  institutions  after  the  accession.
25  Following  the  strategy  to  save  the  most 
difficult issues for last, the agricultural question was taken off the negotiation agenda at the 
beginning of March. 
In the meantime the Six were everything but unified on the transitional arrangements in 
agriculture.  The  Commission  tried  to  coordinate  a  common  position  by  analyzing  policy 
problems and chairing the national ministers in the Special Committee for Agriculture. However, 
it  did  not  manage  to  soften  the  divisions,  due  to  its  own  inflexible  stand,  which  was 
commensurate with the French position. The problem of coordinating a common position endured 
until the end of the first enlargement process.
26 
The lack of unity among the member state governments and the French insistence on 
presenting a strictly coordinated position paralyzed the Accession Conference with the UK. The 
minutes of deputy meetings in April indicate that no serious discussion took place due to a lack of 
instructions from the Ministerial level.
27 The Commission intervened by setting a limit on the 
duration of the negotiations and encouraging the presentation of concrete policy proposals by the 
deputies and the British delegation in the Ministerial meeting of 8-9 May. The idea was that once 
the positions  of  both  sides  became  clear,  negotiations,  facilitated  by  a  possible  package-deal 
proposal of the Commission, could take place in a Ministerial meeting at the end of May.
28 
Attempts to find compromises on principal issues, however, failed and the Commission decided 
not to present any compromise proposals. 
Between June  and  October  little  progress  was  made  in the  negotiations  and  contacts 
between  the  Six  and  the  UK  were  undertaken  on  a  bilateral  basis  outside  the  Accession 
Conference.  The  first  real  negotiations  on  agriculture  were  only  to  take  place  in  the  12th 
Ministerial  meeting  of  25-27  October  1962.  Again,  no  progress  regarding  the  length  of  the 
transitional periods was achieved. The only room for compromise consisted of the decision that 
after January 1966 the Commission would have the mandate to make proposals, to be adopted by 
the  Council  with  qualified  majority,  on  certain  aspects  of  the  British  policy  adaptation  that 
required exceeding the deadline of 31 December 1969.
29 
With regard to the first formal task of coordination among the Six, the Commission’s 
actual role can be assessed as both positive and negative. One the one hand, the Commission’s 
preference for a strict acceptance of the Treaty and a strategy to first reach agreement on the 
whole set of problems, before entering in discussions about the specifics, was reflected in the 
member  states’  definition  of  the  modalities  of  the  negotiations.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Commission’s plea for a short transitional period in agriculture of 3-4 years and the fact that it did 
not issue an official opinion complicated, rather than softened, the divergence among the Six and 
the definition of a Community position.  
This affected the Commission’s second formal task of participating in and coordinating 
the  Accession  Conference.  The  divisions  among  the  Six and the subsequent deadlock  in the 
Conference, on the one hand, gave the Commission little opportunity to play a leading role since 
there was no ground for real negotiations. This is apparent in the Commission’s reluctance to 
present package-deal proposals. One the other hand, the Commission used the deadlock in the 
negotiations to play an extended role, for example, by not only acting as advisor of the Six, but 
also by advising the British delegation on how to formulate concrete policy proposals in the 
Ministerial meetings. Further, the lack of progress in the negotiations forced the Six to relinquish 
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some  control  and  delegate  more  responsibilities  to  the  Commission,  for  example,  to  initiate 
exceptional transitional arrangements for specific British adaptation problems. An assessment of 
the Commission’s actual role in the first enlargement process leads to the conclusion that it 
contained certain entrepreneurial aspects that were not foreseen in its mandate of 1961.  
 
Following  this  conclusion  the  question  is:  To  what  extent  were  the  conditions  for  the 
Commission’s influence present? At the level of the Commission’s organization, the preference 
regarding its own role, its organizational coherence and its expertise provide a mixed picture. 
First, from the specification of the Commission’s mandate in 1961 it becomes clear that the final 
outcome did not conform entirely to the Commission’s own preferences. This was a potential 
source for exploiting every available room for manoeuvre. However, internal views on what kind 
of role to play diverged. The pleas of Hallstein and Mansholt for political leadership met with 
resistance  by  others,  notably  by  the  French  commissioner  for  External  Relations,  Robert 
Marjolin, who defended the centrality of the member states.
 30 
Second, the Commission’s work on enlargement was not centrally directed. A working 
group consisting of the president and four commissioners, assisted by a task force of officials 
from  different  Directorates  General  (DG),  was  in  charge.
31  Although  the  Commission’s 
organization  contained  leading  figures  such  as  Hallstein,  Deniau  and  Mansholt,  several 
documents  indicate  the  presence  of  internal  coordination  problems,  including  the  limited 
communication with the Commission’s delegation in London.
32  
Third, despite the relatively small size of the acquis, the agricultural negotiations already 
contained technicalities for which the member state governments depended on the Commission. 
This  was  due  to  the  Commission’s  initiatives  in  developing  the  CAP.  An  indication  of  the 
importance  of  the  Commission’s  expertise  was  Mansholt’s  chairmanship  of  the  Special 
Committee for Agriculture.
33  
At the level of the member state governments, the effects of the early state of European 
integration on their incentives and capabilities to control the enlargement process were mixed. On 
the one hand, the lack of experience with the working of supranational institutions provided an 
incentive for the national governments to control the process. This is obvious in, first, the title of 
the conference; second, the monitoring of the Commission’s participation in the negotiations by 
monthly  meetings  with  the  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives  (Coreper)  and  the 
deliberations with national governments; and, third, the fact that the Six didn’t always sufficiently 
inform the Commission about the national policy stances as well as procedural questions.  
On the other hand, the member state governments’ capabilities to control the enlargement 
process were restricted as a result of coordination difficulties. This was due to the absence of a 
chairperson  who  could  soften  the  ideological  and  practical  divergence  on  the  desirability  of 
enlargement, the conditions for accession and the modalities of the negotiations. Features of the 
process that illustrate this were the long internal deliberations among the Six, which led to British 
demands for longer and more frequent meetings, and the attempts to improve the coordination 
among the Six by separating meetings on the same agricultural questions of the Council from the 
Ministerial meetings with the candidate countries.
34 
 
The redefinition of the formal enlargement procedure in 1970 
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The establishment of the negotiation framework in 1970 took place in a slightly different context. 
Experience had been gained from the first enlargement negotiations, which broke down after the 
French veto in January 1963, and policy and institutional developments had taken place. The 
agricultural marathons in December 1962 and 1963 led to the establishment of provisions for a 
number  of  agricultural  products  and  a  Council  decision  on  common  prices  for  cereals.  The 
Commission’s attempt to link the financing of the agricultural policy to the creation of resources 
specific to the Community was a source of contention among the Six. The French disagreement 
with the expansion of the agricultural policy and the Commission’s role culminated in the empty 
chair  crisis  of  1965.  The  agreement  on  the  common  agricultural  policy  and  a  preliminary 
financial  regulation  in  1966  left  the  Commission’s  ambitions  aside  and  didn’t  mention  the 
Community’s own resources. By contrast, the Commission’s memorandum on agricultural reform 
in  1968,  the  so-called  Mansholt  plan,  was  to  become  the  foundation  of  the  Community’s 
agricultural  system.  At  the  institutional  level,  the  empty  chair  crisis  paved  the  way  for  the 
Luxembourg agreement in 1966, which strengthened national control over the European decision-
making process. Trust in the European integration project was renewed at the Hague summit in 
1969. Based on the three principles of completing, deepening and widening the further course of 
the Community was laid out and an impetus was given to the resumption of the enlargement 
process. 
The renewal of the requests for membership in 1967 provoked long discussions on the 
division of competences between the member states and the Community institutions, notably the 
Commission’s mandate. The French insistence on a purely technical role for the Commission was 
countered  by  the  Belgian  delegation  and  the  Commission,  which  suggested  conducting  the 
negotiations along the lines of trade negotiations in the Kennedy round. Accordingly, in the first 
phase the Commission would negotiate on behalf of the Community with regard to all problems 
posed  by  the  common  policies  already  in  operation  or  in  the  course  of  elaboration.  After  a 
successful conclusion of this phase, the member states would conduct the second phase in which 
the general political problems resulting from the enlargement, as well as institutional problems 
and adjustments to the Treaties could be discussed. 
In a  meeting of 8-9 June 1970, at the start of the second round of negotiations, the 
Council  redefined  the  principles  of  the  enlargement  procedure.  The  negotiations  would  be 
conducted according to a uniform procedure. The point of departure was the Community rather 
than the member states, which implied that negotiations were conducted on a bilateral basis. This 
meant  a  larger  role  for  the  Council,  which  would  determine  the  common  position  of  the 
Communities and whose Presidency would chair the Accession Conference with the applicant 
states and hold up the common position. The Commission’s mandate was restricted to, first, 
contributing to the drafting of the Community position by analysing and making proposals on the 
problems  posed  by  the  accession  negotiations.  Second,  the  Commission  would  present  and 
explain  the  common  position  at  the  request  of  the  Council.  Third,  the  Commission  would 
participate in the negotiations by seeking, in liaison with the applicants, possible solutions to 
problems that would arise during the negotiations.
35  
The specification of the enlargement procedure can be seen as the result of a two-fold 
effect of the preceding enlargement negotiations. On the one hand, the procedure reflects a certain 
degree  of  institutionalisation  of  the  Commission’s  actual  role.  An  illustration  of  this  is  the 
increased focus on the Commission’s expertise in analysing and solving policy problems and 
mediating between the Six and the applicants. At the same time, the more precise definition of the 
procedure and the organization of the enlargement negotiations embody a formalisation of the 
Accession Conference, with less opportunities for the Commission to intervene.  
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The Commission’s role in the enlargement process of 1970-72 
In June 1970 the negotiations were opened as a ‘Conference between the Communities and the 
States which have applied for membership of the Communities’. This was based on three official 
opinions of the Commission. In September 1967 the Commission recommended the opening of 
the  negotiations  ‘in  the  most  appropriate  forms’,  taking  into  account  the  problems  of  the 
applicants and the necessary arrangements to ensure the cohesion and dynamism of the enlarged 
Community.
36 Problems existed notably in the field of agriculture, for which the Commission 
expected the negotiations to be long and difficult. The cautious wording of the opinion was a 
source of dispute among the Six about the conceptions of ‘negotiations’ and ‘transitional periods’ 
and, eventually, was rejected by France.
37 In April 1968 the Commission published a second 
opinion in which the member state governments’ proposals concerning specific policy problems 
were  considered  and  points  of  agreement  were  identified.
38  In  July  1969  the  Commission 
reviewed its first opinion. As in 1967, it recommended opening the negotiations. However, this 
time it was accompanied by the words ‘as soon as possible’.
39 In its chapter on agriculture the 
Commission stated the positive implication of the CAP reform that was initiated in the meantime. 
This would facilitate the adaptation of the applicants to the EEC system.  
Compared  to  the  previous  process,  the  prospect  of  enlargement  was  perceived  more 
positively in the Community. Instead of complicating further policy integration, widening and 
deepening were increasingly considered to be two sides of the same coin. Based on frequent 
deliberations in Coreper in the first three months of 1970 and a Commission communication on 
transitional periods, the modalities of the negotiations were established. These were explained at 
the  opening  session  of  the  negotiations  on  30  June  1970  by  the  acting  President  of  the 
Community, Pierre Harmel. Accordingly, the applicant states should accept the treaties and their 
political objectives; problems should be solved by the establishment of transitional measures, 
rather than changes of the existing rules; as a guideline, transitional measures should ensure 
reciprocal advantages for all parties; and, though their duration could vary according to the policy 
field, it should be the same for all applicants.
40  
Following the Commission’s insistence on prioritizing procedural questions, the agenda 
at the start of the Accession Conference was dominated by the organization and procedure of the 
negotiations and transitional arrangements.
41 In November 1970 the Commission issued a global 
report  on  transitional arrangements  in  agriculture,  in  which it  argued for  parallel transitional 
periods of five years for both industrial and agricultural products; an immediate application of the 
CAP  mechanisms  and  Community  preference  from  the  outset  of  the  transitional  periods;  a 
gradual price adaptation in phases as the main element of the arrangements; and import levies and 
export restitution as a way to compensate price differences in the adaptation phase, financed by 
the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.
42 Though the Council members were still not 
unified on the flexibility of the application of the Community preference, the majority supported 
the Commission’s ideas and the report became a guideline for the common position. The only 
aspects that would be open for negotiation were the rhythm and the percentages of the adaptation 
phases. 
The  first  six  months  of  the  negotiations  formed  an  explorative  phase.  In  the  first 
Ministerial meeting with the UK on 21 July 1970 procedural arrangements were made. While the 
Commission was invited to study the data supplied by the UK during its fact-finding mission, the 
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member state governments clarified that it should do so as a servant of the Six and not of the 
Conference as a whole (O’Neill 2000). This, together with the Commission’s tactic not to reveal 
its positions on transitional arrangements until the start of the actual negotiations, contributed to 
the rather technocratic image of the Commission at the start.
43 
In  the  Ministerial  meetings  of  October  and  December  the  positions  of  the  candidate 
countries and the Community on transitional periods in agriculture were exchanged. The practice 
was continued of the applicants presenting their positions first, in order for the Six to be able to 
streamline their national positions in a common response. The Community stressed that all policy 
questions should be settled by single transitional periods. However, in individual cases, it was 
prepared to take a more flexible stance. The Commission’s plea for granting special derogations 
to Norway, given its special problems in adopting the CAP, was for example developed. ?  
Progress in the Accession Conference was intensified when, in December, agreement was 
recorded on the basic principles of the transitional arrangements. This was largely due to the 
adjustment by the UK, which was most demanding in this respect, of its old demands for different 
periods for industrial and agricultural products of 3 and 6 years respectively, and the acceptance 
of  the  Community  position  of  a  single  period  of  5  years.  From  January  1971  onwards,  the 
negotiations  entered  a  decisive  phase.  During  this  phase  the  Commission’s  mandate  to  be 
consulted by the candidate countries about the technical issues was extended, thereby making the 
Commission also a servant of the Conference. In addition, the Commission was to initiate not 
only technical adaptations of existing secondary rules, but also Council decisions and regulations 
in  the  post-enlargement  period.
44  In  preparing  the  crucial  Conference  meeting  in  May,  the 
Commission acted as a catalyst by presenting definitive policy packages and by softening the still 
existing  French  mistrust  towards  the  UK  and,  at  the  same  time,  convincing  the  UK  of  its 
agricultural  proposals.  According  to  several  reports,  the  breakthrough  in  the  Accession 
Conference was due to these informal negotiations. Source?  A final agreement on transitional 
periods with the UK, Ireland and Denmark was reached in the Ministerial meetings of May and 
June.  
An assessment of the Commission’s role in the enlargement negotiations between 1970-
72  involves  the  question  of  which  of  the  underlying  factors  for  the  specification  of  the 
enlargement  procedure  holds:  an  institutionalization  of  the  actual  opportunities  for  the 
Commission to influence the negotiation process, or a formalization of the process in order to 
reduce  the  Commission’s  opportunities  and  strengthen  the  control  of  the  member  state 
governments.    
With regard to the first task of coordination among the Six, the Commission played a 
larger role compared to the 1961-1963 negotiations. First, the Commission issued three official 
opinions that proved to be a driving force behind the Council’s decision to open the negotiations. 
Second,  with  its  communication  on  transitional  period  in  March  1970,  the  Commission 
contributed to reaching agreement among the member state governments on the modalities of the 
negotiations. Third, the Commission was more actively involved in contributing to the drafting of 
the Community position. Its global report on transitional periods in agriculture of November 
1970, for example, became the guideline for the Community position. 
With  regard  to  the  Commission’s  task  of  coordinating  and  participating  in  the 
negotiations two observations can be made. At an official level, in the Accession Conference, the 
Commission  was  less  visible  than  it  had  previously  been.  Due  to  the  appointment  of  one 
spokesman on all levels of the negotiations, the Commission’s opportunities to intervene in the 
Conference  were  reduced,  which  in  turn  resulted  in  less  incentive  to  show  up  on  the 
commissioners’ side (O’Neill 2000).  
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At  an  informal  level,  however,  the  Commission  more  actively  gave  direction  to  the 
negotiations. The enlargement condition that acceding countries should accept the acquis implied 
that  the  negotiations  were  dominated  by  technical  discussions  on  transitional  arrangements. 
Together with the increased size of the acquis, as a consequence of the policy developments since 
1963, this led to an increasing reliance on the Commission’s expertise in solving policy problems 
in  screening  the  candidate  countries  in  their  adaptation  to  the  Community  rules  and  the 
subsequent policy negotiations with the Six. 
In  sum,  when  looking  at  the  possible  effects  of the  specification  of  the  enlargement 
procedure on the actual enlargement process, the conclusion is that the Commission’s role in the 
agricultural negotiations seems to have become more decisive. The effect of a restriction of the 
Commission’s  formal  opportunities  seems  to  have  been  offset  by  a  reinforcement  of  the 
Commission’s role at an informal level. In other words, the actual enlargement process reflects an 
institutionalisation of the Commission’s influence rather than a reversal.  
 
To what extent can the reinforced role of the Commission be explained by the initiatives 
of  the  Commission,  acting  as  a  quasi-autonomous  actor,  or  the  changed  capabilities  and 
incentives of the member state governments? Compared to the enlargement negotiations of 1961-
63 the Commission gave more priority to enlargement and was more unified on what kind of role 
to play. This was due to the general political consensus about the necessity of enlargement and 
the perception that widening and deepening were two sides of the same coin. Another difference 
with the previous negotiations was that the Commission took a more technical and less political 
approach. This, however, did not imply that it wanted to exert less influence. Assuming a more 
technical role seems  to  have  been  a  tactical choice.  This  can  be  illustrated by  the  Secretary 
General’s call to concentrate on the formulation of the Community’s policy position rather than 
obtaining the political role of spokesman, based on the experience that the common position was 
more decisive for the course of the negotiations.
45 Further, the Commission’s representatives 
actively  promoted  the  Commission’s  competences  whenever  its  mandate  was  subject  to 
discussion in Coreper or the Council. They did so by referring to the communitarian nature of the 
EEC and linking enlargement and policy integration, thereby underlining the Commission’s right 
of initiative.  
Second,  several  attempts  were  undertaken  to  strengthen  the  organizational  coherence 
after  the  merger  of  the  executives  of  the  three  Communities  in  1967.  At  College  level 
coordination was improved by charging one Commissioner, instead of a group, with the accession 
negotiations.  This  task  was  entrusted  to  Deniau,  who  was  assisted  by  a  working  group  that 
operated independently of DG Enlargement. Further, precise rules were established concerning 
the  lines  of  communication  within  the  Commission,  the  representation  of  the  Commission’s 
position in Coreper and its cooperation with the applicant states. Finally, the Commission’s work 
on  the  enlargement  process  was  facilitated  by  the  creation  of  new  instruments,  such  as  the 
questionnaires as a way to gather information from the applicants. These efforts, however, did not 
automatically culminate in a more coherent internal organization. Disputes about the division of 
competences, for example between the Secretary General and the enlargement delegation, and 
coordination  problems  between  the  different  DGs  and  with  the  Commission’s  delegation  in 
London continued to exist.  
Third,  as  a  consequence  of  the  policy  developments,  the  agricultural  negotiations 
increasingly contained technicalities for which the member states depended on the Commission. 
This  effect  was  strengthened  by  the  Commission’s  technical  approach,  which  enhanced  the 
division of labour between the Commission and the Council members. An illustration of this is 
Deniau’s remark that the Commission’s policy proposals were usually adopted in the Council 
without further discussion, thereby relying on the Commission reports and the deliberations in 
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Coreper.
46 In sum, the conditions for a reinforcement of the Commission’s role by acting as a 
policy entrepreneur that had learned from its experiences in the previous enlargement process 
seem to be present.   
At  the level  of  the  Council, the  growing  complexity  of  the  European  policies  had  a 
twofold  effect  on  the  member  state  governments’  capabilities  and  incentives  to  control  the 
enlargement process. On the one hand, the Council members were better organized and more 
unified on the necessity of enlargement. Following the decision to conduct the negotiations on a 
bilateral basis in 1970 the pre-coordination among the member states to fine-tune the national 
positions was improved and a chairperson was appointed to set the agenda and speak for the 
Community.  
On the other hand, the achievement of a stronger cohesion in the Council increased the 
incentive to delegate more responsibilities to the Commission in the coordination a common 
position. Further, due to the slow progress of the Conference and the complaints of the applicants 
about  its  work  method,  the  member  states  felt  compelled  to  also  delegate  extended 
responsibilities  to  the  Commission  in  the  negotiations  with  the  applicants.  The  Council 
deliberations about the Commission’s fact-finding mission, in which the French expressed the 
fear  that  this  would  become  a  form  of  problem-solving  and  pre-negotiation,  reveal  that  the 
member states lost more control than some of them desired.
47 
At the level of the member states, the conditions for a reinforcement of the Commission’s 
role were also fulfilled. Despite the fact that the Council members had learned from the previous 
enlargement negotiations and improved their national coordination and the organization of the 
Accession  Conference,  the  growing  policy  complexity  resulted  in  more  reliance  on  the 
Commission’s expertise and incentives to delegate more tasks.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings in this paper suggest that, despite the decreased room for interpretation in 
the definition of the enlargement procedure, the Commission’s actual role in the first enlargement 
round has increased. In contrast to the rational institutionalist expectation that this is due to a 
delegation of power by the member state governments, this paper argues that the ideological 
nature of the conflicting national interests and the autonomy of the Commission as a learning 
organization are important explanatory factors as well.  
Future research should further examine whether the observed path dependency of the 
Commission’s role in the first enlargement round also holds for the next enlargement rounds. 
This refers, for example, to the sunk costs of institutional developments that have started in the 
1970-72 accession negotiations, such as the changed ideas about the relation between deepening 
and widening, the emphasis on the Community instead of the member states and the extended 
mandate of the Commission in initiating policy solutions and advising the Accession Conference 
as a whole.  
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Promoting a Knowledge of Europe: The Youth and European Integration 
Alexander Reinfeldt 
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
On March 24-25, 2007, 50 years after the signing of the Rome Treaties and in parallel with the 
European Council in Berlin, the “first ever EU Youth Summit” was held in Rome under the 
heading ‘Your Europe – Your Future’ – assembling about 200 young people from all EU mem-
ber states. The summit was organized by the European Commission and the European Parlia-
ment (in cooperation with the European Youth Forum). Its aim was to find answers to the ques-
tion what the youth wants the EU to be in future.
1 The results of the discussions were delivered 
to representatives of the EU institutions, even though the final declaration could not be submit-
ted directly to the Heads of State and Government in Berlin.
2 
 
The gathering in Rome is only one of numerous events aiming at the involvement of the youth 
in EU affairs in 2007.
3 As the Eurobarometer on “The Future of Europe” (published in May 
2006) reveals, young people are among those less interested in European political matters.
4 On 
the other hand, the younger the respondents, the more they tend to consider their respective 
countries’ EU membership a good thing
5 and to be optimistic about the future EU develop-
ment.
6 But knowledge of European issues among young people is rather under-developed – in 
times when developments on the European level become increasingly important for their every-
day life.
7 
 
Broadly describing the lifetime between childhood and adulthood, ‘youth’ as a category is far 
from being clear-cut in socio-historical discourses.
8 In modern times, the early youth period is 
generally equated with personality development and sexual maturation, the later youth period 
with occupational choice and assuming social and political responsibility.
9 In this respect, Jan 
                                                 
1 See http://www.europa.eu/50/news/article/070118_en.htm  and 
http://www.youthforum.org/youthsummit.htm.  
2 Deutsches Nationalkomitee für internationale Jugendarbeit: Presidency News Flash. Newsletter on the 
German EU Presidency, 02/2007, p. 1-3, available online 
http://www.dbjr.de/uploadfiles/17_1811_Presidency%20Youth%20Flash%2002-2007.pdf  
3 Cf. for further events concerning young people inter alia 
http://www.europa.eu/50/types/young_people/index_en.htm.  
4 Special Eurobarometer 251, Wave 65.1: “The Future of Europe”, available online 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_251_en.pdf , p. 14. 
5 Ibidem, p. 27. See also Standard Eurobarometer 66, Autumn 2006: First Results, available online 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/ebb66_highlights_en.pdf , p. 11. 
6 Standard Eurobarometer 66, Autumn 2006: First Results, available online 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/ebb66_highlights_en.pdf , p. 21. 
7 Cf. Stefan Rappenglück, 2006, “Jugend in der Europäischen Union”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 
vol.47, p. 3. 
8 It should be mentioned here that sociological youth studies do not refer any longer to ‘the’ youth as a 
socially differentiated group or accurately definable phase in life between childhood and adulthood; cf. 
Werner  Weidenfeld/Melanie  Piepenschneider,  1990,  Junge  Generation  und  Europäische  Einigung. 
Einstellungen – Wünsche – Perspektiven, Bonn, p. 9. 
9 Especially in the period under consideration here, the youth (or parts of it) were politically very active; 
for a social history of the youth in Europe see John R. Gillis, 1974, Youth and History. Tradition and 
Change  in  European  Age  Relations  1770-Present,  New  York/London;  Michael  Mitterauer,  1986, 
Sozialgeschichte der Jugend, Frankfurt/Main.  HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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W. van Deth alludes to the assumption that attitudes and skills acquired in childhood and youth 
tend to be formative and long-lasting, whereas it is a contentious issue which factors – family, 
school, ‘peer groups’, mass media etc. – are predominantly decisive for the political socialisa-
tion of young people.
10 One of the main purposes in the process of ‘political socialisation’ in 
democratic societies is to develop deliberate political attitudes and the ability to be critical on 
the basis of a general acceptance of the political system.
11 Hence, it seems to be both promising 
and necessary to address the youth in terms of European integration issues. 
 
In the early 1990s, Werner Weidenfeld and Melanie Piepenschneider described the relation be-
tween the youth and European unification as follows: “Die Zukunft Europas wird wesentlich 
davon  abhängen,  ob  es  gelingt,  die  heranwachsende  Generation  auf  ein  Leben  in  diesen 
übernationalen Strukturen vorzubereiten und dafür ihr aktives Interesse zu wecken.”
12 Hence, 
according  to  Weidenfeld  and  Piepenschneider  the  ‘future  of  Europe’  depends  not  only  on 
preparing the youth for living in supranational structures but on arousing their ‘active interest’ 
in it. According to them, any new generation will question the ‘architecture’ of international 
arrangements in Europe anew and draw its own conclusions.
13  
 
The European institutions seem to be fully aware that the attitudes of the youth towards the EU 
do matter given their manifold undertakings to get in contact with young people in Europe and 
to find out about their attitudes. But since when were the European institutions interested in the 
youth? What was considered to be the role of the youth in the process of European integration? 
And what has been done to address young people and to involve them in the EC/EU develop-
ment since the early 1950s? 
 
This contribution, based on recent multi-archival research, will deal with these questions by 
outlining a specific field of EC/EU-citizen relations: the information policies of the Commission 
of the European Communities and its predecessors, i.e. the High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Commissions of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and Euratom, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. In this respect, the efforts of or-
ganizations close to the European Movement – efforts with the aim to influence the thinking of 
young people about European co-operation and integration – will be taken into consideration, 
too. Referring, for instance, to the British case, it can be found that pro-European youth move-
ments in the early 1950s – when the European Movement in Britain was paralyzed and the press 
and  information  machinery  of  the  ECSC  not  yet  entirely  established  –  were  the  only 
organizations capable of actively promoting the idea of European unification and of serving as 
intermediaries between the Community institutions and the public in general. Hence, attention 
will be directed to the relations between these supranational and non-governmental actors to 
highlight their role in the process of European unification.
14 
                                                 
10 Jan W. van Deth, 2005, “Kinder und Politik”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte vol.41, p. 4f. For the 
concept of ‘political socialisation’ in general cf. Hans-Peter Kuhn, 2000, Mediennutzung und politische 
Sozialisation.  Eine  empirische  Studie  zum  Zusammenhang  zwischen  Mediennutzung  und  politischer 
Identitätsbildung im Jugendalter, Opladen. 
11 Rainer Watermann, 2005, “Politische Sozialisation von Kindern und Jugendlichen”, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte vol.41, p. 16. 
12 Weidenfeld/Piepenschneider, op.cit., p. 7. 
13 Ibidem. For a more recent account of the ambivalent and complex relation between the youth and the 
EU  cf.  Barbara  Tham,  2004,  “EU-Politik  und  die  Partizipation  Jugendlicher”,  in:  Forschungsgruppe 
Jugend und Europa (ed.) Das junge Europa. Plädoyer für eine wirksame Jugendpartizipation, München, 
p. 19-34. 
14 The political communication of the actors involved in the process of European integration has been 
largely neglected in the historiography on European integration so far. This neglect corresponds with the 
general political disregard for public participation in the first decades of European integration – disregard 
which initially was seen as a prerequisite for its functioning and progress. In accordance with the then HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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The Communities’ Information Policies and the Youth 
 
According to Weidenfeld and Piepenschneider “Bereits die Gründungsväter der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft  beschworen  die  Bedeutung  des  Engagements  der  jungen  Generation  für  ein 
geeintes Europa.”
15 And the ‘founding fathers’ deservedly did so, since those euro-enthusiastic 
young people after the Second World War, tearing down barriers and boundary-posts were 
rather a small active minority committed to a specific idea albeit with considerable (publicity) 
effect on the broader public.
16  
 
Hence, since the founding of the respective European Communities their ‘executives’
17 have 
been interested in the information of the public in the member states as well as in third coun-
tries. As early as 1952, the High Authority of the ECSC began to set up a press and information 
apparatus in Luxembourg, which was soon completed with exterior press and information of-
fices in several European capitals. This information machinery became the nucleus of the ‘com-
mon press and information service’ of the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom and, after the merger of 
the  three  ‘executives’  in  1967,  of  the  Commission’s  Directorate  General  for  press  and 
information. 
 
Essentially, the information policies – in third countries as well as in the member states – were 
intended to present the structure and the aims of the Communities, to explain the general deci-
sion-making process as well as specific decisions, and to establish a ‘dialogue permanent’
18 
with the public to make the Communities and its institutions known. All this was to acquire 
reputation  and  to  mobilize  support  for  the  Communities  and  the  process  of  European 
integration, and thereby to secure their existence and further development.
19 
 
                                                                                                                                               
prevailing neo-functionalist theory of political integration, public opinion seemed to be largely irrelevant; 
cf.  Frank  Brettschneider/Jan  van  Deth/Edeltraud  Roller  (eds.),  2003,  Europäische  Integration  in  der 
öffentlichen Meinung, Opladen. Only recently, given the increasing politicization and democratization of 
the integration process since the 1990s, political actors and researchers begin to recognize public opinion 
as a factor of fundamental importance for European integration and foreign policies; cf., for example, Ga-
briele  Clemens,  2004,  “Werben  für  Europa.  Öffentlichkeitsarbeit  für  den  europäischen 
Integrationsprozess am Beispiel des Films ‘Das Bankett der Schmuggler’”, in: Mareike König/Matthias 
Schulz  (eds.)  Die  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  und  die  europäische  Einigung,  1949-2000.  Politische 
Akteure, gesellschaftliche Kräfte und internationale Erfahrungen, Stuttgart, p. 311-326. 
15 Weidenfeld/Piepenschneider, op.cit., p. 7. 
16 Ibidem, p. 8. 
17  It  is  arguable  whether  the  term  ‘executive’  is  appropriate  for  the  European  Commission  and  its 
predecessors: first, because the High Authority, the EEC and Euratom Commissions and the merged 
Commission of the European Communities cannot be described as mere ‘executives’ for they each have 
their specific part in what might be called the ‘European supranational governance’; second, their re-
spective responsibilities allotted by the founding treaties differ considerably from each other. For heuris-
tic reasons, though, the term ‘executives’ will be used in this contribution as a generic term for the Com-
mission and its predecessors.   
18 BAC (Bruxelles Archives Commission) 173/1995/232: Orientations sur la Politique d’Information de la 
Commission pour 1970, 19.06.1969, Annexe: Information dans les pays tiers. 
19 These topics will be set out in more detail in the author’s forthcoming PhD thesis on Öffentlichkeitsar-
beit für den europäischen Integrationsprozess. Der Fall Großbritannien (1952-1972) [working title]; see 
also  Alexander  Reinfeldt, 2007, “British public opinion and European integration. Supranational and 
governmental  information  policies  in  Britain  (1952-1973)”,  in:  Marie-Thérèse  Bitsch/Wilfried 
Loth/Charles Barthel (eds.) Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne, Bruxelles, 
p. 107-122. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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The Communities’ information policies were mainly elite-oriented, aiming at politicians and 
political groups, trade unions, economic and business organizations, the media and academic 
circles.
20 Aside from this, informing ‘the youth’ was a preoccupation of the European ‘execu-
tives’. A budgetary draft concerning the High Authority’s information efforts in 1956/57 states: 
“Die  Information  der  Schüler  und  Studierenden  über  die  Gemeinschaft  bildet  Gegenstand 
besonderer Aufmerksamkeit seitens der Informationsstelle; es wurde ein besonderes Informa-
tionsprogramm dafür aufgestellt.”
21 Information work in this field comprised research grants (in 
co-operation with the Council of Europe), contacts with universities, primary and secondary 
schools, technical and commercial schools etc. were established; colloquia were organized for 
pedagogues, educational publishers, university professors, school inspectors, schoolmasters or 
teachers, and information material like working papers, maps, wall charts, filmstrips (statues) 
and other sources were made available for integration into the curricula.
22 According to Geor-
ges Berthoin from the High Authority’s press and information service these and other efforts – 
on the whole notably successful – served the purpose “den Lehrkräften eine Kenntnis der Mon-
tanunion zu vermitteln und ihnen behilflich zu sein, diese Kenntnisse weiter zu verbreiten.”
23 
For example, schemes of courses on the ECSC have been developed.
24  
 
Information in the youth field comprised two distinct, but complementary sectors: the informa-
tion in university milieus on the one hand, and the information of youth milieus in general (and 
adult education) on the other hand. The information in university milieus comprised higher edu-
cation whereas the information of youth milieus in general comprised pedagogic and educa-
tional organizations as a whole (extracurricular education, youth movements, advanced voca-
tional training – and adult education).
25 
 
The policies pursued in this field of information had the objective to respond to demands for 
documentation and information from professors, students, educators and teachers etc., and, if 
necessary, to arouse such demands “de façon que tous ceux qui exercent une influence sur ces 
milieux  soient  eux-mêmes  aussi  bien  informés  que  possible  des  réalités  communautaires  et 
puissent contribuer à former ceux dont ils ont la charge, notamment les jeunes générations, aux 
responsabilités qui sont ou seront les leurs dans une Europe unie.”
26 
 
                                                 
20 Cf. EGKS/Hohe Behörde: Fünfter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (9. April 1956 – 
13. April 1957), [Luxemburg] 1957, p. 53ff.; CEAB (Commission des Communautés Européennes Ar-
chives  Bruxelles)  1/940  (Microfiche):  Note  sur  l’organisation  du  Service  d’Information  de  la  Haute 
Autorité, 10.06.1954. 
21 CEAB 13/117 (Microfiche): Voranschlag fuer die Ausgaben der Informationsstelle im Rechnungsjahr 
1956/57, 18.01.1956. 
22 See, for example, EGKS/Hohe Behörde: Fünfter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (9. 
April 1956 – 13. April 1957), [Luxemburg] 1957, p. 56f. All this is not to be confused with ‘educational 
policy’ on the Community level, on this cf. Tobias Theiler, 2005, Political Symbolism and European 
Integration, Manchester/New York, p. 113-146. See also Antonio Varsori (ed.), 2004, The development of 
VET in the context of the construction of the EC/EU and the role of Cedefop, Luxembourg [Towards a 
history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe in a comparative perspective, Proceedings 
of the first international conference on the history of vocational education and training (VET) in Europe 
in a comparative perspective (Florence, 11-12 October 2002), Luxembourg, 2004, Vol. 2].  
23  CEAB  13/69  (Microfiche):  Georges  Berthoin:  Die  Montanunion  im  Unterricht  (Tätigkeitsbilanz), 
19.10.1955.  
24 Cf. CEAB 1/94 (Microfiche): Schéma d’un cours sur la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de 
l’Acier, undated [1955]. 
25  BAC  (Bruxelles  Archives  Commission)  51/1986/575:  Service  de  Presse  et  d’Information  des 
Communautés Européennes: Avant-Projet de Programme d’Activité pour 1967, 31.01.1967. 
26 Ibidem. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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In accordance with a decision of the European Parliament in November 1959, in subsequent 
years the Communities’ information service had special funds at its disposal, “um die Unter-
richtung der Öffentlichkeit über europäische Fragen und im besonderen die Ausbildung der 
Jugend im europäischen Geist zu fördern.”
27 To this end, arrangements were made with various 
European informational and educational institutions.
28 
 
The information efforts towards the youth and educational milieus developed in three main di-
rections: the  production  of  educational  material  (geographic  maps,  slides  and  publications); 
intensified co-operation with governmental services, especially those responsible for civic edu-
cation in the member states; and the realization of conferences for and with various educational 
organizations.
29 
 
It  became  increasingly  clear,  that  informing  the  youth  on  European  integration  issues,  too, 
meant to concentrate on ‘minorités agissantes’, reflecting the generally elite-oriented approach 
of the Communities’ information policies. In the information programme for 1961 it states: “Il 
est indéniable qu’une proportion considérable de la jeunesse dans les divers pays ignore à peu 
près tout de l’existence et des responsabilités des Communautés, et s’en désintéresse, de même 
qu’elle se désintéresse du fonctionnement des institutions politiques nationales ou de celui des 
autres organisations internationales.”
30 Despite the additional funds of 15 millions FB (francs 
belges) for the information of the youth, given the limited funds available for information – not 
only  in  this  field  –  “[u]ne  ‘conscience  civique  européenne  engagée’  ne  peut  être  créée  et 
développée […] qu’au sein des ‘minorités agissantes’ qui existent chez les jeunes comme chez 
les adultes, à l’intérieur des divers groupes sociaux (jeunes étudiants, ruraux, ouvriers).”
31 It 
was  these  ‘minorités  agissantes’,  organized  in  professional,  trade  unionist,  political  or 
confessional associations, that the ‘executives’ counted on ‘pour sensibiliser toute l’opinion 
jeune.’ For an effective information work, arousing lasting interest in European integration, it 
was considered to be necessary to “susciter l’intérêt actif et engagé des futurs citoyens en les 
intéressant  [original  emphasis]  aux  aspects  du  travail  des  Communautés  qui  auront  des 
incidences directes sur leur vie”
32. Hence, emphasis was also put on the exchange of ideas and 
concerns on an international level, i.e. on encounters of the European youth: “Une large part 
doit donc être faite dans le programme ‘d’information de la jeunesse’ aux activités susceptibles 
de créer une coopération durable entre organisations des six pays, dans l’étude des problèmes 
concrets posés par le processus d’intégration et intéressant les jeunes générations.”
33 
 
Concerning the ‘information universitaire’ the declared objective of the respective efforts – i.e. 
making available necessary information and funds – was to lay the foundations for a ‘coopéra-
tion culturelle européenne de forme communautaire’ by reinforcing co-operation between re-
searchers  and  institutions  and,  thus,  promoting  multi-disciplinary  research  on  questions  of 
European integration.
34 Additionally, those responsible for the Communities’ information poli-
cies were interested in the ‘information universitaire’, “car la consécration par l’université du 
processus d’intégration et des institutions qui le régissent a pour effet de créer une sorte de lé-
                                                 
27 EGKS/Hohe Behörde: Neunter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft (1. Februar 1960 – 
31. Januar 1961), Luxemburg 1961, p. 60. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 CEAB 2/2345 (Microfiche): CEE/Commission: Mémorandum sur la politique des Communautés en 
matière d’information à l’attention des Conseils, 26.06.1963. 
30 CEAB 13/360 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: Pro-
grammes d’Activité pour 1961, 18.01.1961. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 Ibidem. 
33 Ibidem. 
34 Cf. CEAB 2/2344 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: 
Programmes d’Activités pour 1963 (Document de travail), 26.02.1963. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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gitimité dans un milieu important et influent de nos sociétés, et contribue à influencer les jeunes 
générations à un moment décisif de leur formation intellectuelle et de leur orientation socio-
professionnelle.”
35 
 
Since the mid-1960s, information work in the educational field (university circles, youth organi-
sations and institutions  for  adult education)  has increasingly  become  the focal  point  of the 
Communities’ information policies.
36 This found its institutional expression in the course of the 
re-structuring of the Directorate General for press and information in the early 1970s when 
information-oriented ‘youth work – adult education and higher education’ together with the 
division for trade unionist information and the press and information offices were directly put in 
charge of the Director General.
37 
 
This was partly due to the fact that meanwhile “une génération de jeunes, âgés de seize à vingt-
cinq ans, pour qui la Communauté européenne est une réalité aussi vieille que leur premier 
souvenir”
38,  had  grown  up  and  reached  responsible  positions.  Hence,  in  an  information 
programme for 1965 it says: “Il convient donc […] d’axer notre effort d’information et de 
formation sur la génération montante, notamment sur les jeunes universitaires et les étudiants, 
mais  aussi  sur  les  jeunes  patrons,  les  jeunes  ouvriers,  les  jeunes  agriculteurs,  et  plus 
généralement  sur  les  jeunes  citoyens  [original  emphasis],  en  mettant  en  lumière  –  sans 
propagande  et  de  façon  très  concrète  –  le  dynamisme  et  l’irréversibilité  du  processus 
d’intégration”
39. 
 
Information efforts in university milieus should not only adapt higher education (in the member 
states) to the consequences of European integration for the transformation of national econo-
mies. In an information programme for 1967 a parallel was drawn with the role of European 
universities in the formation of European nation-states. This was not set out in detail, but it was 
intended to get contemporary universities to “jouer un rôle analogue dans la formation de 
l’unité européenne, tant par l’adaptation de l’enseignement proprement dit (programmes en 
cours) que par la recherche et par les échanges d’idées, de professeurs et d’étudiants.”
40 
 
Those responsible for the Communities’ information work also regarded those points of the 
final communiqué of the Hague Summit in 1969 referring to the participation of the youth
41 as a 
confirmation of their approach in this field: “Cette prise de position est une légitimation de 
l’action poursuivie depuis 1960 par la Commission dans ce domaine. Non seulement elle en 
souligne  la  finalité:  un  avenir  assuré  des  initiatives  communautaires,  mais  elle  en  définit 
l’inspiration essentielle: il s’agit d’associer les jeunes générations aux actions de création et de 
                                                 
35 CEAB 2/2909 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: Pro-
gramme d’Activité pour 1965, undated. 
36  Europäische  Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft/Kommission:  Zehnter  Gesamtbericht  über  die  Tätigkeit  der 
Gemeinschaft (1. April 1966 – 31. März 1967), [Brüssel] 1967, p. 403. 
37 EGKS-EWG-EAG/Kommission: Fünfter Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaften 1971, 
Brüssel/Luxemburg 1972, p. 472f. 
38 CEAB 2/2909 (Microfiche): Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: Pro-
gramme d’Activité pour 1965, undated. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 BAC 51/1986/575: Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: Avant-Projet 
de Programme d’Activité pour 1967, 31.01.1967.  
41  Schlußkommuniqué  der  Konferenz  [der  Staats-  und  Regierungschefs  der  Mitgliedstaaten  der  Eu-
ropäischen Gemeinschaften in Den Haag] (2. Dezember 1969), in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemein-
schaften, Nr. 1, 1970, p. 17: “16. Den hier beschlossenen Maßnahmen für die schöpferische Gestaltung 
und das Wachstum Europas steht eine größere Zukunft offen, wenn die Jugend daran engen Anteil hat; 
dieses Anliegen haben die Regierungen beherzigt, und die Gemeinschaften werden sich dessen anneh-
men.”  HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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progrès, ce qui implique, de toute évidence, plus que la simple information, l’éducation à la 
participation [original emphasis].”
42 Hence, more than ever, it was considered necessary to 
communicate the European project as a coherent ‘projet de civilisation’ with political, economic 
and social implications – rather than being purely technical or economical in character.
43 
 
On the whole, the European ‘executives’ seem to have been content with the results of the in-
formation efforts in the educational, especially in the university field: for example, due to the 
financial assistance of the Communities and other resources an increasing number of ‘centres de 
documentation  européenne’,  the  development  of  regular  courses  and  seminars  on  European 
issues, an increasing number of individual or collective research projects, PhD theses and the 
setting up of private organizations devoted to the co-ordination of research on European issues 
was noticed.
44 
 
Consequently, at the end of the 1960s it was intended to slightly adapt the information strategy 
regarding information of the youth. In the past, information activities in this field consisted to a 
large extent of gatherings like ‘journées d’étude’ and colloquia to interest those preoccupied 
with educational matters in European issues. In this respect, the capacities of the Communities’ 
information service were exhausted, particularly as the demands for information became in-
creasingly specialized. Thus, in future the main effort should be to produce and to disseminate 
publications responding to the particular needs of teachers and educators – such as the publica-
tion  Nouvelles  Universitaires  Européennes  in  France  for  the  ‘information  universitaire’;
45 
audio-visual  documentation,  for  example  in  school programmes,  was  another  means  in  this 
respect. 
 
In 1968, a first enquiry was made about the attitudes and focal interests of the youth. The en-
quiry had the objective “de mieux connaître les attitudes et centres d’intérêt des jeunes en vue 
d’une meilleure orientation des actions d’information et de formation européenne.”
46 Further-
more, according to Jacques-René Rabier, then director (general) in the Commission’s Direc-
torate General for press and information, a colloque on ‘the youth and Europe’ was arranged 
                                                 
42 BAC 1/1980/27: Direction Générale de la Presse et de l’Information: Projet de Programme d’Activité 
pour 1970, undated. Interestingly enough, Barbara Tham (op.cit., p. 26) points to increasing attempts of 
the EU since the 1990s to involve young Europeans in the discussions on the way of shaping Europe, “da 
sie  es  sind,  die  von  diesen  Entscheidungen  in  Zukunft  am  meisten  betroffen  sein  werden  und  diese 
Entscheidungen  auch  umsetzen  und  verwirklichen  müssen.”  Even  though  Tham  further  remarks  that 
young people were thus meant to assume “eine aktive Rolle als handelnder Akteur in der europäischen 
Zivilgesellschaft”, they seemingly were not meant to take these decisions as Europe’s future political 
actors and decision-makers. This aspect should not be overemphasized here, but the justifications for the 
Communities’ efforts to involve the youth in the 1950s and 1960s seem to have accentuated this future 
role of young people more explicitly. This points to the above-mentioned rather elite-oriented approach to 
‘the youth’ in the early period of European integration. 
43 A crucial project for 1970 was the planned international ‘Colloque des organisations de jeunesse’; cf. 
BAC 1/1980/27: Direction Générale de la Presse et de l’Information: Projet de Programme d’Activité 
pour 1970, undated. 
44 Cf. BAC 51/1986/575: Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes:  Avant-
Projet de Programme d’Activité pour 1967, 31.01.1967; CEAB 12/1076 (Microfiche): Service de Presse 
et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: Programme d’Activité pour 1966, undated. 
45 BAC 1/1980/26: Service de Presse et d’Information des Communautés Européennes: Projet de Pro-
gramme d’Activité pour 1968, undated. The plurilingual monthly bulletin Nouvelles Universitaires Eu-
ropéennes offered university milieus an overall view of the developments on a Community level re-
garding courses and studies on Community issues as well as on the respective activities of the Communi-
ties’ institutions; cf. on this BAC 1/1980/28: Commission des Communautés Européennes: Programme 
d’Activité d’Information pour 1971, 02.04.1971. 
46  BAC  1/1980/26:  Projet  de  Programme  d’Action  pour  la  Direction  Générale  de  la  Presse  et  de 
l’Information pour l’Année 1969, undated. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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gathering young people organized in various political, cultural or religious organizations to let 
them discuss their ideas of Europe; as Rabier recalls: “Les délégués étaient tout à fait libres de 
dire  ce  qu’ils  pensaient  et  de  l’Europe  et  de  la  façon  dont  elle  se  faisait.  Ce  qu’ils  nous 
demandaient surtout, c’était qu’on les aide à faire une information européenne indépendante 
dans leurs associations: les religieux, comme les politiques et les culturels étaient soucieux de 
développer leurs organisations. Ils n’étaient pas d’accord sur beaucoup de choses, mais ils con-
sidéraient que l’Europe était un terrain privilégié pour défendre leurs convictions et développer 
leurs activités.”
47 
 
A  clarification  in  a  Commission  document  on  the  general  orientations  of  the  information 
policies,  worth  mentioning  here,  emphasizes  that  the  Commission  was  not  to  subsidise 
organizations  but  stimulated  specific  activities  or  programmes  if  these  were  considered  to 
promote  a  better  understanding  of  the  Communities’  activities  and  responded  to  needs  of 
information.
48 
 
 
The Communities, the European Movement and the Youth: Forms of Co-Operation 
 
In this final chapter, a specific form of co-operation between the supranational ‘executives’ and 
branches of the European Movement, especially the European Youth Campaign (EYC), will be 
illustrated. It will mainly focus on the British case which, as will be seen, features some in-
teresting elements.  
 
In 1949, the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM)
49 had officially 
been launched. But only a few years later there was a split over the attitude towards suprana-
tional  European  integration.  Some  members,  especially  of  the  United  Europe  Movement 
(UEM), favoured a policy of pure inter-governmental co-operation, whereas other parts of the 
movement, above all members of Federal Union (FU), believed that the unification of the Six 
was in the best interests of Europe and should be encouraged.
50 The British European movement 
was  paralyzed  in  these  years;
51  and  even  when  the  UKCEM  was  revived  as  an  ‘all-party 
                                                 
47 Entretien avec Jacques-René Rabier par Gérard Bossuat (Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Juin 1998, 
Jean Monnet Oral Project, Chaires Jean Monnet d’Histoire – Histoire des débuts de la construction eu-
ropéenne,  Programme  français,  1998,  available  online  http://wwwarc.eui.eu/oh/pdf/INT609.pdf  . 
According to Rabier, this colloque was the precursor of the ‘European Youth Forum’. 
48 BAC 1/1980/27: Orientations sur la Politique d’Information de la Commission pour 1970 (Communica-
tion de la Commission au Conseil), 16.07.1969. 
49 The United Kingdom Council of the European Movement (UKCEM), serving as a coordinating body 
for pro-European movements in the UK, was officially launched at a meeting in the House of Commons 
on February 16, 1949. Its founding members were the United Europe Movement (UEM), the British sec-
tions of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (SMUSE), the European League for Eco-
nomic Cooperation (ELEC) and the Federal Union (FU); cf. Clemens A. Wurm, 1988, “Great Britain: 
Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Discussion on European Union”, in: Walter Lipgens/Wilfried 
Loth (eds.) Documents on the History of European Integration, Vol. 3: The Struggle for European Union 
by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-1950, Berlin et al., p. 
638,  and  F.X.  Rebattet,  1962,  The  “European  Movement”  1945-1953:  a  study  in  national  and 
international non-governmental organisations working for European unity, PhD Thesis, Oxford, p. 275f.; 
Jeremy  Moon,  1985,  European  Integration  in  British  Politics  1950-1963:  A  Study  of  Issue  Change, 
Aldershot et al., p. 101. The United Kingdom Council of the European Movement was later renamed 
British Council of the European Movement (BCEM) and finally merged with ‘Britain in Europe’ in 1969. 
50 AHCE (Archives Historiques des Communautés Européennes) Dep. ME (Mouvement Européen), No 
930/4: E.G. Thompson, Memorandum on the U.K. Council of the European Movement, undated.  
51 Moon, op.cit., p. 139. For the crisis of the international European Movement in the aftermath of the 
failure of the European Defence Community (EDC)/European Political Community (EPC) see Daniela 
Preda, 2006, “The Movements for European unity (1958 to 1972)”, in: Antonio Varsori (ed.) Inside the HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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organisation’ in 1954
52 it developed little activity until the 1960s.
53 The only organizations in 
Britain then working in the European field were the EYC and FU. 
 
The European Youth Campaign had been launched in 1951 under the auspices of the European 
Movement with the aim “de propager par l’éducation et l’information, l’idée de l’unité eu-
ropéenne parmi les jeunes.”
54 Its creation was born of the initiative of the American Committee 
for United Europe (ACUE), a CIA-led organisation, and reflected the general propagandistic 
stand against communist youth movements in Western Europe.
55 According to Michael Fogarty, 
Chairman of the British Youth Organisations’ Committee, the EYC was wholly educational in 
character; it sought only to assist existing youth movements to play their part in educating their 
members on the nature and problems of European co-operation. Financing for the EYC was 
mainly provided by the European Movement with special aid from the ACUE.
56 Hence, the 
EYC was meant to be ‘purely educational’; moreover, “participation in it should not imply ap-
proval of the political aims of those in favour of European Union”, but mere approval of “more 
cooperation and closer ties” in Europe.
57 
 
However, though the EYC tended to follow the cautious and balanced European Movement’s 
attitude towards supranational integration it pursued a policy in favour of the ECSC in its edu-
cational and information efforts. In a document from 1955 on the activities of the EYC it says: 
“Faire connaître l’existence et les activités de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de 
l’Acier auprès de la jeunesse d’Europe est l’un des buts de l’action de la C.E.J. [Campagne Eu-
ropéenne de la Jeunesse].”
58 According to this document, after the failure of the European De-
fence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) it was said to be the 
EYC’s task ‘à défendre la C.E.C.A.’ (Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier): “Il 
s’agit d’une part de continuer à informer les jeunes Européens de l’existence et du travail de la 
C.E.C.A. (Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier), et d’autre part, ce qui est encore 
plus  important,  de  leur  expliquer  dans  quelle  mesure  et  par  quel  procédé  l’action  de  la 
Communauté a une influence sur leurs intérêts et préoccupations quotidiens.”
59 To this end, for 
example, the EYC intended to publish a brochure on the ECSC and to introduce a regular 
column  on  the  ECSC  in its  own journals ‘Jeune  Europe’,  ‘Jugend  Europas’  and  ‘Giovane 
Europa’ respectively, “rubrique dans laquelle seraient reprises et présentées sous une forme 
                                                                                                                                               
European  Community.  Actors  and  Policies  in  the  European  Integration,  1957-1972,  Baden-
Baden/Bruxelles, p. 184. 
52 See AHCE Dep. ME, No 930/3: Constitution and objectives of the United Kingdom Council of the 
European Movement agreed at meeting in the House of Lords on the 18th November, 1954, Appendix A 
to UKCEM Min 12 (1954). 
53 Moon, op.cit., p. 151. 
54 CEAB 3/445 (Microfiche): Activités de la Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse intéressant la Com-
munauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, [1955]. For the EYC see also Jean Marie Palayret, 1995, 
“Eduquer les jeunes à l’union: La Campagne européenne de le jeunesse 1951-1958”, Journal of European 
Integration History vol.1, N
o 2, p. 47-60. 
55 Palayret, op.cit., p. 47f. Cf. Hugh Wilford, 2003, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War. Calling 
the Tune?, London/Portland, p. 239f. 
56 AHCE Dep. ME, No 181/2: Preparatory Meeting of Welsh Youth Organisations, 22.04.1952. For the 
ACUE funding of the European Movement and the EYC see Richard J. Aldrich, 2002, The Hidden Hand. 
Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, Woodstock/New York, p. 342-370, especially p. 
361f. 
57 AHCE Dep. ME, No 181/1: European Youth Campaign: Meeting of Representatives of British Youth 
Organisations, 18.12.1951. A distinction had been made in the EYC between rather educational youth 
movements abstaining from ‘political’ activities and those political youth movements falling in with the 
general ideas of the European Movement, cf. Palayret, op.cit., p. 49. 
58 CEAB 3/445 (Microfiche): Activités de la Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse intéressant la Com-
munauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, [1955]. 
59 Ibidem. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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mieux adaptée au grand public, les informations que la C.E.C.A. diffuse elle-même dans ses 
différents bulletins.”
60 Interestingly enough, High Authority officials were far from enthusiastic 
about these and similar plans of the EYC because – given the strained financial situation of the 
Campaign – they suspected financial motives behind the EYC’s intentions.
61 
 
Contacts between the European ‘executives’ and the EYC in the information field also com-
prised the financing of courses for individuals including stays in the headquarters of the ‘execu-
tives’  in  Luxembourg  or  Brussels  respectively.
62  Regarding  co-operation  in  the  educational 
field, in 1958, Roy Pryce from the Communities’ London press and information office proposed 
to the secretary of the UKCEM to jointly organize ‘journées d’étude’ on the Common Market 
for university professors. Besides, a common project with the European Youth Campaign for 
‘journées d’étude’ assembling teachers from ‘secondary modern schools’ should be continued. 
As a result of the ‘journées d’étude’ in the previous year a pilot scheme was arranged in Bir-
mingham schools. For teachers in sciences and economy from ‘secondary technical schools’ 
similar ‘journées d’étude’ were envisaged to prepare a ‘programme de leçons’.
63 In particular 
after the signing of the Rome Treaties the EYC fell in line with the supranational approach to 
European integration as represented by the European Communities and “le succès de la mise en 
application des deux traités devenait l’objectif numéro un de la Campagne.”
64 
 
Concerning the British case, hence, the Communities’ London press and information office not 
only maintained contacts with the British media and the ‘milieux de l’enseignement’, but un-
dertook common action in collaboration with the European Movement, and especially with the 
EYC in Britain – to an extent that those responsible for the Communities’ information work in 
Britain considered the necessity for the services of their public relations counsellor in Britain, 
Alan Campbell-Johnson, to be decreasing.
65  
 
According to Jean Marie Palayret, the co-operation between the European ‘executives’ and the 
EYC ended when the EYC was dissolved in 1959 after futile attempts to serve as an ‘office 
d’information et d’éducation européenne’ for the European Communities in response to the 
reduced funds from the ACUE.
66 Since then, for example, financial contributions from the Com-
munities to various organizations in the political vicinity of the European Movement or to its 
branches such as the ‘Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe’ or the ‘Nouvelles 
Equipes Internationales’ remained a common method in the educational field (including adult 
education). Such funds were granted for specific operations, if necessary, subject to prior con-
sultation of the respective Community authorities.
67 
 
                                                 
60 Ibidem. 
61 Cf. CEAB 3/445 (Microfiche): Note Fontaine to Renckens, 01.03.1955. 
62 Cf., for example, CEAB 13/69 (Microfiche): Informationsstelle: Antrag auf Erhöhung der finanziellen 
Beihilfe für die ‘Campagne Européenne de la Jeunesse’ (Europäische Jugendaktion), 30.11.1955. 
63 CEAB 13/246 (Microfiche): Programme d’Activité du Service d’Information jusqu’au 30 Juin 1959, 
20.09.1958, Annexe VI: Secteur Anglo-Américain, Programme 1958-1959. 
64 Palayret, op.cit., p. 57-59 (57); Palayret points out that the creation of EEC and Euratom led to a 
significant reduction of ACUE funds in aid of the EYC from 425,000 dollars in previous years to 300,000 
dollars in 1957-1958 and 150,000 dollars in 1958/1959. According to Preda, op.cit., p. 185, the European 
Movement as a whole increasingly sought to obtain Community funding after the Rome Treaties came 
into effect – with “no small impact on the official policies of the EM [European Movement].” 
65 CEAB 13/246 (Microfiche): Programme d’Activité du Service d’Information jusqu’au 30 Juin 1959, 
20.09.1958, Annexe VI c): Note sur le Bureau de Londres. 
66 Cf. Palayret, op.cit., p. 58f. 
67  Cf.,  for  example,  BAC  140/1987/40:  Procès-verbal  de  la  cinquième  réunion  du  Conseil 
d’Administration du Service Commun “Presse et Information”, 21.10.1960. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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For the British case it has to be kept in mind that the situation in the 1960s was different from 
previous periods anyway, given the first British application to join the Common Market in 1961 
and subsequent events. Co-operation with the British European Movement even in the youth 
and educational field seems to have been very cautious until final British entry. In a document 
on the utilisation of the funds for the information of the youth (and adult education) from Janu-
ary 1962 it says in this respect “qu’aucune somme n’a été explicitement prévue pour les actions 
en direction des pays tiers et notamment de la Grande-Bretagne. Alors qu’en fait, l’intérêt mar-
qué par les organisations de jeunesse de ces pays s’accentue de plus en plus.”
68 These expecta-
tions ought to be met indirectly by enabling young people from Britain and other third countries 
to participate in international youth activities organised by various educational organizations or 
in meetings held in other countries.
69 
 
It was the aim of this contribution to focus on some aspects of the manifold relations between 
‘the  youth’  and  European  integration  by  highlighting  the  efforts  of  supranational  and  non-
governmental actors to influence the thinking of young people about European unification. As 
exemplified above, informing young people was a focal interest of the European ‘executives’ 
since the 1950s and in this field of activity co-operation with branches of the European Move-
ment took place. However, much more research would be necessary to assess the actual impact 
of these efforts on youth thinking and to compare the efforts of that time with those nowadays. 
 
 
Alexander Reinfeldt 
Universität Hamburg 
Historisches Seminar  
Arbeitsbereich Europäische Geschichte 
alexander.reinfeldt[at]uni-hamburg.de 
 
                                                 
68  CEAB  2/2116  (Microfiche):  Répartition  générale  du  crédit  ‘Jeunesse  et  Education  populaire’, 
12.01.1962 in conjunction with: Utilisation du crédit ‘Jeunesse – Education populaire’. 
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Towards a “Dialogued Integration”? The Overlapping Nature of Actors and 
Witnesses in the Eastward Enlargement Process 
Cristina Blanco Sío-López 
 
Introduction 
The Eastward enlargement of the EU, usually presented as a culmination of European 
integration history, even constitutes, for some Commission actors, “the real end of the Cold 
War”. On the other hand, they also expect the citizens-witnesses to believe that the EU-25/27 is 
“obviously” the same Union, with the same initial objectives: to achieve peace, stability, and 
prosperity in the continent. 
However,  one  fundamental  difference  with  past  enlargements  lies  in  the  need  of 
approval by a new and progressively powerful “European voice”: the incipient European public 
opinion, which has been strong enough to eliminate or postpone the Constitutional Treaty. If it 
is true that past EC/EU enlargements have raised controversial issues in different national public 
opinions, the question of the definition of Europeanness and the issue of the final frontiers of the 
EU  has  been  discussed  as  never  before  with the  approaching  of  the  Eastward  enlargement 
implementation date in 2004. And the determinant fact is that it had an incomparable European-
wide dimension and reaction surpassing national public opinion spheres. Hence, the need of 
approval  by  a  European-wide  public  opinion  has  become  essential  to  legitimise  further 
enlargement, as the creation of a DG Communication and the￿European Commission Plan D 
(Democracy, Dialogue and Debate) urgently evidence. This new voice creates an overlap in the 
roles, power, and definition of traditionally separated actors and witnesses in the process of 
European integration. Furthermore, it is modifying the direction of an integration process that 
has changed European society without, in many cases, entailing its involvement. An economic 
Union can work and rely on believing elites but a growingly political Union can only survive 
with the support of the citizens.  
Eastward  enlargement  implies  for  the  EU  a  redefinition  of  its  raison  d’être,  its 
institutions, and frontiers and this fact creates the new need of a “two-ways communication” 
that  goes  beyond  informative  and  propagandistic  campaigns.  In  this  sense,  and  taking  into 
account the  increasingly  influential roles of  non-state actors  like  the  media  or  civil society 
organisations  in  the  planning  and  implementation  of  enlargement,  we  could  even  see  the 
transition towards an urgent demand for a “dialogued integration”. 
The new voices bring puzzling debates, such as those who are asking out loud whether 
today’s EU is not too much an answer to the concerns of the past and too little an answer to the 
challenges of the future1. 
This  is  accompanied  by  a  temporal  dissociation  between  the  citizens  and  the 
institutions:  While  the  first  focus  on  contextual  realities  which  affect  their  daily  lives,  the 
second ones seem to be immersed in a time of use and abuse of historical arguments to defend 
their political positions. And a clear example of this phenomenon is the EU Communication 
Strategy on Enlargement.  
                                                 
1 Interview with the Representative of the Action Campaign to support and implement Plan D on behalf of the DG 
Communication. Strategic field: Eastward enlargement. Permanent Representation of the European Commission in 
Berlin, held on 10th July 2006 
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The new methodology underlining this document, as we will observe in the following 
sections,  is  based  on  a  massive  number  of  media  studies  and  projects  ordered  by  the 
Commission in order to detect, which are the fears and threats perceived by the EU public 
opinion,  to  be  able  to  elaborate  counter-myths  that  could  offer  guarantees,  reasonable 
explanations and a relief to combat any initial reluctance. 
 
1. The EU Communication Strategy on Enlargement and the Reactions to it: The New 
Determining Element of Public Opinion Perceptions 
 
The  1st  May  2004,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  “Old  Continent”,  most 
European  countries  became,  following  their  democratic  will,  equal  members  of  the  same 
political and economic entity. The hope of the “Return to Europe” of the Central and Eastern 
European  Countries  (CEEC)  after  the  democratic  revolutions  of  1989  found  then  a 
materialisation through the accession to the European Union. For the new member states it was 
a revenge on history, the history inherited from “Yalta” and from the division of Europe after 
the Second World War. The notion of Europe was an integrant part of these countries’ cultural 
identity and of their attachment to so-called Western values. And it is precisely that very notion 
of  Europe  that  becomes  the  objective  of  these  countries  after  the  fall  of  communism, 
constituting the main horizon of their democratic transitions. For the old EU member states, 
Eastward  enlargement  is  a  geopolitical  ambition  (to  extend  stability  and  democracy  in  the 
continent) but, above all, a major challenge for European integration, its political cohesion, and 
its future frontiers. 
But, are we talking about the same Union? Or does the nature of the Union totally 
change in the post-Cold war period when its geopolitical meaning is suddenly cancelled?  
In this sense, it is curious to observe how the persons in charge of bringing about the 
enlargement process at the Commission want to give the impression that it is obviously the 
same  Union  going  through  a  new  enlargement  process  and  walking  towards  the  initial 
objectives of the Union, to achieve peace, stability and prosperity in the continent. 
 The way the enlargement process was organised, with a focus on accession conditions 
to be fulfilled and a negotiations calendar, emphasises the impression of “just a new step” in a 
future-oriented  process  leaning  towards  an  ignored  culmination.  Setting  the  phases  of  a 
“natural” evolution accentuates the perception of “going on as we should and need to”. But is it 
just the same Union in a new evolutionary phase? 
There are many factors that indicate that Eastward enlargement is an unprecedented 
one. Fist of all, we could allude to the so-called “revolution of the new member states number”. 
Unlike former enlargements, which implied the accession of one or two new member states, 
Eastward  enlargement  includes  twelve  new  member  states:  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the islands of Malta and Cyprus in 
20042, joined by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Linked to this fact there is another important 
difference based on the economic and political antecedents of the post-Soviet states. Besides, 
Eastward  enlargement  explicitly  poses  the  question  on  the  final  frontiers  of  European 
integration as no other enlargement has done before. But, above all, one fundamental difference 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that only the Greek part of Cyprus has acceded to the EU, since the referendum of the “Annan 
Plan” to unite both sides (Greek and Turkish) of the island before enlargement to enter as a unity has not been 
approved. 
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with past enlargements lies in the need of the approval of the European public opinion, which 
has  never  been  so  influential  to  change  the  direction  of  an  integration  process  with  was 
changing their lives without this entailing their involvement.  
An economic Union can work and rely on believing elites but a growingly political 
Union can only survive with the support of the citizens. This is because a more political union 
challenges  the  existing  levels  of  representativity  within  the  EU  institutional  system  and 
demands not only a stronger role of the European Parliament, but also more interaction with 
civil society actors, better and more accessible information on influential political decisions and 
the acting visibility of the other side of the mirror in any transparent democracy, e.g. the views 
and claims of the EU citizenry. Is this, therefore, a different Union? A constitutional process 
could have indicated the success of the vision of the EU as a political project but the weight of 
public opinion in the dismissal of the Constitutional Treaty sheds light on the nature of this 
probably new Union. It is not just “action” on behalf of politicians and civil servants which 
builds the integration process, but also “reaction” and reaction comes from an unheard of actor 
in this scenario, an actor commonly defined as European citizenry. 
In sum, Eastward enlargement implies for the EU a redefinition of its raison d’être, its 
institutions and of frontiers. Enlargement poses, therefore, the question of the EU legitimacy 
before the peoples who compose it and entails a reformulation of the major ideas, issues and 
interests  which  shape  its  political  identity  (European  solidarity,  European  Constitution, 
European security…)3. 
 
2.  The  challenges  of  an  enlarged  Europe:  Public  opinions  without  a  European  public 
space? 
 
The study of Eastward enlargement has largely emphasised the diplomatic and political 
strategies or juridical and economic aspects of the candidate countries. On the other hand, it is 
necessary to take into account the societies, the political and partisan cleavages and the role of 
the public opinion. The referendums on EU accession have shown the common aspiration of the 
peoples of the CEECs to take part in the European integration process. However, the candidate 
countries are not part of a homogenous block but are characterised by a diversity which will 
grow even more within the EU4. In opposition to NATO enlargement, which implies only the 
accession to a military institution, EU enlargement does not only involve the legislators and 
state administrations but also an interpenetration in the economies and societies of the candidate 
countries. For this reason, the success of enlargement will also depend on “intermediary bodies” 
like trade unions, the media, universities, the NGOs and other agents which participate in the 
constitution of a civil society5.  
                                                 
3Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide Report (ordered by DG ENLARGEMENT): Impact Assessment of Calls for 
Proposals as implementation tools of the Enlargement Communication Strategy. Executive Summary, 10 December 
2005, pp. 2-3   
4Speech  of  the  former  Head  of  the  Information  Unit  at  the  DG  Enlargement  of  the  European  Commission: 
Enlargement of the European Union and the Role of the European Commission in this Process, presented at the DG 
Enlargement of the European Commission in Brussels on the 30th of October 2001. 
5  Personal  Interview  with  the  Deputy  Head  of  Unit  of  the  Information,  Communication  and  Inter-Institutional 
Relations Unit at the DG Enlargement, European Commission. Brussels, 15th of January 2006 HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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In a nutshell, Eastward enlargement obliges us to ask ourselves on the one hand, about 
the formation of a “European civil society”6 as Victor Perez Diaz did and, on the other hand, 
about the existence of a European public space and public opinion within the EU member states, 
as Jürgen Habermas7 maintained.  
But  there  is  still  one  phenomenon  that  needs  to  be  explained  and  it  is  that  of  the 
reluctances of the EU public opinion to enlargement, accompanied by the occasional reluctance 
of some elites and the citizens of the new member states. The factors to analyse such reluctances 
to welcome the candidate countries (stronger than ever before in the history of the European 
integration)  could  be  explained  by  these  three  factors:  the  step  by  step  evolution  of  the 
enlargement process, the “normative” method of this new accession and an information deficit, 
linked to the absence of a trans-European debate. 
 
2.1. The first factor: Time perceptions and the different phases of the Eastward 
enlargement process 
 
The fifteen years that separate the fall of the communist system in 1989 and the access 
of the CEECs to the European Union in 2004 have a major consequence for the public opinions 
of the continent, both West and East, namely the dissociation between the democratic changes 
of 1989 and the European project. The “dividends of peace” were pocketed in the West as the 
“dividends of democracy” in the East. Besides, we should not underestimate the political cost of 
the fact that NATO enlargement preceded that of the EU. 
In their relations with the EU, the candidate countries have known three phases which 
partly explain the perplexity of the CEECs’ elites and opinions at the moment of their accession 
to the EU. From 1989 till 1993 there is a phase of “europhoria” after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
during which there is a strong European aspiration in the CEECs, an authentic sympathy and a 
will of openness, linked to empathy, in the Western European public opinions. However, such 
enthusiasm is not unanimous in the realm of European politics. The Association agreement 
signed with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia8 in 1991 was vague about a future accession 
and was limited to a commercial agreement establishing quotas in determined sectors in which 
the post-Soviet countries could be competitive (textile, steel, agricultural products…). This is 
also the time when François Mitterrand introduces his plan of a European Confederation, which 
at first seduced Vaclav Havel at first. In this sense, many political figures of the time understand 
that the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact must imply that the post-Soviet countries come 
closer to the European Union in some way. Nonetheless, Mitterrand soon declares that “the 
accession of the CEECs to the EU could only happen after decades and decades” even if he 
thinks it is wiser to integrate in a “European Confederation” a Soviet Union about to break up9. 
It is then that the image of a France hostile to Eastward enlargement was born, a perception 
reinforced after the “no” to the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, in which the fear to 
                                                 
6 Perez Diaz, V. (1998) “La Cité européenne”, Critique internationale, vol.3, p. 1 
7 Habermas, J. and Derrida, J. (2003) “Europe, plaidoyer pour une politique extérieure commune», Libération, 2 Juin 
2003 ; Habermas, J. (2003) L’espace public, Paris: PUF. 
8 Still one country in 1991. 
9 Mitterrand, F. (1991) Le Monde, 14 Juin 1991. On French foreign policy in this period see Rupnik, J. (1998) “La 
France de François Mitterrand et les pays du Centre-Est” in Samy, C. (dir.) Mitterrand et le sortie de la guerre froide, 
Paris: PUF and also De la Serre, F. (2004) «La France et l’élargissement à l’Est de l’Union européenne », Annuaire  
français des Relations internationales, Printemps. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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further enlargement (and especially to Turkey’s accession) seems to have played an influential 
role in public opinion. 
The second phase, from 1993 to 2000 would be characterised by impatience on behalf 
of the CEECs and mutual disappointments. With the violent break-up of the ex-Yugoslavia it 
was soon clear that post-communism did not imply only the triumph of liberal democracy but 
also a return to war and extreme nationalism, constituting challenges to which the EU did not 
well know how to respond. In historical terms, this is a reminder of the usual unmanageability 
of change and historical turning points. In 1799 Woltmann made a very interesting reflection on 
the  real  effect  of  turning  points  in  History.  He  refers  to  the  French  Revolution,  which  he 
witnessed,  but  it  could  well  be  applied  to  other  cases.  He  defines  turning  points,  very 
interestingly, as a paradigmatic example of “progressive future” and says:  
“The French Revolution was for the whole world a phenomenon that appeared to mock 
all historical wisdom, daily developing out of itself new phenomena which one knew less and 
less how to come to terms with”10. 
The end of the Cold War retains the same sense of unmanageability of radical change in 
History, in which previous criteria, values and instruments seem not to work any more. Turning 
points are a time of re-invention but, till new self-definitions are created, events move faster 
than decisions and discourses and are not the fruit of them but the striking cause.  
This  was  the  case  with  the  EU  and  the  disorientated  search  for  a  solution  for  the 
Yugoslavian tragedy. Thus, it is very significant to observe that there was a turn towards the 
CEECs and the promotion of their future accession since that could give the positive image of 
history-changer  and  dream-fulfiller  that  the  EU  would  forever  lack  in  its  intervention  in 
Yugoslavia11. Therefore we can say that the gruesome war on European soil during the nineties 
was the dark side of the medal that had to be hidden by the golden side, represented by the 
project of re-unifying the East and West of Europe. To some extent, enlargement could have 
won  from  that.  And  that  is  also  why  from  2005  onwards  there  is  a  high  emphasis  on  the 
accession of the Balkan countries with the meaning of a pending debt for which it is not even 
necessary to give reasons or justifications. 
In any case, from 1994 till 2000 the CEECs understand that it is time for deepening, 
clearly  explicated  by  the  implementation  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  that  the  Eastward 
enlargement does not seem to be such an urgent priority for the EU. These countries prepare 
themselves  then  for  a  long  and  demanding  march,  marked  by  a  shifting  calendar  which 
resembles a permanent waiting room. 
However, in the spring of 1998, with the opening of negotiations for five countries 
(Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Estonia) the enlargement process is given 
a new impulse. This third phase, which goes from the Nice Treaty of 2001 to the actual entry of 
the  ten  first  candidate  countries  in  May  2004,  is  pervaded  by  a  sense  of  pragmatism  and 
expertise. The negotiators representing the CEECs’ governments examine with the Commission 
officials  (under  the  direction  of  Commissioner  Günter  Verheugen)  the  thirty  chapters 
concerning the conditions for accession. In this period (also marked by the creation of the DG 
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Enlargement at the European Commission in 199912) the enlargement process takes a technical 
turn that also affects public opinion since it starts to focus on the analysis of the advantages and 
drawbacks  and  the  costs  and  benefits  of  enlargement.  The  cost-benefit  analysis  is  really 
overwhelming in the media and in the academic literature of the period, and also very present at 
the EU institutions, which threatens to lose the conducting thread with the origins and objectives 
of the democratic changes of 198913. Without an explicit redefinition of the European project 
and without a communication strategy focusing on the political explanation of enlargement, the 
EU gives the impression of being imposing a “we know what’s best for you” kind of attitude. 
The obvious result of such mood is a low support of the citizens within the EU member states, 
but also, increasingly, in the candidate countries. 
 
2.2. The second factor: The so-called “normative method” 
 
In the aftermath of the disappearance of the “Soviet empire” there are two available 
options for the EU with regard to the new states knocking on its door: The first option consists 
of an inclusion in the democratic European club without an actual accession, which could come 
eventually after long transition periods to fulfil all the necessary adaptations. Meanwhile, the 
CEECs would only be tied to the EU by an association partnership. The second option consists 
of promoting the same model as that used for Southern Europe in the eighties and for Northern 
Europe in the nineties, actual accession in several steps of negotiations to become a full member 
of the club. This will be the selected option. This model has the advantage of having been partly 
experimented before, of not clashing with the deepening priorities of the EU in the nineties and 
of taking the time to decide on the evolution of the process. Nonetheless, it will soon be clear 
that having to deal with countries, which were well immersed in a totally different political and 
economic  system  will  need  new  instruments  for  unprecedented  challenges.  Also,  new 
conditionality rules will have to be invented to manage applications and negotiations process. In 
any case, the creation of a new kind of conditionality is also a way of postponing accession 
whenever this is convenient for the EU, managing at least the timetable of the process. 
The counterpart of such an evolution is that the idea of a unifying encounter of the 
continent has been substituted by the notion of the EU enlarging itself to charitably integrate the 
other side of the continent. It is a change from the idea of reinventing democracy over the ruins 
of totalitarianism implying a re-foundation of the European project (alluding to the “founding 
myth  of  the  freedom  of  all  peoples  as  the  true  fundament  of  the  European  project”14,  as 
sustained by Geremek) to the priority of exporting to Eastern Europe a model of norms and 
institutions. Such priority, dictated by the understandable need to preserve the internal cohesion 
of the Union was commonly perceived by the CEECs as the oblivion of the unification priority, 
which should value more their possible contributions. In Geremek’s words “EU enlargement 
                                                 
12 Before the creation of the DG Enlargement at the European Commission in 1999, the enlargement process was 
managed by the DG 1A within the External Relations DG, devoted to the relations with Central and Eastern European 
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policy  was  perceived  in  the  CEECs  as  a  pure  assimilation  of  new  economic  and  political 
standards”15. 
In this sense, the reaction of the CEECs could be similar to that of Eastern Germany 
after reunification, where the feeling of annexation without valued intrinsic contributions was 
very strong, too. The terminology of the enlargement process also accentuates the normative 
character  of  the  enterprise:  “screening”,  “monitoring”,  “regular  reports”,  “adoption  of  the 
acquis”, and “assessment reports”16. All those terms also emphasise how performances had a 
one-sided judge that one must please so that the final assimilation by the bigger entity can be 
completed. They also suggest a feeling of being under surveillance and of deserving to be 
punished with postponements if the assimilation process does not fit the conditionality rules. 
And that was difficult to accept from countries which were under surveillance and under a 
demanding patron with its own conditionality to punish or reward during long decades. This is 
maybe one of the main motors of public opinion discontent or reluctance in the CEECs: It is 
difficult to enjoy a regained sovereignty when a new conditionality is limiting the directions of 
your recently acquired freedom. 
There are also two readings of the process: The first and positive one comes from the 
modernising elites and the long durée historians who see enlargement as a necessary step of the 
process of modernisation of the economies and institutions of the “suburbs of Europe”17 always 
in search of catching up with the Western world. The Polish historian Jerzyy Jedlicki calls it 
“the eternal return of the CEECs towards Europe”18 . The Eastward enlargement of the EU will 
appear, under this optic as the fourth version of the modernisation of the CEECs after the 
Habsburgian,  Prussian  and  communist  ones.  The  main  difference  would  be  that  this  time 
entering the EU can be seen as a “voluntary servitude” since it is a freely consented choice to 
integrate in European modernity. In this sense, the EU acts as a structural power able to organise 
the structure of the political economy in the states of the Central-Eastern periphery. This passes 
through the diffusion of norms to the states and to the social actors, with an impact over the 
political systems, constituting “norms and nannies”19 as Ron Linden upheld when explaining the 
transfers and appropriations of norms in the enlargement process. Following this approach, the 
enlargement process will become, for political scientists, the finest example of a process of 
international socialisation. 
The second reading of the process privileges the vision of a juridical and economic 
integration  over  a  political  one  and represents therefore  a  danger  for  European  integration. 
According to Vaclav Havel “Europe falls under the feet of technocracy, under normative rules 
and  administrative  procedures  that  make  us  forget  the  essential:  the  sense  of  a  process  of 
reunification”20. The detachment between democratic change and integration process increases 
the impression of a hope confiscated by experts and technocrats and made unintelligible for the 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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public opinion. This is due to the distance taken in the form of a jargon which cannot be 
understood by the public and which divides, therefore, EU policy-makers on the one-hand and 
citizens on the other, having the latter no time to decipher the isolating language of the EU 
institutions.  Thus,  increasingly,  “the  arguments  of  the  euro-sceptic  parties  of  the  candidate 
countries become very similar to those within the EU”21. 
 
 
 
2.3. The third factor: The absence of a trans-European debate in addition to a 
static information deficit 
 
The  complaints,  misunderstandings,  and  reluctances  of  the  public  opinion  towards 
Eastward enlargement are also explained by the poverty of the available information and the 
absence of a political explanation of enlargement. The role of the media is essential from this 
point of view. There was not a big interest of the media in the CEECs during the nineties and 
that could be consider as a good sign of political stability since as it is commonly said “no news 
means good news”. Hence, democracy in the CEECs goes under a process of trivialisation while 
media attention is concentrated in the Balkans. “Ignorance is bliss” is a statement generally 
made regarding the perceptions on enlargement. However, ignorance seems to generate the 
opposite effect, since a deficit of information linked to a deficit of support has been confirmed 
by numerous surveys and reports22. 
On the other hand, the low support to enlargement in old and new member states could 
also be explained by the absence of a political debate on the meaning of enlargement and on the 
redefinition of the European project. And it is curious to observe how the increasing number of 
all sorts of exchanges and a circulation of persons between both sides of the continent are not 
mirrored  by  a  debate  between  the  intellectual  and  political  elites  of  Western  and  Eastern 
Europe23. During the eighties the contacts were more limited but the positions of the great 
figures of intellectual dissidence had an impact in the West. Today, there are more and more 
contacts but very limited exchanges of ideas. It is as if after the disappearance of the common 
adversary -Soviet totalitarianism- we have nothing else to tell to each other, as if the former 
exchange of ideas with the CEECs was a mere political instrument with a given caducity.  
The result is that in fifteen years we have passed from a political view founded on 
democratic political values to a more technocratic approach which looks tied to the chosen 
method of enlargement and to the duration of the process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 See the study of Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002) “The Party Politics of Euro-scepticism in the EU Member 
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3. Patterns of opinion towards an enlarged Europe 
 
In the post-war period, European integration was positively legitimated by the peace 
guaranteed by the Franco-German reconciliation and, negatively, to stand against the threat of 
the Soviet block. The threat has disappeared and the Franco-German reconciliation is no more 
enough to guarantee peace in the continent, as it could be seen in the case of ex-Yugoslavia. 
Nowadays, the EU is extending eastwards and a new political identity is being searched, as well 
as a new legitimacy able to respond to the challenges of the new century: the challenges of 
European security and the redefinition of the Trans-Atlantic relation, the new challenges to 
European solidarity and to the European social model and the expectation of a new Constitution 
and a common European citizenship. Eastward enlargement has somehow become a catalyser 
for these three realms. During fifteen years the EU helped the transition of the CEECs and today 
it is the enlargement process that propels the transition of the EU. Unfortunately, the absence of 
a  trans-European  debate  on  EU  challenges,  linked  to  the  symmetry  of  the  fears  towards 
enlargement  and  change within  the  EU, reinforces  the  reluctances  toward the  future  of  the 
Union.  In  this  sense,  there  are  many  contradictory  tendencies.  For  instance,  while  the  old 
member states are afraid of the paralysis and dissolution of the Union as well as of the future of 
European budgetary solidarity, the new member states cry for losing their sovereignty and are 
afraid of being marginalised within the Union.  
There is a constant paradox that helps to nuance European divisions. Therefore the 
analysis of public opinion can be helpful to shed light on significant convergences for the future 
of European integration. The main questionings which appeared with regard to enlargement in 
the old member states can be considered legitimate, and are also indispensable to generate a 
trans-European debate. It is the overlapping of three cleavages on foreign and security policy, 
on the notion of the need for a European Constitution and on European solidarity which could 
make that the so much longed for moment of the reunification of the continent (more longed for 
in the East than in the West of the continent though) does not coincide with fracturing lines 
within the EU.  
The study of the public opinion in the EU shows that most of the fears are related to 
cleavages between the elites, usually in difficulty in the domestic arena, cleavages that are not 
so deeply shared by the national societies24. European integration has largely progressed from 
the approach of the elites to the one of the perplexed and badly informed public opinion. The 
new  fact  is  that  national  public  opinions  are  demanding  more  and  better  information  and 
communication  on  EU  issues  and,  as the referendum  on  the  Constitutional Treaty  has also 
shown,  they  are  not  willing  to  accept  the  detachment  between  the  process  of  European 
integration and the voice of the citizens.  
In this framework, Eastward enlargement belongs to a series of policies rarely explained 
and which are formulated as long-term projects. The absence of a long-term view in national 
politicians, along with an “enlargement fatigue” in many old EU member states do not play in 
favour of a more transparent communication between the EU and the citizens. 
Eastward enlargement, with its unheard of number of candidates and the geopolitical 
dimension of the project, could not be assimilated as just another natural integration cycle such 
as that of the single market or the euro. Enlargement also causes doubts and fears but could, on 
the  contrary,  provide  the  necessary  impulse  to  a  redefinition  of  the  finalities  of  European 
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integration and of the legitimacy of the European project. In this sense, we could maybe speak 
about a European public opinion but not yet of a European public space. 
 
At this point it is clear that Eastward enlargement is not an enlargement process as the 
previous ones. It marks the materialisation of a historical change marked by the fall of the 
Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War and of the division of Germany. It is an ambitious and 
admirable decision, especially from the point of view of its antecedents in European History and 
what it represents for the new member states. 
After half a century under the communist regime, the reactions to it were featured by the 
revolts  of  Berlin  in  1953,  of  Budapest  and  Poznan  in  1956,  of  Gdansk  in  1980  (which 
accompanied the creation of Solidarsnoc), and culminated in the resistance movements of 1989, 
usually considered an annus mirabilis. The year 1989 is characterised by the retreat of the 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the round tables of Hungary and Poland preparing the road for 
democracy, and the fall of the toughest communist regimes in the Czech Republic, the GDR and 
in the Romania of Ceausescu. The peoples who are now entering the European Union are the 
same ones that thought their resistance contributed to put an end to the Cold War. Then there is 
the impression that a peaceful and liberal revolution is transforming the European landscape. 
For the peoples of the CEECs the accession to the EU means the real end to the order of 
Yalta, inherited from WWII. For them Yalta symbolised a regime imposed against their will as 
well as the division of Europe. They have not participated to the order of Yalta and have been 
submitted with the more or less clear acquiescence of the Western world. Hence, the Eastward 
enlargement of the EU is seen, at the beginning of the nineties as the means of superseding the 
divisions of Yalta and of European history in the past century. 
   
In this very first period of the transition Eastward enlargement was understood by the 
CEECs as a courageous decision imbued with an essential element of hope. It was the moment 
of the re-encounter for the European family but, with the approach of the accession date that 
enthusiasm would blur in an atmosphere of disappointment and mutual reluctances. It was as if 
Europe was afraid of its own courageous decisions. This fear was not so much the fruit of the 
concrete new member states accessing the EU but of the challenges of an enlarged Union in a 
new global context. At its origins, the horizon of European integration was defined by the 
search of a durable peace in the continent, summarised in the original premise of making war 
impossible at the European home place. Half a century later, pragmatism seems to prevail and 
the  new  issues  are  no  longer  formulated  in  so  dramatic  terms.  In  this  sense,  Eastward 
enlargement offers the chance to use the new pragmatism to make ancient divisions disappear 
but also, step by step to dissolve a history sustained in the fear and the hate to the Other, 
whoever this is. 
The results of public opinion surveys regarding enlargement in the CEECs reveals what 
Bronislaw Geremek has defined as “a hope deficit”.25 In this context, he emphasizes the role of 
hope in European integration as well as in politics more generally, suggesting it might serve to 
measure  the  level  of  democratic  stability  while  emphasising  the  role  of  hope  in  European 
integration as well as in politics to measure the level of democratic stability.  
But hope is something that could be encouraged with a good political will and it is then 
a lack that the EU could fill, maybe through the question of determining which could be the 
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genuine contributions of the CEECs to the EU. Whenever this question is posed to the political 
leaders of the CEECs, they reply that they provide the experience of resistance to totalitarianism 
and a different sensibility and political culture that brings a fresh attitude and a new perspective 
on European integration26. However, especially in the opinion of the old member states they are 
said to provide many new problems. The political priority of the CEECs has largely focused on 
security, which seems to be a vital need. In the eyes of the CEECs NATO is the European 
alliance par excellence, which incarnates trans-Atlantic solidarity and the CEECs, because of 
the security needs of their history, continue to see the American presence in the continent as 
something inescapable. 
Such perspective does not diminish their attachment to the European project but the 
CEECs’ citizens, after the end of the Cold war uphold a strong European Union and solid 
institutions and policies, because they could ensure the material and political solidarity needed 
by these countries which consider themselves as having been “punished” by History. 
Enlargement entails two essential dimensions for the “principle of hope” of the CEECs: 
First of all, they see the catching up of the CEECs with Western Europe as one of the most 
formidable challenges in the modern history of the continent, which is full of new positive 
potentialities for the whole Union. However, the public opinion of the CEECs thinks that such 
aspiration do not find correspondence in the reluctances and even discriminations of some old 
member states. 
The initial EU policies oriented towards the reduction of economic disparities in the 
levels  of  prosperity  within  the  Union  are  being  contrasted  with  a  reduction  of  a  solidarity 
priority  towards  the  CEECs  as  the  document  on  the  Inter-institutional  Agreement  and  the 
Financial Perspective 2007-2013 shows27. In the eyes of the CEECs the moderation of the 
solidarity  policies  could  be  partly  explained  by  the  difficulties  of  the  European  economic 
conjuncture but that should not overshadow the need of making also the political disparities 
disappear between the two sides of the continent. The EU finds itself, also because of the defeat 
of the constitutional initiative, at the crossroads and the CEECs cannot understand that the 
historical change that their entry implies is not equated with challenging policies which at least 
acknowledge their existence28.   
The second dimension of the “principle of hope” in the CEECs regards the changing 
nature of the Union and the question of its new frontiers. The CEECs know that they are part of 
a dynamic process of enlargement and after May 2004 see how the accession efforts are more 
focused  on  integrating  Turkey  and  the  Balkans  as  soon  as  possible  than  on  deepening  the 
relations with the CEECs, making sure that their needs are being met and that their aspirations 
are now part of the common EU policies. One manifestation of such feeling lies in the fact that 
the  DG  Enlargement  of  the  EU,  since  2005,  is  focusing  in  the  new  wave  of  Enlargement 
towards  Turkey  and  the  Balkans  and  is  not  dealing  so  much  with  CEECs’  issues.  This  is 
                                                 
26 CEORG, Attitudes towards EU Membership in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland: High Participation in 
Referendum, Stable or Decreasing Support. Published in December 2002, pp. 10-12. 
27 An example of that could be the discussions and decisions on the EU budget for the period 2007-2013, which were 
taken without nearly no considering the needs of a Union of 25 member states. See Inter-institutional Agreement and 
the  Financial  Perspective  2007-2013.  Committee  on  Budgets.  European  Parliament.  Meeting  of  Wednesday  11 
January 2006, Brussels, BUDG/6/22765. Draft Resolution PE 367.813v01-00. 
28 Personal Interview with the Director General of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission.  Brussels, 25th 
of February 2006. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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naturally explained by the Commission officials29 by saying that since they are members in their 
full right after May 2004, the CEECs do not need any special guidance or treatment within the 
EU institutions and particularly from the Commission. But, on the other hand, the CEECs are 
not so much full members since, for the first time in European integration history, they are 
experiencing transition periods which, in timing and conditions, are totally unprecedented and 
which are applied in very important fields such as the free movement of labour within the Union 
and environmental measures30. The other Commission DGs apart from DG Enlargement declare 
that they have neither the time nor the resources to deal with the complexities of the CEECs’ 
transitions periods, which should be considered a matter that requires an exclusive attention. 
The DG Enlargement, with the justification that they are not any more candidate countries says 
they  are  not  their  direct  competence.  Hence,  the  political  leaders  of  the  CEECs  strongly 
complain  about  the  lack  of  exclusive  attention  after  their  accession,  which  was  previously 
considered as a major historical event. They feel that the EU, and especially the Commission, 
do not want to be disturbed with their complex digestion while they are under pressure to 
assimilate more member states in a speedy sort of fashion. At the end the CEECs governments 
feel that nobody is actually dealing with the particular problems of their gradual accession since 
most Commission DGs deal with the Union as a whole and DG Enlargement is devoted to a 
next wave of Enlargement which is, once again, presented as a historical opportunity31. 
It seems as if every new generation of Europeans is forcefully being invited to answer 
the question of the limits of the European Union. Geographically, the fact that Turkey belongs 
to Europe is not so self-evident and the sole idea of sharing borders with Iran and Iraq is 
considered  off-putting  for  many  EU  member  states’  public  opinions.  The  new  wave  of 
enlargement also poses the question of EU-Russia relations and again sees Russia as the new 
probable “natural” border of EU. Such questions are related to the old issue of the “absorption 
capacity”,32  which  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  the  Conclusions  of  the  Presidency  of  the 
European Council of Copenhagen of 1993. In this document we can see, for the first time, a 
direct allusion to the need to delimitate the physical and axiological frontiers of the Union. In 
1993 the Copenhagen Criteria tried to define the conditions for eventual candidates for EU 
accession.  In  2002,  the  Laeken  Declaration  stated  that  the  frontiers  of  the  EU  halt  where 
democracy and human rights are not respected. But this is a very vague definition. Democracy 
and human rights should not better be a monopoly of Europe, but a desired characteristic of all 
regions of the world. Thus, the fact that they continue beyond any “European” frontier does not 
mean that Europe has extended its values but that other parts of the world do not differ that 
                                                 
29 Personal interview with the Director of the Directorate B in charge of Candidate Countries at the DG Enlargement 
of the European Commission. Brussels, 1st of December 2005. 
30 For a source of comparison with previous enlargements, please, refer to Determinant Facts and Success Stories 
demonstrating the benefits of Enlargement for the 25 + 2. Report elaborated by the Information, Communication and 
Inter-Institutional Relations Unit of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission, Brussels, p. 12 
31 See for instance Joint Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Warsaw, 22 May 2002). Meeting of the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia (Warsaw, 22 May 2002) Joint Statement. [ON-LINE]. [Riga]: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Latvia, [23.05.2005]. Available on http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/eu/news/4308/ 
32 European Council of Copenhagen (21 and 22 June 1993) Conclusions of the Presidency. Section on Enlargement, 
SN 180/93. Brussels: Council of the European Communities, 1993, p. 2. HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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much from those principles, which they also have the right to call theirs. Where then is the 
axiological frontier of the EU? 
Maybe it is the notion of “community” itself, which accompanies this entity since its 
creation. The EU is, above all, a political and economic community, a community of laws, a 
community of interests but, essentially a community of values and common memories. And that 
could be a key notion for the new member states. They became, above all, part of a community, 
finally acknowledged through the enlargement process. It is a community that constructed itself, 
historically,  through  the  reconciliation  of  the  interconnected  memories  of  all  its  members, 
within a spirit of mutual solidarity and the aspiration of a shared identity based on a history of 
interactions that cannot be neglected. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski raised the following question: “If we would 
like the EU to be not just a place for money temples and the stock exchange, but also a place 
where material prosperity is surrounded by art and is used to help the poor, if we want freedom 
of speech, which can so easily be misused to propagate lies and evil, as well as being used for 
inspiring works -then, what is to be done?”33. 
This  question,  which  can  be  reduced  to  the  question  “Why  the  European  Union?” 
continues to be replied with the standard (but still legitimate and meaningful) response “peace 
and prosperity”.  
At the same time many voices are asking out loud whether today’s European Union is 
not too much an answer to the concerns of the past and too little an answer to the challenges of 
the future34. This very important observation is the conducting thread of the EU Communication 
Strategy on Enlargement and the reactions to it. Since the EU Communication Strategy on 
Enlargement has proved to be neither efficient nor successful at the level of the EU 25 public 
opinion we are to pose the question35 “Was it again giving more answers to the concerns of the 
past and little answers of the fears and expectations projected into the future?” In any case, we 
can  observe  how  it  recreates  again  the  “making  History  claims”  typical  of  Eastward 
Enlargement justifications.  
In this circulation of information there is an incipient phenomenon that surpasses the 
intended effect of finding a professional communication and public relations system able to 
provide the two-way communication on European issues ideally dreamt by the so-called “Plan-
D”36 to put in connection the Union and the citizens. And this phenomenon, surprisingly enough 
                                                 
33  Kolakowski,  L  in  Lendvai,  P.  (2006)  (ed.)  The  Sound  of  Europe.  International  Conference  of  the  Austrian 
Presidency of the EU, Salzburg, 27-28 January 2006. A Documentation, Wien: Europäische Rundschau, p. 46. For 
more information and the full conference proceedings go to Austria’s EU Presidency website: www.eu2006.at 
34 Personal interview with the Chief Advisor of the Information, Communication and Inter-Institutional Relations 
Unit of the DG Enlargement at the European Commission. Brussels, 15 November 2005. 
35  Personal  Interview  with  the  Deputy  Head  of  Unit  of  the  Information,  Communication  and  Inter-Institutional 
Relations Unit at the DG Enlargement, European Commission. Brussels, 15th of January 2006. 
36 Nowadays, we can observe an open and committed prioritisation of the EU institutions to build a solid two-ways 
communication bridge between the citizens and the institutions through policy actions like the creation of a DG 
Communication at the European Commission, initiatives such as the Commission White Paper on Communication, 
the European Commission Plan D (to promote Democracy, Dialogue and Debate), etc. For more information on the  
features and objectives of the Plan D, please, refer to HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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for  the  EU  institutional  actors,  does  not  come  from  what  they  call  “their  communicative 
actions” but from a growingly trans-European network of reactions which want to make their 
voice heard and go from conformist witnesses to actual actors of the process. This incipient 
European public opinion, which is modifying the direction of an integration process that has 
changed European society without, in many cases, entailing its involvement, is maybe opening a 
new  phase  in  the  history  of  European  Integration.  We  might  be  witnessing  the  new  born 
imperative of a “dialogued integration”. 
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La société civile a-t-elle pris le pouvoir symbolique dans l’UE? Essai d’analyse à 
travers le débat sur les frontières de l’Union 
Axel Marion 
 
 
La définition des frontières extérieures est aujourd’hui au cœur des débats sur l’avenir 
de l’Union européenne. Initié par la chute du mur de Berlin et alimenté par les élargissements 
successifs  vers  l’Est  puis  l’ouverture  de  négociations  avec  la  Turquie,  ce  sujet  hautement 
passionnel touche tout à la fois à l’identité européenne, à la conception que l’on se fait de 
l’Union (puissance politique ou marché commun ?) et à son rôle dans le concert international, 
en particulier vis-à-vis de son environnement proche.  
 
Or, on peut constater que ce débat est aujourd’hui marqué par les acteurs non-étatiques, 
ou autrement dit la « société civile » (partis politiques, élites intellectuelles, médias et opinion 
publique) autant que par les gouvernements et les administrations nationales. Alors que ces 
derniers tendent à se concentrer sur les aspects techniques liés à l’accessibilité ou non d’un pays 
candidat (critères de Copenhague, acquis communautaire, etc.), la société civile se saisit de la 
question sur un plan plus fondamental, faisant appel à la pertinence politique, géopolitique, 
voire philosophique de tel ou tel élargissement. Cette « division des tâches » interpelle d’autant 
plus  que  la  construction  européenne  a  historiquement  mis  en  évidence  le  rôle  des 
gouvernements et hommes d’Etats, davantage que celui de la société civile
1.  
 
Cette affirmation de la société civile ne se limite pas à la question des frontières de 
l’Union. Le débat autour du projet de Constitution européenne, notamment, a mis en évidence 
le  poids  des  élites  non-gouvernementales  dans  la  formation  des  opinions  publiques. 
L’émergence des mouvements anti-libéraux (qui se sont illustrés par exemple dans la lutte 
contre  la  directive  Bolkenstein
2),  cumulée  à  l’opposition  « classique »  des  nationalistes,  a 
influencé en profondeur le regard porté sur l’Union européenne dans la population.  
 
Ce constat tendrait à signifier qu’une évolution s’est opérée dans le leadership que l’on 
pourrait appeler « symbolique » de l’Union – c’est-à-dire les réflexions de fond sur sa forme, 
son avenir et son identité – celui-ci s’étant déplacé des sphères étatiques et gouvernementales 
vers les élites intellectuelles
3, non-gouvernementales, et par le truchement des médias, vers 
l’opinion publique. Notre propos sera ainsi d’interroger la pertinence de cette hypothèse, en 
étudiant l’évolution de la question des frontières extérieures de l’Union de 1957 à aujourd’hui 
ainsi que le rôle comparatif des acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques dans ce débat. Nous tenterons 
au  final  de  discerner  si  les  changements  paradigmatiques  survenus  depuis  1989  ont  eu  un 
impact notable sur leurs rapports de force symboliques. 
 
 
                                                 
1 L’historiographie classique a contribué à cette situation en insistant sur le rôle des acteurs étatiques. 
Cette tendance est aujourd’hui en cours de révision - à l’exemple du congrès dans lequel s’inscrit cet 
article (« European Voices : Actors and Witnesses of European Integration », HEIRS, Genève, mars 
2007) 
2 Directive élaborée par le Commissaire européen Bolkenstein, visant à instaurer la liberté 
d’établissement et de circulation des services au sein de l’Union européenne, et approuvée en 2003 par le 
Conseil.  
3 Il ne s’agit pas ici de minimiser le rôle des intellectuels dans les premières étapes de l’intégration 
européenne. Voir à ce propos : Bachoud, Andrée (dir.), Les intellectuels et l’Europe de 1945 à nos jours,  
Publ. Universitaires Denis Diderot, Paris, 2000 HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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Evolution de la problématique des frontières extérieures 
 
La question des frontières de l’Europe n’a pas constitué un enjeu majeur durant les trois 
premières décennies de la construction européenne. La division de l’Europe en deux blocs 
antagonistes rendait par avance inutiles – ou à tout le moins anachroniques – les réflexions sur 
les  limites  « fondamentales »  de  l’Europe  en  tant  qu’ensemble  territorial  et  culturel
4.  Les 
gouvernants étaient bien davantage préoccupés à fonder un espace de paix et de prospérité entre 
pays que tout opposait jusqu’alors – sauf précisément l’identité indiscutablement européenne. 
Les rédacteurs du Traité de Rome ont ainsi pu se contenter d’indiquer que « tout Etat européen 
peut demander à devenir membre de la Communauté
5 », sans donner aucune précision sur la 
nature de « l’européanité » ainsi évoquée. Par la suite, si les élargissements de 1973 au Nord et 
de 1981-86 au Sud ont occasionnés des débats nourris, ces derniers avaient trait à des motifs 
politiques  (l’opposition  gaulliste  à  la  Grande-Bretagne)  ou  économiques  (crainte  de  la 
concurrence agricole de l’Espagne et du Portugal) et non à l’identité européenne des nouveaux 
arrivants.  
 
En comparaison, la question des frontières intérieures constituait un enjeu bien plus 
capital. La disparition progressive des frontières entre pays membres constituait un défi de taille 
pour des Etats-nations dont les querelles de territoires avaient précisément provoqué tant de 
conflits.  De  la  défense  de  l’identité  nationale  à  la  protection  de  l’économie  intérieure,  les 
méfiances que suscitait la construction d’un espace « partagé » étaient infiniment plus présentes 
aux yeux des Européens que la définition des limites théoriques de cet espace.    
 
La chute du bloc communiste, dans les années 1989-1991, va renverser complètement 
la problématique. Le double phénomène, simultané, de la disparition du rideau de fer (facteur 
géographique de division du continent) et de la victoire du modèle économique et sociétal 
occidental (facteur idéologique) a ouvert la voie à l’expansion de l’Union européenne à l’Est. 
Bien  que  l’élargissement  effectif  ait  demandé  près  de  quinze  années,  la  perspective  d’une 
Union  étendue  aux  pays  d’Europe  centrale  et  orientale  a  rapidement  fait  son  chemin  dans 
l’inconscient collectif européen. L’idée fondamentale selon laquelle l’Europe occidentale avait 
une responsabilité dans la réhabilitation économique et l’accompagnement démocratique de ces 
Etats – ne serait-ce que pour veiller à sa propre sécurité – était largement partagée. Au-delà de 
l’action  d’autres  organes  comme  le  Conseil  de  l’Europe,  l’OTAN  ou  l’OSCE,  l’Union 
européenne était perçue comme l’instrument le plus abouti pour réaliser cette tâche
6.  
 
Cet horizon nouveau pour la construction européenne a fait surgir d’un quasi-néant la 
question des frontières extérieures. L’Union grandissante commençant à coïncider toujours plus 
avec les frontières géographiques communément admises du continent (avec évidemment de 
grosses exceptions et approximations), l’idée s’est progressivement installée dans les esprits 
que  l’Europe  en  tant  que  construction  institutionnelle  et  l’Europe  en  tant  qu’espace 
géographique et culturel n’allait peut-être bientôt plus faire qu’un. Le souci de cohérence de 
l’ensemble, la crainte qu’en dépassant les frontières « naturelles » du continent on fasse entrer 
                                                 
4 Les fondateurs de la Communauté européenne n’en concevaient pas moins l’Europe comme un 
ensemble malgré le rideau de fer : on se souvient notamment de la vision gaullienne d’une Europe 
« de l’Atlantique à l’Oural ».  
5 Art.237 du Traité original instituant la Communauté économique européenne. 
6 Le principe de l’extension de la Communauté européenne aux pays d’Europe centrale et orientale 
avait  déjà  été  exprimé,  entre  autres,  par  Robert  Schuman :  « Non  seulement  nous  devons  faire 
l’Europe dans l’intérêt des peuples libres, mais nous devons aussi pouvoir y accueillir les peuples de 
l’Europe de l’Est. Quand ceux-ci se seront libérés du pouvoir auquel ils sont assujettis à ce jour, ils 
nous demanderont leur adhésion et leur appui, pas uniquement moral ». Cité in Audisio, Giuseppe et 
Chiara, Alberto, Les Fondateurs de l’Europe Unie selon le projet de Jean Monnet, Paris, Salvator, 
2004 HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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un « corps étranger » qui mette en péril le fragile équilibre européen, s’est installé dans de 
nombreux  esprits.  Le  souci  de  définir  précisément  si  tel  ou  tel  Etat  pouvait  être  ou  non 
considéré comme européen a dès lors pris de l’ampleur, sortant du champ gouvernemental et, 
pour ainsi dire, « technique », pour envahir l’espace politique et citoyen. 
 
 
L’affirmation de la société civile dans le processus de construction européenne 
 
L’arrivée de cette problématique dans le débat citoyen n’est pas un hasard. Les années 
1990 ont également marqué l’affirmation de la société civile et de l’opinion publique en tant 
qu’acteurs à part entière de la vie de l’Union, alors que leur rôle avait été plus discret lors des 
décennies précédentes. Le rôle déterminant joué par les gouvernants (les fameux « pères de 
l’Europe ») dans les premières années de la construction européenne explique certainement en 
partie  cet état de fait.  D’autre  part, l’approche  fonctionnaliste  alors  suivie,  privilégiant  des 
éléments économiques et techniques souvent abscons aux grandes questions philosophiques sur 
le devenir de l’Europe, ne créait pas un environnement propice aux débats de fond intéressant 
les citoyens. Enfin, le conflit Est-Ouest occupait bien davantage les esprits : la nécessité d’une 
vaste unité du « monde libre » (englobant évidemment les Etats-Unis) face au « péril rouge » 
relativisait aux yeux du public les enjeux du marché commun. 
 
Les bouleversements des années 1989-1991 vont modifier cette situation en profondeur. 
L’ouverture  de  « l’espace  européen »  et  la  responsabilité  nouvelle  des  pays  d’Europe 
occidentale par rapport à leurs voisions orientaux a suscité, on l’a évoqué, des réflexions sur 
l’identité et le destin de l’Union européenne. Ces questionnements vont être renforcés par la 
remise en question du lien transatlantique, suite à la fin de la guerre froide et au passage à un 
univers  multipolaire.  D’autre  part,  entre  crise  économique  et  réapparition  des  mouvements 
nationalistes,  les  premiers  doutes  sur  le  bien-fondé  de  la  construction  européenne  ont 
commencé à surgir
7. L’Union européenne, devant se réinventer un rôle géopolitique dans un 
monde  transformé,  se  substituant  toujours  davantage  aux  Etats-nations  dans  leur  mission 
historique,  devenait  le  réceptacle  tout  à  la  fois  de  questions,  de  craintes  et  d’ambitions 
nouvelles. La société civile, les médias et l’opinion publique ne pouvaient pas manquer de 
s’engouffrer dans ce vaste débat. 
 
Les conditions-cadres pour cet élargissement du débat public étaient d’ailleurs de plus 
en plus favorables. L’apparition de votes populaires sur les sujets européens – à l’exemple du 
scrutin français sur le Traité de Maastricht en 1992 – a permis de susciter de vastes débats et 
d’amener sur la place publique les différentes visions possibles de la construction européenne. 
Le développement des médias, et notamment d’Internet à partir du milieu des années 1990, a 
également étendu les espaces possibles d’échanges et d’informations pour le grand public. 
 
 
Peut-on parler d’évolution des rapports de pouvoir symbolique ? 
 
Au  vu  des  éléments  ci-dessus,  on  peut  donc  formuler  l’hypothèse  d’une  évolution 
schématique  entre :  1)  une  Communauté  européenne  (1957-1989)  fondée  sur  l’approche 
fonctionnaliste, peu préoccupée par la question des frontières extérieures et avec une opinion 
publique  plutôt  en  retrait,  et :  2)  une  Union  européenne  contemporaine,  soucieuse  de  son 
identité et de son avenir politique, dont la définition des frontières extérieures est devenue un 
enjeu et dans laquelle la société civile et l’opinion publique ont gagné en importance.  
 
                                                 
7 Du moins se sont renforcés, si l’on considère que les critiques de la construction européenne ont 
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Il est légitime de se demander si cette évolution a eu des implications sur les rapports de 
force entre gouvernants et société civile au sein de l’Union, et en particulier si elle a impliqué 
un  transfert  du  pouvoir  symbolique dans  le  mécanisme  de  la  construction  européenne.  Par 
« pouvoir symbolique », nous entendons ici l’ascendant exercé par un acteur sur la conscience 
collective des citoyens, par opposition aux pouvoirs « effectifs » en mains des responsables 
politiques ou économiques. En d’autres termes, le pouvoir symbolique touche aux valeurs, à la 
détermination de l’opinion des personnes sur lesquelles il est exercé (équivalent, en quelque 
sorte, du soft power) et non à la gestion quotidienne des affaires de la cité (hard power)
8. 
 
La période 1957-1989, on l’a vu, semble témoigner d’une concomitance entre pouvoir 
symbolique et pouvoir effectif. L’idée européenne était avant tout portée par ceux-là même qui 
mettaient en œuvre sa réalisation : les dirigeants politiques et les administrations publiques. La 
synthèse de la vision et de la mise en pratique était d’autant plus probable que les objectifs 
fondamentaux  de  cette  période  –  fonder  un  espace  commun  de  paix  et  de  prospérité 
économique via une approche fonctionnaliste des problèmes – coïncidaient en grande partie 
avec les pouvoirs effectifs des gouvernants et des Etats. La situation change après 1989, et la 
question des frontières extérieures en est une bonne illustration. Si l’élargissement vers les Etats 
d’Europe centrale et orientale a bel et bien été pensé dans les chancelleries, ses implications ont 
rapidement été débattues par les élites intellectuelles puis par les médias. En parallèle aux 
considérations  économiques  liées  à  la  pauvreté  de  ces  pays,  les  questions  identitaires  ont 
commencé à susciter un intense débat : « Ces pays sont certes européens au sens géographique, 
mais partage-t-on la même culture ? », « leur passé idéologique est-il compatibles avec nos 
valeurs ? », « ne vont-ils pas mettre en péril notre édifice européen ? ». 
 
Les Etats et les gouvernants se sont rapidement trouvés empruntés face à ces questions. 
En effet, leurs atouts tendent à disparaître à mesure que le débat sort des cadres techniques et 
diplomatiques pour rentrer dans le passionnel. De même, des motifs de politique intérieure 
peuvent  contraindre  l’Etat  à  faire  preuve  d’une  grande  prudence
9.  Cependant,  les 
gouvernements peuvent faire valoir certaines positions. En définissant des critères normatifs 
d’adhésion, les chancelleries peuvent prétendre défendre les valeurs d’égalité et de justice qui 
sont au cœur du projet européen, tout en assurant la stabilité du débat et la défense des intérêts 
de  l’Union.  Les  dirigeants  peuvent  également  se  permettre  en  certaines  occasions  de 
s’affranchir de la ligne officielle en faisant connaître leur avis personnel, ce qui leur permet de 
peser dans le débat. Ces différents éléments, qui tous peuvent avoir un impact symbolique sur 
l’opinion publique, ne suffisent cependant pas à conserver aux gouvernements la maîtrise du 
débat. Les citoyens n’attendent pas (ou plus) des Etats les réponses concernant par exemple une 
définition claire des frontières extérieures de l’Union.  
 
A l’inverse, la société civile s’est imposée comme un intervenant incontournable sur les 
grands enjeux européens actuels. Celle-ci comprend en substance les producteurs de concepts 
(intellectuels,  universitaires,  mais  également  politiciens  sans  charge  gouvernementale),  les 
relais (médias traditionnels et électroniques, éditeurs) et les destinataires (la population) qui 
donnent au final la résonnance aux idées. Cet ensemble d’acteurs – à la fois complémentaires et 
très différents tant sur la forme que sur le fond – a pris une importance considérable dans la vie 
quotidienne  des  européens.  Sur  de  nombreux  sujets  à  connotation  identitaire,  sociétale,  ou 
impliquant l’avenir de l’Union, comme par exemple la libre circulation des personnes, la place 
de l’Islam en Europe, la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune ou encore les relations avec 
                                                 
8 Nous reprenons ici les concepts développés par Joseph Nye sur le « Hard » et le « Soft » Power. Voir 
Nye, Joseph S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004  
9 La présence d’une importante minorité turque en Allemagne, ou le ressentiment encore vif des 
Grecs  vis-à-vis  des  Turcs  conditionnent  par  exemple  l’attitude  de  ces  deux  Etats  vis-à-vis  de 
l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union.   HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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les Etats-Unis, les faiseurs d’opinion ont au moins autant de poids que les gouvernants. Au-delà 
du  thème  des  frontières  extérieures,  le  plus  bel  exemple  concerne  le  débat  sur  le  Traité 
constitutionnel en France et aux Pays-Bas. Au terme de campagnes intenses, les citoyens ont 
désavoué les gouvernements et les principales formations politiques, qui soutenaient le texte. 
Le pouvoir symbolique de la société civile est apparu ici d’autant plus fort qu’il a emporté une 
victoire sur le plan du pouvoir effectif, en dictant in fine à l’Etat sa conduite. Il semble évident 
que le débat sur l’adhésion de la Turquie, déjà bien présent dans les médias, suivra ce modèle et 
gagnera en importance ces prochaines années
10. 
 
Peut-on dès lors établir que, pour les raisons décrites ci-dessus, le pouvoir symbolique 
des Etats s’est amenuisé au profit de la société civile à partir du moment où certaines questions 
politiques, identitaires et sociétales ont gagné en importance ? En tous les cas, l’impact de 
l’opinion publique européenne n’est plus sous-estimé par les gouvernants
11. Les eurobaromètres 
sont des outils de travail toujours plus indispensables pour la Commission et les Etats-membres. 
Dans de nombreux Etats, les referenda populaires sur les sujets européens deviennent tabous, 
ou sont perçus à l’inverse comme des moyens de faire échouer certains projets. Les citoyens 
eux-mêmes  revendiquent  le  droit  d’être  plus  étroitement  informés  et  impliqués  dans  les 
processus décisionnels européens
12. Et lorsque certains responsables politiques de premier plan 
s’en  remettent  à  l’opinion  publique  pour  déterminer  leur  vision  de  l’Union
13,  on  ne  peut 
qu’admettre une évolution profonde des rapports de force entre gouvernants et société civile 
depuis ces quinze dernières années. Si ce constat ne permet certes pas d’affirmer que le pouvoir 
symbolique a changé de main, il conforte cependant le sentiment que l’avenir de l’Union se 
construira en partenariat entre gouvernants et société civile, ou ne sera pas. 
 
Axel Marion 
HEI, Genève 
mariona7[at]hei.unige.ch 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Voir à ce sujet : Brodsky, Lauren, ‘The role of the International Media and Public Opinion in the 
debate over Turkey’s EU membership’ in Insight Turkey, vol.8, no.3, July-September 2006, pp.16-27 
11 Jacques Chirac a par exemple admis que qu’il n’a « peut-être pas fait tout ce qu’il aurait fallu » 
pour éviter le non à la Constitution (in Le Temps, Genève, 10 mars 2007). De même, le commissaire 
européen Olli Rehn déclarait en janvier 2006 devant la London School of Economics : « The EU’s 
ability to respond to its citizens must increase (…)» (in Insight Turkey, vol.8, n°1, January-March 
2006, p.34) 
12 Voir à ce sujet : l’Eurobaromètre « Les citoyens européens et l’avenir de l’Europe », mai 2006 
13 On peut penser entre autres à Mme Ségolène Royal, candidate à la Présidence de la République 
française  en  2007,  déclarant  que  sa  position  concernant  l’adhésion  de  la  Turquie  à  l’Union 
européenne était « celle des Français ». HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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Habermas'  dream or Habermas'  nightmare? A transnational, participatory 
European public sphere at the Maastricht European Council 1991? 
Jan-Henrik Meyer 
Maastricht and the European public sphere 
At the Summit of Maastricht in 1991, the European Community turned itself into the 
European  Union.  In  the  wake  of  the  successful  Single  Market  Programme  and  against  the 
backdrop of the end of the Cold War, European integration made a quantum leap. The projects 
of Economic and Monetary Union as well as Political Union had been on the Community's 
agenda at least since 1969. However, these proposals were never fully turned into practice. On 
the basis of detailed plans that had been prepared by Jacques Delors in collaboration with the 
heads of the Central Banks from the late 1980s onwards, EMU was agreed – with a British opt-
out clause – and subsequently actually implemented (Dyson and Featherstone 1999), despite the 
doubts of contemporary observers (e.g. Thoma 1991) and the EC's record of failing plans. 
The German government insisted on advances on Political Union. Although the EU did 
introduce Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA), these policy areas remained within the intergovernmental second and third pillars 
of  the  EU's  new  temple  structure.  Maastricht  also  created  European  citizenship  –  allowing 
citizens from other member states to vote in local and European elections wherever they reside 
within the Union. Quite controversially, the new treaty introduced basic standards for workers 
via the Social Chapter. Also here, the new British Prime Minister John Major achieved an opt-
out – not least in order to prove to his still largely Thatcherite Party that he was just as tough a 
negotiator as had been the Iron Lady. 
Although the governments entered the elusive "subsidiarity clause" (Jachtenfuchs 1992: 
281-283) into the treaty to avoid an erosion of national competences, critics expressed qualms 
that  the  EU  was  increasingly  becoming  a  European  "superstate".  The  intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs) strengthened the role of the European Parliament (EP) with the introduction 
of the co-decision procedure. Still, increasingly there were doubts about a "democratic deficit" – 
a  mismatch  between  the  continued  weakness  of  democratic  control  and  the  EU's  growing 
decision-making powers (Dinan 2004: 245-262). In the aftermath of Maastricht, the debate on 
the European democratic deficit gained great momentum. Support for European integration in 
the  polls  had  been  declining,  as  epitomised  by  the  "ratification  crisis"  –  the  Danish  "No" 
(Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Ratinger 1994). A central element in the debate was the 
apparent  lack  of  a  societal  basis  on  which  European  democracy  could  rest.  The  German 
constitutional  court's  "no  demos"  argument  –  stipulating  that  the  absence  of  a  "European 
people" imposed limits on the legitimacy European-level democracy – is but one case in point 
(Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995: 9-14). 
In this context, critics also pointed to the lack of a European public sphere, which they 
deemed  necessary  for  Europeans  to  form  an  informed  opinion  on  European  politics.  Their 
central argument was that because Europe lacked common media, a common language and a 
common identity, a European public sphere was absent and unlikely to emerge (Grimm 1995: 
294-296).  At  best,  it  was  "lagging  behind"  Europe's  political  and  economic  integration 
(Gerhards 2000: 280-286). This claim has triggered a wave of research on the European public 
sphere that focused on specific debates in the latter half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. This 
research has demonstrated that with respect to media coverage on European integration, there is 
evidence of an emerging European public sphere – characterised by substantial relevance of 
European issues, and frequently also simultaneously shared agendas across borders (Kantner 
2006; Steeg 2006). 
This paper provides a case study on the European public sphere at the time of the 
Maastricht European Council, which marks the transition to greater political importance of the 
EC and greater public awareness of European affairs. Maastricht can safely be assumed to have HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
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been a focal point for the European public sphere in the early 1990s. The aim of this case study 
is not only to show to that the summit itself was discussed in a European public sphere of the 
media in France, Germany and Britain. The main goal is to assess the "quality" of the European 
public  sphere,  in  two  respects:  First,  to  what  extent  was  this  public  sphere  transnationally 
integrated, rather than consisting of distinct national debates? Second, to what extent was it 
participatory, discussing the views of actors beyond governments? In the following I will first 
explain the theoretical concept of the European public sphere, the normative assumptions about 
its democratic quality and the ways to examine transnational communication. Subsequently, I 
will present evidence that allows for an assessment of these criteria concerning the European 
public sphere at the Maastricht European Council. 
Habermas'  Dream: A transnational, participatory European public sphere 
The European public sphere can be understood as a sphere of communication, in which 
European politics, i.e. the affairs of the European polity are addressed (Eder 2003: 85). The 
European  public  sphere  can  therefore  simply  defined  by  its  contents.  Communication, 
information  and  debate  on  European  affairs  are  necessary  to  enable  citizens  to  form  their 
opinion  on  European  policy-making  (and  polity-building).  This  is  essentially  a  basic 
precondition for democracy at the European level, regardless whether it concerns participation 
in European elections, or via other avenues of participation.
1 
Two normative criteria are central in evaluating the role of the European public sphere 
as a precondition for European democracy. First, for a European public sphere to be not only 
European  in  its  contents,  but  also  European  in  scope,  transnational  communication  is  key. 
Without transnational interaction, the European public sphere would simply consist of distinct 
national pillars. Communication would take place solely within the national framework, but not 
across the European space. A second normative criterion stems from Habermas' "discursive" 
concept of the public sphere. Ideally, participation should include as wide a range of citizens 
and societal actors as possible. It should not only be limited to governments, but involve civil 
society (Habermas 1995: 306). 
Empirically, these two criteria that describe the quality of the European public sphere 
can appear in different combinations. We can systematically map them in a two-by-two matrix: 
Table 1 Conceivable combinations of transnational communication and participation in the 
European Public Sphere 
  national communication  transnational 
communication 
 
broad participation  Domestic debate on 
Europe, broad participation of societal 
actors 
Transnational debate on 
Europe, broad transnational 
participation of societal actors – 
Habermas' Dream 
narrow participation  Domestic, government-
dominated debate on Europe –  
Habermas' Nightmare 
Transnational debate on 
Europe, dominated by governments 
 
"Habermas' dream", namely a normatively ideal version of a European public sphere 
would be a public sphere that is both participatory and transnational. It would comprise a broad 
range of views on which opinions can be formed (Habermas 2001). Conversely, "Habermas' 
nightmare" would be a nationally distinct and government-dominated public sphere. Given that 
this case study looks at the European public sphere discussing an intergovernmental event, we 
can expect that journalists cover the views of their own and foreign governments, who are the 
bargaining partners. Hence, the expectable outcome is a transnational public sphere, still largely 
dominated by governments. Such a result would be located somewhere in between dream and 
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nightmare. It would imply that there is evidence of transnational integration of the European 
public  sphere.  However,  this  public  sphere  would  not  be  very  participatory  and  hence 
democratically  deficient  according  to  the  criteria  of  the  "discursive"  concept  of  the  public 
sphere (Gerhards 1997, 2002). 
How  can  these  theoretical  notions  be  studied  empirically?  Most  research  on  the 
European  public  sphere  has  focused  on  the  mass  media,  particularly  newspapers,  not  least 
because it is via the media that people learn and form an opinion on the EU. Researchers have 
applied different indicators to demonstrate the existence, or to assess the quality of a European 
public sphere (Machill, Beiler and Fischer 2006; Meyer 2004, 2007b; Sifft et al. 2007; Trenz 
2005a, b). The most basic criterion by which to measure the "magnitude" of the European 
public sphere is the amount of coverage on European integration. A more sophisticated criterion 
has been developed by Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner (2000: 315). They follow Habermas 
(1995: 306) in arguing that the effective formation of opinion across Europe requires that "the 
same issues" must be discussed "at the same time" "at similar levels of attention".
2 While this 
criterion is surely a necessary one, it is not entirely sufficient for arguing that the European 
public sphere is in fact a transnational one. As indicated above, the same issues could also be 
discussed  at  the same  time  at  a similar  level  of  attention in  parallel but  nationally  distinct 
European  public  spheres  (Steeg  2005:  27-30).  Therefore,  additionally  we  have  to  examine 
whether  other  actors'  views  and  opinions  are  also  taken  into  account  and  discussed  across 
borders (Wimmel 2004, 2005, 2006). 
The empirical basis for such an inquiry is a case study of the commentary
3 on the 
European Council of Maastricht 1991 in British, German and French broadsheet newspapers, 
namely  The  Guardian,  The  Daily  Telegraph,  Süddeutsche  Zeitung,  Frankfurter  Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ), Le Monde and Le Figaro in a two-week period around the event. The analysis of 
the European public sphere will proceed in three steps: First, I will assess to what extent the 
media coverage fulfils the basic criterion of the European public sphere, namely, to what extent 
the same issues receive the same level of attention. Second, I will examine, to what extent 
transnational  interaction  can  be  demonstrated  across  the  media.  "Transnational  intermedia 
references" indicate that journalists take note of and even actively discuss issues presented in 
the media in other European countries. Comments by foreign external contributors are another 
mode of transnational communication. The third step of the analysis seeks to find out, whether 
the European public sphere at Maastricht was closer to "Habermas' dream" or to "Habermas' 
nightmare". Did the media discuss the actors' views across borders? This gives evidence of 
transnational communication. Did the media also take note of societal actors' opinions? This 
may serve as an indication of a participatory European public sphere. 
                                                 
2 Translation by (Risse 2003: 1). 
3 My research focuses on the analysis of commentary, because commentary not only points to what is 
important to discuss, but also voices an opinion on issues and actors. How influential these views are on 
the formation of public opinion is unclear. However, these views receive great attention by decision-
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The same issues at the same time? 
While  the  number  of  comment  pieces  that  discuss  the  various  issues  at  stake  at 
Maastricht differs substantially between the newspapers, the rank order – reflecting the order of 
relevance – of the issues is remarkably similar, as can be taken from the subsequent table. 
Table 2 Top eight most-discussed issues in the commentary on Maastricht in the respective 
newspapers (descending order of frequency) 
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The  most  important  issues  discussed  are  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  and 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). EMU appears most salient to the British and 
German  newspapers.  In  Le  Monde  the  number  of  comment  pieces  on  EMU  and  CFSP  is 
identical, in Le Figaro the difference between the two is only one article. In The Guardian 
CFSP ranks third, while Social Policy takes the second place. It is an issue on which The 
Guardian's commentators are fiercely critical of the British government. Social Policy ranks 
third in both of the German newspapers, but only fourth in The Daily Telegraph.
4 In the French 
newspapers, Social Policy is apparently less relevant. It only comes seventh, after the Single 
Market and future enlargement. The third most frequently discussed issue for the Conservative 
and fiercely Eurosceptic Daily Telegraph is agriculture. A further issue that is highly relevant 
across all newspapers is institutional reform – particularly the extension of qualified majority 
voting and the strengthening of the European Parliament. This issue ranks third in the French 
newspapers,  fourth  in  The  Guardian  and  the  German  newspapers,  and  fifth  in  The  Daily 
Telegraph. 
All in all, we find that the same issues being discussed at the same time at essentially 
the same level of relevance – albeit within a wide margin of variance. However, is there also 
evidence that this debate is not only parallel but transnationally integrated, too? 
Transnational interaction: intermedia references and external contributors 
The  most  directly  visible  indicators  of  transnational  interaction  are  transnational 
intermedia  references  –  i.e.  the  mention  and  discussion  of  views  from  foreign  media  and 
external  contributions  across  borders.  There  are  two  examples  of  transnational  intermedia 
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references.  In  a  comment  criticising  the  German  position  on  the  crisis  in  Yugoslavia,  The 
Guardian's  editorialist  Ian  Traynor  (1991)  accuses  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of 
campaigning for the unilateral recognition of Croatia's and Slovenia's independence. He quotes 
extensively from the FAZ. The second reference is to a German newspaper, too. Le Monde's 
Pierre  Servent  (1991)  cites  the  contemporary  historian  Hans  Peter  Schwarz  form  the 
conservative German broadsheet Die Welt. Servent, however, agrees with Schwarz warning not 
to be overly optimistic concerning the summit results. 
"Comme  l' écrit  l' historien  Hans-Peter  Schwarz  dans  le  journal  allemand  Die  Welt: 
Quelques gouvernements, et d' abord la commission, annoncent "le grand bond en avant" - 
"irréversible" - "historique - et il en sort des petits pas, qui toutefois mènent finalement loin". 
A second avenue of transnational communication are external contributions, authored 
by fellow Europeans or other foreigners. In The Guardian, a Dutch and a German journalist 
comment  on  the  specifically  British  interpretation  of  federalism  as  centralism  (Joffe  1991; 
Joustra  1991).  Similarly,  Ingo  Kolboom,  the  director  of  the  German  Council  of  Foreign 
Relations (DGAP), a German foreign policy think tank, explains to Le Figaro's readers the 
benefits of Franco-German cooperation from a German perspective (Kolboom 1991). Two of 
the foreign experts writing in Le Figaro are from Québec. Both provide a view on federalism 
from across the ocean (Brenner and Brenner 1991; Lemieux 1991). Not only in principle, but 
also in practice, transnational communication is not limited to Europe. Ties of shared culture 
and language – la francophonie or British connections with the US or the former empire – 
facilitate,  if  not  even  privilege,  transnational  communication  with  overseas  countries.  John 
Major (1991) directly addresses the French and the wider European public via an article on the 
front page of Le Monde. 
Some of the external contributions at Maastricht revive a venerable tradition of the 
European Public Sphere. Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel (2002) have demonstrated 
that even before the creation of a European power centre, the European public sphere had served 
as an imaginary court of appeal. Powerless, but morally vindicated actors tended to appeal to the 
European public. Thus they rhetorically invoked and thereby constructed a European public 
sphere, even if they did not necessarily generate great resonance. Along the lines of such a 
tradition,  the  Turkish  ambassador  admonishes  the  European  public  not  to  forget  about  the 
promises of eventual EU membership (Bleda 1991). Similarly, in an open letter, an international 
group of intellectuals, appeal to the European summit to stop the civil war in Croatia (Berendei 
1991). In fact, this time the writers may have received more resonance. Commentators from all 
six newspapers called upon the EC governments to take responsibility for Yugoslavia (e.g. 
Almaric 1991; Hort 1991). 
Compared to earlier European Councils and summits
5 there is a notable increase of 
direct  intermedia  references  and  particularly  of  foreign  contributions.  The  transnational 
contributions  reflect  in  their  arguments  a  transnational  familiarity  with  European  partners' 
qualms and aspirations. Hence, they mark just the visible tip of the iceberg, while most of the 
transnational communication remains invisible. Hence we have to examine weaker indicators: 
Did commentators include and discuss the views of foreign actors? 
Transnational references: Discussing foreign actors'  views 
Commentators discuss views voiced by different actors. To what extent they include 
actors from other European countries and from the European institutions can be taken from the 
following chart. It presents the nationality of the actor, respectively the European institution he 
or she belongs to. Mostly, these are government actors. That the chart presents only actors from 
Britain,  Germany  and  France,  reflects  the  great  asymmetry  in  transnational  awareness  and 
debate. Essentially the newspapers only refer to the European Community's big three countries. 
                                                 
5 See evidence on the Summits in 1969, 1974, 1978 and 1985 in my forthcoming PhD thesis (Meyer 
forthcoming 2007) HEIRS 3rd Annual Colloquium 2007 
￿￿￿
Even the views of the Dutch presidency, or sizeable countries like Spain or Italy are treated so 
rarely that they cannot meaningfully be charted here. 
 
Chart 1 Transnational references to most frequently addressed foreign countries and 
European Institutions'  views in the commentary at Maastricht 
 
Even  though  all  newspapers  focus  on  the  views  from  their  own  country,  there  are 
differences in degree. British newspapers refer to their own national actors' views in 90 (The 
Guardian) to 80 (The Daily Telegraph) per cent of all comment pieces. Among the French 
newspapers this value is at more than 60 per cent. The value for Süddeutsche Zeitung is not 
drastically lower, at slightly under 60 per cent. Solely Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is more 
transnationally oriented, devoting as many references to German as to French actors' views. 
Exceptionally, in FAZ, greater attention is given to the European Council than to any individual 
nation. Whereas the French and German newspapers devote more attention to the European 
Council,  the  British  newspapers  tend  to  focus  on  individual  nations'  views.  The  relative 
importance  of  the  two  other  European  countries  differs  between  the  newspapers.  Only  the 
German  newspapers  discuss  French  views  more  frequently  than  British  ones.  Among  the 
European  institutions,  the  European  Commission  receives  varying  attention,  however, 
substantially  more  than  the  European  Parliament.  Le  Monde  devotes  greatest  attention  to 
Commission views, in particular those articulated by Jacques Delors. Le Monde seems to admire 
the Commission President while The Daily Telegraph loathes him as the French instigator of 
EMU and European Social Policy. 
All  in  all,  even  though  the  newspapers  predominantly  focus  on  their  own  national 
actors, they do discuss views of their most important European partners. However, can we also 
demonstrate that they actually discuss the views of other countries' actors on the same issues? 
This could be understood as the nearest approximation of a transnationally integrated debate, in 
which the views of the European partners on European issues matter. 
Transnational debate: The same actors'  views on the same issues? 
The extent of transnational communication and of the participation of societal actors in 
the debate varies according to the nature of the issue. Therefore, three of the most salient issues 
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will be more closely examined. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), both touch upon the core of national sovereignty. By contrast, the 
Social Chapter concerns a socio-economic issue that is more similar to domestic policy making. 
For each policy area, I will show who were the core actors, whose views were being discussed. 
The  data  for  each  policy  will  be  presented  in  two  different  charts.  The  first  one  covers 
references to governments – which accounts for the overwhelming majority of transnational 
references. The second one provides an insight into the presence of societal actors' views – 
within and across national borders. 
Economic and Monetary Union 
To what extent do the newspapers’ commentaries take the views of other countries and 
of the European institutions into account in the debate? References to countries other than the 
ones mentioned in the following table are rare and normally not shared by more than one or two 
newspapers. Therefore they are not charted. 
Chart 2 EMU – transnational references to national governments, the European Council 
and the European Commission 
 
In line with their overall national focus, the British newspapers predominantly deal with 
Her Majesty's government's positions on EMU. However, while German and even more so 
French views find some attention in The Guardian, in The Daily Telegraph it is rather the 
Council  as  a  whole  and  specifically  the  Commission,  whose  president  –  they  highlight  – 
invented the EMU scheme. Süddeutsche Zeitung strongly focuses on the German governments' 
views, attacking Chancellor Kohl's intention to "sacrifice" the D-Mark. Süddeutsche criticises 
the French government's pushing for EMU more frequently than the British government's opt-
out. In line with their own opposition to EMU, the British stance seems a sensible option, 
possibly even an example to follow. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's orientation is strongly 
transnational.  Similar  to  Le  Figaro,  references  to  the  national  government  are  on  par  with 
references to the European Council and the other governments. However, both newspapers do 
not  refer  to  the  Commission's  views.  Still,  Le  Monde  debates  the  position  of  the  French 
government  more  frequently  than  the  German  and  the  British  governments'.  The  European 
Council and the European Commission receive even less attention. Apart from references to 
national actors, non-governmental actors' views receive substantial attention, as the following 
chart aptly demonstrates. 
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Chart 3 EMU – transnational references to non-government actors (including the 
Bundesbank) 
 
The  British  newspapers  do  not  only  intensely  discuss  their  own  country's  parties', 
business' ("the City") and experts' views as well as public opinion. The stance of the German 
Central Bank, the Bundesbank, and German public opinion, that opposes EMU, seem to matter, 
too.  The  French  and  German  newspapers  are  less  transnationally  aware.  Only  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung refers to a French expert, and Le Monde still discusses the Bundesbank' s 
views. Openness to non-government actors is limited to party views in the French and the 
German newspapers, apart from a national expert's view in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. So, 
in conclusion, we find that in discussing EMU the British newspapers are more national, but 
also more participatory in the views they include. The German and French newspapers contain 
more views from across borders, but are less open to non-governmental societal participation. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  is  a  policy  area  in  which  we  might  expect 
substantial  transnational  communication.  However,  we  can  anticipate  mainly  references  to 
governments' views. High politics are clearly the prerogative of the government. 
Chart 4 CFSP – transnational references to national governments, the European Council 
and the European Commission 
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The own national governments' position is not as dominant as on EMU. To be sure, The 
Guardian refers most frequently to the national governments' positions. This is also the case in 
Le Figaro. In the other newspapers, the position collectively held by the European Council is 
most frequently discussed – concerning the introduction of the CFSP, but also on the European 
role towards the conflict in Yugoslavia. The Daily Telegraph does not even discuss British 
government views more frequently than other countries', albeit both at very low level. British 
views  come  second  after  the  EC  Councils'  stance  in  Süddeutsche  Zeitung.  In  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung British views are not even discussed. French and German views are clearly 
more important than British ones in the French newspapers. French and German newspapers 
also discuss other governments' and the European Council's views more frequently than the 
British newspapers do. 
Chart 5 CFSP – (transnational) references to non-government actors 
As anticipated, societal views on foreign policy rarely appear. The newspapers refer to 
actors from political parties, or to experts, as does The Daily Telegraph. There is only one 
instance of a transnational reference to a societal actor, i.e. the above-mentioned intermedia 
reference to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on Yugoslavia. 
All in all, on CFSP, the debate of other countries' views is less extensive than expected. 
The  newspapers'  commentators  focus  on  the  European  Council  as  a  collective  actor. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and the French newspapers are more strongly transnationally oriented, 
while the British newspapers and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung devote less attention to other 
countries' governments' views. This is remarkably different from the debate on EMU. 
The Social Chapter 
The struggle on Social Policy is an "eleven to one"-affair. While most countries support 
the Social Chapter, the British government fiercely resists it. The main reason for this resistance 
is that, to the Conservative party faithful, the Social Chapter is tantamount to a revocation of 
Thatcherite  industrial  relations  reform.  John  Major  achieves  an  opt-out,  here,  too.  He 
pompously declares victory: "Game, set and match." 
CFSP - [trans]national participation
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Chart 6 Social chapter – transnational references to national governments, the European 
Council and the European Commission 
Not surprisingly therefore, in Süddeutsche Zeitung Social Policy appears solely as a 
British affair. Commentators severely attack the British government for depriving their workers 
of equal protection. Conversely, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Social Policy is treated as a 
national issue and as a collective European one. This pattern is similarly found in Le Figaro. Le 
Monde also discusses the British governments' view as well as those of Commission President 
Delors, himself a trade union veteran. It was Delors who initiated Social Policy at the European 
level to complement the Single Market (Delors 2004: 248f, 375ff.). Delors' views are similarly 
discussed in the British newspapers, positively in The Guardian and critically in The Daily 
Telegraph. The German government's position features as a positive example in The Guardian. 
However, The Daily Telegraph disparages the German stance as a plot to achieve comparative 
advantage by driving up costs elsewhere. The Guardian treats the Conservative governments' 
Social Policy opt-out in a large number of comment pieces and with much zest. 
Social policy - transnational references
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Chart 7 Social chapter – (transnational) references to non-government actors 
Consequently, The Guardian also debates Labour and Conservative party views, as well 
as  unions'  and  employers'  positions.  Similarly,  the  newspaper  mentions  German  employers' 
critique of European Social Policy, but equally the more positive response of the Union of 
Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE). Similarly, The Daily Telegraph 
debates  party  opinions,  as  much  as  the  views  of  experts  and  Labour  unions.  Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, observing the British debate, takes note of Tony Blair's – then shadow employment 
secretary  –  views  on  the  social  chapter.  In  Le  Monde,  British,  French  and  European  level 
unions, as well as European employers associations are discussed. Thereby, Le Monde in fact 
observes the debate in a European civil society (Kaelble 2004; Kocka 2007), as much as it 
transnationally discusses national civil societies' opinions. 
All  in  all,  Social  Policy  is  the  policy  area  that  is  –  except  for  in  Le  Figaro  and 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung– not only broadest in participation, but also transnational in its 
shared focus on British resistance to European Social Policy. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We  may  summarise  these  findings,  by  plotting  them  on  the  transnational 
communication and participation grid, developed above. We can map the different newspapers' 
discussion of views: 
Table 3 Actual combinations of transnational communication and participation in the 
commentary at Maastricht 
  national communication  transnational communication 
 
broad participation    EMU: GU, 
DT 
Social 
Policy: DT 
Social 
Policy: GU 
Haberma
s' dream 
     
CFSP: 
GU, DT 
EMU: 
FAZ 
Social 
Policy: LM, SZ 
    EMU: SZ  CFSP: 
FAZ 
EMU: LM 
CFSP: LM 
EMU: LF 
narrow 
participation 
Haberma
s' nightmare 
Social 
Policy: FAZ, LF 
  CFSP: 
SZ, LF 
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Apparently, the extent of transnational debate as well as the involvement of societal 
actors' views depends on the policy area and on the newspaper. Not unexpectedly, the debate on 
the CFSP is strongly transnational, but does not involve many societal actors. EMU is mainly 
nationally discussed in the British newspapers. The debate includes the views of a high number 
of societal participants, including ones from abroad. In the other newspapers, the debate of 
societal actors' views tends to be less important. However, the presence of views from abroad is 
stronger. Only Süddeutsche Zeitung discusses EMU mainly addressing the German national 
government's views, severely criticising them for giving up the Deutsche Mark. The findings 
with respect to Social Policy are most surprising. The French and German left-liberal Le Monde 
and  Süddeutsche  Zeitung  find  themselves  close  to  Habermas'  favourite  corner:  Broad 
participation and strong transnational discussion. Given that the debate mainly concerns the 
stance of the British government, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph are more nationally 
oriented, though taking foreign views into account. On this issue, the conservative Le Figaro 
and  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  are  closer  to  Habermas'  nightmare:  Social  Policy  is 
discussed in national terms and without taking into account societal actors. 
Nevertheless, Habermas would also not be pleased finding that part of the transnational 
references in The Daily Telegraph do not conform to the standards of enlightened discourse, but 
are  blunt  accusations,  playing  on  prejudice. This fact  points  to  a limitation  of  this  type  of 
systematic quantifying analysis and the implicit assumption that transnational interaction is per 
se positive, benign and conducive to European democracy. Taking into account the views of the 
European partners does not always mean engaging in real debate. Often, the European "other" is 
employed as an argument (Schriewer et al. 1999: 167f.), rather than discussed in its own right, 
taking into account their actual views, rather than a stereotype (cf. Meyer forthcoming 2008). 
All in  all,  we  can  conclude:  At  Maastricht,  not  only  were  roughly  the  same  issues 
discussed,  but  there  is  also  evidence  of  transnational  interaction  and  communication. 
Occasionally, media directly discuss each others' views, explicitly quoting each other. There are 
a number of foreign contributions that bring about a transfer of opinions. Moreover, it emerges 
from the analysis of transnational references that commentators routinely and widely discuss the 
views of actors from across national borders. The extent of this transnational debate however 
differs between countries and newspapers. Particularly the British newspapers are more national 
in  focus  than  the  German  ones,  with  the  French  newspapers  taking  an  intermediate  role. 
Moreover, transnational communication on Europe has many blind spots and asymmetries – the 
opinions of small countries as much as non-governmental actors.  
The extent to which non-governmental actors appear is contingent on the issue. In the 
debate  on  socio-economic  issues  such  as  Social  Policy  and  to  some  extent  also  on  EMU, 
societal actors, even actors from transnational civil society, appear more frequently. Conflict 
seems  to  stimulate  commentators  to  take  into  account  views  from  other  countries.  The 
controversial British debate on Social Policy was observed elsewhere. It was considered highly 
relevant, because the British views impacted on the negotiations of policies in the multi-level 
polity. The more EU affairs have touched on socio-economic issues and provoked conflict, the 
more participatory and the more transnational the debate in the European public sphere has 
become (cf. also Meyer 2007a). Moreover, the conceivable trade-off between high-participation 
national debates and transnational involvement is less pronounced than expected. This means 
that the European public sphere could become more transnational and more participatory at the 
same time – approaching Habermas' Dream? 
Still, there is no determinism. This study also finds that the treatment of the issues 
strongly depends on the newspaper and national editorial cultures (Preston and Horgan 2006). 
Journalists and their editors may just as well tend to "domesticate" an EU issue – e.g. Social 
Policy –, as they could open it up as a European question. 
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